ASSESSING COP26 OUTCOMES ON THE BASIS OF THE FIVE-POINT PLAN FOR SOLIDARITY, FAIRNESS AND PROSPERITY

MAY 2022
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews the outcomes of the 26th session of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), held in Glasgow in November 2021, against the priorities of developing countries.

It assesses areas where there was some progress, and highlights those where there was little. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for the period to COP27 and beyond – recommendations aiming to rebalance the Glasgow outcomes, and thereby the overall shape of the global climate regime, towards the needs of developing countries.

COP26 outcomes fell short of developing countries’ expectations. The negotiated outcomes (collectively called the Glasgow Climate Pact) featured a mitigation-oriented narrative, largely focused on the myth of “net zero by 2050” pledges coupled with a mitigation-focused global target, ratchet and review mechanism. Related decisions included agreement on common timeframes for NDCs, and rules for carbon markets under Article 6. While negotiated decisions constitute a key pillar of COP26’s outcomes, the other main pillar is the number of non-negotiated plurilateral voluntary initiatives that were announced by various sets of Parties and other stakeholders (including the business sector).

Related decisions included agreement on common timeframes for NDCs, and rules for carbon markets under Article 6. While negotiated decisions constitute a key pillar of COP26’s outcomes, the other main pillar is the number of non-negotiated plurilateral voluntary initiatives that were announced by various sets of Parties and other stakeholders (including the business sector).

Compared with this range of actions on mitigation, there was no commensurate advance in terms of adaptation, loss and damage and finance, or technology transfer. All of these are crucial for enabling...
developing countries to take stronger climate action while at the same time meeting their sustainable development and poverty eradication priorities.

A review of the various COP26 negotiated decisions show that for the most part, those relating to adaptation, technology transfer, and loss and damage merely put in place new negotiating processes that will take place over the next few years, while decisions relating to mitigation were more immediately actionable.

There were some gains for developing countries at Glasgow. These include a new process for defining the Global Goal on Adaptation, institutionalising the functions of the Santiago Network on loss and damage, continuing discussions on long term finance, setting out a process for defining the new collective goal on finance post-2025, and ensuring the operationalising of flexibilities in the enhanced transparency framework.

However, COP26 has laid the groundwork for creation of a multilateral legal regime for climate action that is imbalanced. The deal is overly focused on mitigation and therefore subject to Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), and giving less policy focus, attention, and action on the issues that are of greater priority to developing countries – adaptation, loss and damage, response measures, and the means of implementation (finance and technology).

By COP27, concrete and actionable steps, in response to the latest science, must be agreed upon and taken so that developing countries will be better supported in adaptation and loss and damage measures and achieving their sustainable development and poverty eradication priorities. There is a list of recommendations elaborated in full at the end of this analysis but as a summary, they include:

- COP27 should be seen as the “Adaptation COP”, working towards a final decision on the global goal at COP28
- The work programme on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance must see substantial acceleration
- COP27 should be specific about the balance between grants and other concessional forms of finance (such as special drawing rights and debt cancellation), versus loans
- Stakeholders and institutions should contribute to the work of the Standing Committee on Finance on definitions of climate finance that would considered at COP27, to aid clarity
- Developed countries must scale up finance delivery in the period 2021-2025 to at least US$ 100bn per year; with half of the share supporting vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change
- COP27 should take a decision on institutional arrangements and financing for the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage, with funding commitments for its operation
- There should be significant progress during 2022 (including at COP27) on the Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage, advancing towards the goal of an international loss and damage finance facility
- COP27 should confirm that the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) is under joint oversight of the COP and the CMA
- Mitigation-related outcomes under the Glasgow Pact should be implemented in a manner that reflects principles such as equity and common but differentiated responsibility, with provision of scaled up financial support to support economic diversification and just energy transitions in developing countries.
I. THE BIG PICTURE CONTEXT OF COP26 OUTCOMES

Several months since the close of the 26th session of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP26), various analyses and assessments have been made of the outcomes. These have ranged from highly optimistic, such as those put forward by the host government, to highly critical — and various shades in between.¹

To fully understand the outcomes of COP26 and their impact on the continued development of the multilateral regime as the means of global cooperation on climate change, and on national actions to combat climate change, a balanced view of the outcomes is needed.

COP26 was not simply about negotiating the contents of the Glasgow Climate Pact and the other formal decisions² taken during that conference. The other dimension was the number of non-negotiated plurilateral voluntary initiatives announced by various sets of Parties and other stakeholders (including the business sector).³

In the run-up to COP26 and during the summit, developing countries had put forward their priorities in terms of negotiated outcomes.⁴ These included, inter alia:

- fulfillment of the US$ 100 billion per year climate finance goal by developed countries through concrete actions to fill the deficit and to scale up such provision of climate finance
- concrete actions with respect to the Global Goal on Adaptation referred to in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement
- concrete actions on enhancing and institutionalizing mechanisms for addressing loss and damage and its financing
  - concrete actions to scale up mitigation ambition, particularly from developed countries, to fulfil the commitment to ‘make efforts’ to meet the 1.5°C temperature goal set out in Art. 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement
  - agreement on the rules for voluntary cooperation (including with respect to carbon trading) under Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement, in a manner that reflected developing countries’ concerns with respect to ensuring predictable financing for adaptation from carbon trading
  - finalization of the rules on the reporting of national climate actions in a manner that reflected flexibility for developing countries.

The negotiations before and during COP26 were complicated by the health safety measures put in place due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the summit-level meeting attended by many world leaders during the first few days of the conference. Negotiating timelines were squeezed, meaning that many key issues such as adaptation, finance, and loss and damage could not be finalized during the second week among the technical negotiators and had to go into the second week to be finalized at ministerial level.

Despite the best efforts of developing countries to move their priority issues forward towards implementation, COP26 fell short of their hopes. The negotiated outcomes showed a mitigation-oriented narrative, albeit focused on the chimera of “net zero by 2050” pledges coupled with the setting up a mitigation-focused global target, ratchet and review mechanