{"id":9148,"date":"2026-10-21T13:53:16","date_gmt":"2026-10-21T13:53:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/powershiftafrica.org\/?post_type=publication&p=9148"},"modified":"2026-10-21T13:54:29","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T13:54:29","slug":"3-adaptation-concepts-for-the-transition","status":"publish","type":"publication","link":"https:\/\/powershiftafrica.org\/fr\/publication\/a-just-transition-for-adaptation-a-framework-and-vision-for-africa\/3-adaptation-concepts-for-the-transition\/","title":{"rendered":"3. Adaptation concepts for the transition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Adaptation is already a key component of long-term global responses to protect people, livelihoods, and ecosystems from climate change. Adaption should carry increasing political and practical significance, as climate impacts intensify and the 1.5\u00b0C limit is more likely to be exceeded. The interrelated concepts of vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience shape how climate risks are understood and addressed, and they are at the core of global adaptation policy and processes. They are distinct concepts, but they have a complex interrelationship. Put simply, vulnerability is the degree to which systems are susceptible to harm and unable to cope with or adapt to climate stress. Adaptation acts as the bridge and process to assess vulnerability and take action to reduce vulnerability to build long-term climate resilience.[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global climate governance widely references the IPCC and UNFCCC definitions of the three concepts. However, how the concepts are understood and framed has evolved considerably and remains dynamic and contested across policy and academic debate.[2]<\/sup><\/a> Understanding how relevant parties define and interpret the concepts is critical, as definitions can shape who is recognised and who receives support \u2013 when and how. Exploring these concepts and their framings is no mere academic exercise; it \u2018influences the questions asked, the knowledge produced, the policies and responses \u2026 prioritized and the justice outcomes of adaptation actions.\u2019[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How adaptation, vulnerability, and resilience are conceptualised directly affects how adaptation initiatives are designed and whether they advance or undermine justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.1. Vulnerability<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Vulnerability is \u2018the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.\u2019 It includes elements such as \u2018sensitivity or susceptibility to harm\u2019 and the \u2018lack of capacity to cope and adapt,\u2019 according to the IPCC.[4]<\/sup><\/a> Early definitions emphasised measurable negative outcomes of physical exposure to hazards or climate impacts, but the IPCC paradigm evolved to include bottom-up, social, and contextual approaches.[5]<\/sup><\/a> These approaches recognise what causes vulnerability and that these aspects are embedded within and informed by diverse social, political, economic, and environmental contexts or forces.[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, many studies continue to frame vulnerability as narrowly climate-centred. Eriksen and others critiqued such framings for obscuring the socio-economic and political drivers that perpetuate risk and vulnerability, as well as the socio-environmental processes that enable adaptive capacity and resilience.[7]<\/sup><\/a> Studies have also highlighted that fixation on vulnerable groups can depict them as powerless rather than recognising their inherent agency, obscure how actors or institutions create and sustain vulnerability, and entrench top-down, external solutions that sustain capitalist and colonial structures.[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A broader understanding emphasises that covert power relations and disparities in knowledge, voice, and resources shape vulnerability, and that wider political economy drivers \u2013 such as colonial legacies, debt burdens, inequitable trade, finance regimes, and extractive industries \u2013 embed these disparities.[9]<\/sup><\/a> Therefore, a thorough understanding of vulnerability, informed by historical, social, economic, and political drivers, is a prerequisite for assessing justice in climate responses.[10]<\/sup><\/a> Different framings of vulnerability lead to very different adaptation policy responses. For example, an overly technical view might prompt drought-resistant crop technologies, treating people as passive, while a broader framing that highlights structural drivers could prioritise farmers\u2019 land and seed rights, alongside co-ownership of new technologies. The transformation embedded in justice principles becomes possible within this framing.[11]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this report, we understand vulnerability as differentiated, relational, and structurally produced, rather than inherent to identities or communities. Alongside physical exposure, it arises from unequal historical, social, political, and economic conditions that shape exposure, adaptive capacity, access to resources, and decision making. The report, therefore, recognises that vulnerable groups include smallholder farmers (many of whom are women), pastoralists, fisherfolk, women and girls, Indigenous Peoples, youth, informal workers, persons with disabilities, LGBTQ+ persons, low-income households, persons without work or income, displaced populations, and communities dependent on climate-sensitive livelihoods and ecosystems.<\/a>[1]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.2. Adaptation<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Adaptation, in biology, originally referred to \u2018the process by which an organism or species becomes suited to its environment.\u2019 The term entered the climate discourse in the 1990s after the UNFCCC and IPCC were established and as climate change gained global recognition.[12]<\/sup><\/a> Early attention to adaptation in UNFCCC and IPCC reports progressed slowly, overshadowed by a dominant focus on mitigation and global GHG emissions.[13]<\/sup><\/a> With this historical background, adaptation has since received a more precise definition and attention within the climate regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notably, the IPCC indicates that adaptation in human systems is \u2018the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.\u2019[14]<\/sup><\/a> In natural systems, it is the \u2018process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects.\u2019[15]<\/sup><\/a> The IPCC definition is widely referenced, yet it represents a starting point and not necessarily an endpoint, as this definition continues to evolve in literature and policy debate in contrasting ways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perceptions of adaptation as a \u2018tame\u2019 technical or non-political challenge to be addressed primarily through technological or infrastructural fixes are perhaps the most contested understandings.[16]<\/sup><\/a> This type of view overlooks how critical factors such as power dynamics, governance, rights-based approaches, socio-economic contexts shape vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacities, which ultimately influence how adaptation is perceived and implemented.[17]<\/sup><\/a> Views of adaptation as either defensive or proactive also exist. A defensive response happens during or after climate shocks, such as floods or hurricanes, while proactive adaptation is anticipatory, before a risk turns into a hazard. However, Pelling concedes that there is fuzziness and a nuanced interplay between the two, whereby the decision to adapt can be both a reaction to the experience of previous extreme weather events and proactive anticipation of future risk.[18]<\/sup><\/a> Therefore, depending on the socio-political, and economic context, adaptation can take multiple forms: short- or long-term, local to global, incremental or transformative, and either reactive and retrospective or proactive and anticipatory.[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another view is that adaptation is inherently a governance, equity, and justice issue, wherein it is considered a deeply socio-political process shaped by power, knowledge, and institutional dynamics, influencing how societies navigate multiple social and environmental changes.[20]<\/sup><\/a> This framing highlights the need to address what drives vulnerabilities such as structural inequalities, historical injustices, unequal access to resources, opportunities, and decision-making power.[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Framing adaptation is therefore not impartial. Certain interests are advanced while others are undermined or sidelined, power dynamics are reinforced or contested, and certain ideas or actors are included or excluded. Adaptation is \u2018easily framed wrongly, incompletely, or not at all\u2019 in key policy frameworks, so it is critical to interrogate dominant adaptation narratives and concepts to ensure that adaptation policies reflect diverse perspectives and lived experiences, and that they promote equitable climate action.[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Failure to critically interrogate how adaptation is framed and implemented, especially equity and justice considerations, can lead to maladaptation. This occurs when adaptation actions backfire and unintentionally increase vulnerability, undermining the long-term social and ecological resilience they seek to address, or shifting risks to other groups or locations.[23]<\/sup><\/a> Poorly designed or executed adaptation measures can also be unequally distributed, adversely affecting or eroding certain groups\u2019 or areas\u2019 resilience.[24]<\/sup><\/a> Financial, social, technical, legal, and governance barriers can trigger maladaptation, especially when adaptation actions rely on overly technocratic planning and exclusive governance, and they fail to integrate social equity, power, and justice considerations.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Research increasingly highlights maladaptation as a complex and contested phenomenon. This exists along a continuum of success to failure, shaped by technical shortcomings and political choices and assessment decisions regarding whose interests, knowledge, evaluation criteria, and priorities are recognised in adaptation decision making and implementation. From this perspective, adaptation can become maladaptive when existing power imbalances, exclusionary decision-making processes, and unequal resource allocations reinforce or redistribute vulnerability, benefitting some groups while increasing risk for others.[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this research, we recognise adaptation as a deeply political and contested issue and adopt the widely referenced IPCC definition of adaptation as a starting point yet deliberately situate it within a broader justice lens. We focus on governance, justice, politics, and power relations to illuminate how adaptation pathways can be shaped in ways that address structural vulnerabilities and support more transformative, climate-resilient futures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.2.1. Adaptation approaches: From adjustment to transformation<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

According to the UNFCCC and IPCC, adaptation actions are often discussed along a spectrum, from incremental to locally led and transformational responses, which differ in scope, scale, intent, effectiveness, and the degree to which livelihoods are altered (see Figure 1). Differing adaptation approaches can provide benefit or harm depending on the context, barriers, and type of climate risks faced. Recognising these distinctions is critical for ensuring that adaptation policies and practices are just and equitable, and not only effective, in addressing climate risks. This is especially relevant in Africa, where structural inequities, such as historical marginalisation, reliance on raw material exports, and unequal land tenure systems amplify climate vulnerability (see section 4.1 and chapter 6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Figure<\/strong><\/a> 1<\/strong>. Continuum of adaptation responses<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: Dampha, Yassin, and Hamadalla<\/strong>27<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Incremental adaptation<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Incremental adaptation refers to small-scale, gradual adjustments made within existing systems, practices, and structures. Existing systems are preserved, rather than changed, by adjusting livelihood features or practices, established structures or norms, and relying on techno-fixes to address climate risks.<\/a>[27]<\/sup><\/a> It often comes as short-term reactive responses or \u2018doing slightly more than what is already being done.\u2019[28]<\/sup><\/a> (See Table 1 below for more detail.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A core criticism of incremental adaptation, supported by growing scientific evidence, is that small-scale fixes to systems are insufficient for meeting \u2018the pace or scale of climate disruption.\u2019[29]<\/sup><\/a> Such fixes also cannot address the root causes of vulnerability. Despite these shortcomings, from a Global South perspective, incremental adaptation is a vital adaptation approach and often a critical first step for climate-vulnerable countries to prepare for and build more transformative (discussed below) adaptive capacity.[30]<\/sup><\/a> In fact, it can be a preferred approach among climate-vulnerable communities, especially those in LDCs, because these countries can adjust their livelihoods and traditions, rather than completely abandon or change them.[31]<\/sup><\/a> From a justice perspective, incremental adaptation still should be paired with locally led and transformational responses to adequately address structural inequalities and vulnerabilities in the African context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Locally led adaptation<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Locally led adaptation (LLA) approaches are instrumental for avoiding maladaptive outcomes. They shift power and control from non-local actors to local ones for defining and leading adaptation processes and actions. The core of locally led adaptation (LLA) comprises four key elements: local people, institutions, and knowledge systems drive decision making and implementation; local control is exercised over funds and resources; local realities and framings inform evaluations of success; and local inequities and exclusion dynamics are considered.<\/a>[32]<\/sup><\/a> The Principles for Locally Led Adaptation, developed through a multi-stakeholder consultation process and launched at the 2021 Climate Adaptation Summit, have emerged as the most widely endorsed framework for such adaptation. Its eight principles emphasise devolved decision making; addressing structural inequalities, especially for women, youth, persons with disabilities, displaced people, Indigenous Peoples, and marginalised groups; promoting accessible and predictable finance; investing in local capabilities; integrating ILK; encouraging adaptive learning and flexibility; fostering transparency and accountability; and facilitating collaboration across actors and scales.[33]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Figure 2 shows a continuum of locally led responses, ranging from projects offering little to no agency (top) to those with complete agency (bottom). The arrow is deliberately downward, showing a shift away from top-down business-as-usual approaches toward LLA.[34]<\/sup><\/a> Like other adaptation approaches, LLA can result in maladaptive outcomes if not implemented carefully.  For example, inequities and injustices can occur at the local level because of micropolitics \u2013 such as elite capture, patronage networks, and agenda-setting power \u2013 while who is defined as local, who controls resources, and who tracks success are potential problems. Therefore, recognition of layers and complexities in local and community framings is critical because local communities are not necessarily homogenous groups.[35]<\/sup><\/a> Essentially, LLA is positioned as a more transformative approach that can facilitate benefits that non-local approaches cannot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, recognition that \u2018locally led\u2019 does not imply a spatial limitation to climate adaptation initiatives is imperative. For example, successfully implemented LLA initiatives in a local area, or even within a specific country, can enter the international policy arena as globally relevant and repeatable adaptation initiatives.[36]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Figure<\/strong><\/a> 2<\/strong>. Locally led adaptation engagement exists along a continuum<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source:  In Rahman et al.<\/strong>32<\/sup><\/strong><\/strong>
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Transformational adaptation<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Transformational adaptation (TA) entails fundamental shifts in systems, structures, values, and power relations. TA is typically framed as tackling the root causes of climate vulnerability by driving large-scale systemic shifts in core aspects of social, ecological, political, and economic systems to proactively prepare for climate impacts and build long-term resilience.[37]<\/sup><\/a> It does so by challenging dominant narratives on development, security, and risk; reshaping norms, values, policies, and governance; and driving reforms to decision-making and socio-political structures.[38]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite its overall promise, TA\u2019s political implications and implementation practicalities have made it a source of contention in the UNFCCC adaptation negotiations, especially among developing countries. The concerns stem from existing power asymmetries underpinning global climate governance, legacies of colonial exploitation, donor conditionalities, an unjust global financial architecture, developed countries\u2019 failure to deliver on means of implementation support to developing countries, and skewed development patterns.[39]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Concerns around TA are fourfold. First, its current conceptualisation within UNFCCC adaptation negotiations is ambiguous, Western-centric, and fails to reflect the realities of climate-vulnerable regions that need a spectrum of adaptation approaches \u2013 from incremental to transformational \u2013 aligned with their climate risks and development contexts. The notion of TA only being large-scale is also problematic in climate-vulnerable countries. In practice, transformational change can occur across multiple scales \u2013 from personal, household, and micro to meso or macro levels \u2013 making a solely large-scale framing limiting and unrealistic in climate-vulnerable contexts.[40]<\/sup><\/a> Second, the high costs and investments needed to reform infrastructure, governance, and economic systems make implementing TA impractical among climate-vulnerable countries. Third, TA is unrealistic given developing countries\u2019 needs for finance, capacity building, and technology support, and developed countries\u2019 persistent failure to provide these. It is inherently unjust to expect climate-vulnerable countries, which contributed least to the climate crisis, to \u2018overhaul entire sectors, protect vulnerable communities and safeguard ecosystems \u2026 while grappling with debt, economic precarity and historical disadvantage.\u2019[41]<\/sup><\/a> The risk of developed countries using TA as a conditionality to dictate acceptable forms of adaptation for finance, and thereby deflect their financial obligations under the UNFCCC, is another concern.[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, TA is also seen as critical for Africa, especially among climate scientists, and is already unfolding in diverse ways. Research drawing on African learning labs with local municipalities, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and research institutions identified six guiding principles: changes in thinking and doing, inclusivity, challenging power imbalances, delivering tangible benefits, responsiveness and flexibility, and embracing complex systems thinking.[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Africa, TA can only be fit for purpose if it is reimagined to address historical injustices, an unequal global financial system, the unmet obligations of developed countries, and diversity at the scale at which it occurs (personal, household, micro, meso, and macro levels).[44]<\/sup><\/a> This paradigm requires anchoring TA in equitable means of implementation support and aligning it with just transition principles, especially social protection, labour rights, and the justice dimensions discussed in chapter 5. It also demands reframing TA to recognise a flexible continuum of adaptation responses oriented toward transformation, with locally led adaptation at its core.[45]<\/sup><\/a> Contextually grounded TA offers a pathway for decolonising adaptation, empowering local communities and actors, and building systems that are just and inclusive, and not only resilient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table<\/strong><\/a> 1<\/strong>. Examples of adaptation approaches<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Adaptation approach<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>Examples<\/strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
Incremental<\/strong><\/td>Small alterations to livelihoods, such as adopting crop new species and varieties or technocratic solutions to reduce flood risk, such as building seawalls, flood barriers, improved drainage systems, and infrastructure projects. Initiatives do not usually address root causes of vulnerability or power dynamics.[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/td><\/tr>
Locally led<\/strong><\/td>LLA shifts power to local stakeholders to define, prioritise, design, monitor, and evaluate adaptation, resulting in more effective interventions. For example, \u2018whole-of-island\u2019 or local ecosystem approaches, embedding adaptation in local institutions, such as vocational colleges, or working with specific population groups, such as women or religious minorities.[47]<\/sup><\/a><\/td><\/tr>
Transformational<\/strong><\/td>Community-led land tenure reform strengthens land rights and Indigenous customs, boosting communities\u2019 long-term adaptation by altering who owns and controls natural resources and enabling them to protect and manage their land for resilience.[48]<\/sup><\/a><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

3.3. Resilience<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Like adaptation, resilience was not originally developed in a climate policy context. It emerged from ecology as a description of how ecosystems absorb disturbances and \u2018bounce back.\u2019[49]<\/sup><\/a> Resilience now has been adopted across disciplines, including climate discourse, and applied to social, economic, and governance systems.[50]<\/sup><\/a> Despite its various applications, the resilience concept remains contested, especially regarding its ambiguity, technocratic application, and tendency to overlook how social and political dynamics shape it.[51]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three distinct interpretations and framings permeate climate resilience literature. The first is conservative and technocratic, and it informs many climate policy contexts. Here, resilience is the ability of a community or system to \u2018bounce back\u2019 to a previous or stable state after a climate shock. This conservative view resists systemic change, emphasising risk management and maintaining system functionality, often through technical or infrastructural fixes. The view is useful in some contexts, but is critiqued as \u2018backward-looking,\u2019 entrenching systems and vulnerabilities that climate shocks expose and being resistant to innovation or shifts toward alternative development pathways.[52]<\/sup><\/a> For some, bouncing back often means simply returning to a state of vulnerability.[53]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, as with adaptation, resilience is inherently contested and political, rather than a neutral or apolitical concept. For example, researchers highlight the need to ask: resilience of what to what, for whom (power and politics of resource distribution), and to what end (outcome or purpose)?[54]<\/sup><\/a> The questions expose underlying power relations, such as who sets resilience goals, who benefits, and who bears the risks. These issues underscore the need to critically examine the internal, social dynamics influencing resilience.[55]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A third interpretation is a transformative vision of resilience, framing it as a dynamic and forward-looking process regarding the capacity to change in the face of crisis, rather than return to \u2018normal.\u2019 Transformative resilience recognises the need for structural change to shift away from systems that reproduce risk and vulnerability, emphasising learning and flexibility, and addressing root causes such as inequality, underdevelopment, and governance failures.[56]<\/sup><\/a> People, power, and social change are crucial for shaping and building long-term resilience, aligning with the growing consensus that genuine climate resilience requires deep, systemic shifts, and not only incremental adjustments.[57]<\/sup><\/a> The IPCC\u2019s forward-looking and nuanced definition reflects this evolution of views: \u2018the capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganising in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation.\u2019[58]<\/sup><\/a> This definition signals a shift from stability to adaptability and from resisting change to embracing it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>, p. 43.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> See, for example, Greg Bankoff, \u201cRemaking the world in our own image: vulnerability, resilience and adaptation as historical discourses\u201d, Disasters<\/em>, vol. 43, No. 2 (April 2019); Greg Oulahen and others, \u201cPublic perceptions of resilience and vulnerability concepts for adaptation\u201d, The Professional Geographer<\/em>, vol. 76, No. 1 (January 2024); Jiang Lanlan and others, \u201cVulnerability and resilience in the context of natural hazards: a critical conceptual analysis\u201d, Environment, Development and Sustainability<\/em>, vol. 26, No. 8 (June 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> Art Dewulf, \u201cContrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation\u201d, WIREs Climate Change<\/em>, vol. 4, No. 4 (July 2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> Dewulf, \u201cContrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Siri H. Eriksen, Andrea J. Nightingale and Hallie Eakin, \u201cReframing adaptation: the political nature of climate change adaptation\u201d, Global Environmental Change<\/em>, vol. 35, (November 2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Jon Barnett, \u201cGlobal environmental change II: political economies of vulnerability to climate change\u201d, Progress in Human Geography<\/em>, vol. 44, No. 6 (December 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> Terry Cannon and Detlef M\u00fcller-Mahn, \u201cVulnerability, resilience and development discourses in context of climate change\u201d, Natural Hazards<\/em>, vol. 55, No. 3 (December 2010); Mark Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation<\/em> (New York, Routledge, 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Definition from the Concise Oxford Dictionary<\/em> (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998). See also, Ben Orlove, \u201cThe concept of adaptation\u201d, Annual Review of Environment and Resources<\/em>, vol. 47 (October 2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> Orlove, \u201cThe concept of adaptation\u201d; Mikael Granberg and Leigh Glover, \u201cUnderstanding climate change adaptation as politics: development and implications for the practice and scholarship of adaptation\u201d, Local Environment<\/em>, (March 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>, p. 134.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>; Andrea Joslyn Nightingale and others, \u201cBeyond technical fixes: climate solutions and the great derangement\u201d, Climate and Development<\/em>, vol. 12, No. 4 (April 2020); Granberg and Glover, \u201cUnderstanding climate change adaptation as politics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>; Granberg and Glover, \u201cUnderstanding climate change adaptation as politics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/sup><\/a> Granberg and Glover, \u201cUnderstanding climate change adaptation as politics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Dewulf, \u201cContrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation\u201d; Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin, \u201cReframing adaptation\u201d; Granberg and Glover, \u201cUnderstanding climate change adaptation as politics\u201d; S.E. Walker and others, \u201cDefining and conceptualizing equity and justice in climate adaptation\u201d, Global Environmental Change<\/em>, vol. 87 (July 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Dewulf, \u201cContrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation\u201d; Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin, \u201cReframing adaptation\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> Dewulf, \u201cContrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation\u201d, p. 321.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>; Emmanuel Attoh and others, \u201cMaladaptation in Africa: causes, implications and prevention\u201d, AGNES Policy Brief<\/em>, No. 13 (Nairobi, Africa Group of Negotiators Experts Support, 2023); Philip Tetteh Quarshie and others, \u201cWhy \u2018formal\u2019 climate adaptation strategies fail in Sub-Saharan Africa: ignoring adapters\u2019 agency in the case of smallholding agriculture farming practices in Bono East Region of Ghana\u201d, Climate Resilience and Sustainability<\/em>, vol. 2, No. 4 (November 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a> Sirkku Juhola and others, \u201cConnecting climate justice and adaptation planning: an adaptation justice index\u201d, Environmental Science & Policy<\/em>, vol. 136 (October 2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Leigh Glover and Mikael Granberg, \u201cThe politics of maladaptation\u201d, Climate<\/em>, vol. 9, No. 5 (April 2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Nfamara K. Dampha, Lina Yassin and Hana Hamadalla, \u201cReframing transformational adaptation in the UNFCCC: lessons and pathways\u201d, briefing paper (London, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2025). Available at https:\/\/www.iied.org\/sites\/default\/files\/pdfs\/2025-05\/22628iied.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>; Robert W. Kates, William R. Travis and Thomas J. Wilbanks, \u201cTransformational adaptation when incremental adaptations to climate change are insufficient\u201d, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences<\/em>, vol. 109, No. 19 (May 2012), pp. 7156.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> Dampha, Yassin and Hamadalla, \u201cReframing transformational adaptation in the UNFCCC\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[30]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[32]<\/sup><\/a> M. Feisal Rahman and others, \u201cLocally led adaptation: promise, pitfalls, and possibilities\u201d, Ambio<\/em>, vol. 52, No. 10 (October 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[33]<\/sup><\/a> Marek Soanes and others, \u201cPrinciples for locally led adaptation: a call to action\u201d, Issue Paper<\/em> (London, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2021). Available at https:\/\/www.iied.org\/10211iied<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[34]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[35]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[36]<\/sup><\/a> Katharine Vincent, \u201cDevelopment geography II: community-based adaptation and locally-led adaptation\u201d, Progress in Human Geography<\/em>, vol. 47, No. 4 (August 2023), p. 605.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[37]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Transformational Adaptation Report: Defining and understanding transformational adaptation at different spatial scales and sectors, and assessing progress in planning and implementing transformational adaptation approaches at the global level<\/em> (Bonn, 2024). Available at https:\/\/unfccc.int\/sites\/default\/files\/resource\/tp2024_08.pdf<\/a>; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[38]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Transformational Adaptation Report<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[39]<\/sup><\/a> Under Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries are responsible for providing means of implementation (MOI) support to developing countries in implementing mitigation and adaptation actions. MOI refers to finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[40]<\/sup><\/a> Dampha, Yassin and Hamadalla, \u201cReframing transformational adaptation in the UNFCCC\u201d, p. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[41]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[42]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[43]<\/sup><\/a> Lorena Pasquini and others, \u201cPathways to transformative adaptation in southern African cities: a criteria-based assessment in Harare and Durban\u201d, Environmental Science & Policy<\/em>, vol. 158 (August 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[44]<\/sup><\/a> Dampha, Yassin and Hamadalla, \u201cReframing transformational adaptation in the UNFCCC\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[45]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[46]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>; Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[47]<\/sup><\/a> Rahman and others, \u201cLocally led adaptation\u201d; Rachel Clissold and Karen E. McNamara, \u201cExploring local perspectives on the performance of a community-based adaptation project on Aniwa, Vanuatu\u201d, Climate and Development<\/em>, vol. 12, No. 5 (May 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[48]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Transformational Adaptation Report<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[49]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[50]<\/sup><\/a> Katrina Brown, \u201cGlobal environmental change I: a social turn for resilience?\u201d, Progress in Human Geography<\/em>, vol. 38, No. 1 (February 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[51]<\/sup><\/a> Karin de Bruijn and others, \u201cResilience in practice: five principles to enable societies to cope with extreme weather events\u201d, Environmental Science & Policy<\/em>, vol. 70 (April 2017); Simin Davoudi and others, \u201cResilience: a bridging concept or a dead end?\u201d, Planning Theory & Practice<\/em>, vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2012).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[52]<\/sup><\/a> Brown, \u201cGlobal environmental change I\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[53]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[54]<\/sup><\/a> Brown, \u201cGlobal environmental change I\u201d; Davoudi and others, \u201cResilience\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[55]<\/sup><\/a> Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[56]<\/sup><\/a> Brian Walker and others, \u201cA handful of heuristics and some propositions for understanding resilience in social-ecological systems\u201d, Ecology and Society<\/em>, vol. 11, No. 1 (June 2006); Carl Folke and others, \u201cResilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability\u201d, Ecology and Society<\/em>, vol. 15, No. 4 (December 2010).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[57]<\/sup><\/a> Brown, \u201cGlobal environmental change I\u201d; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Transformational Adaptation Report<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[58]<\/sup><\/a> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a>Note for design: Please highlight this point.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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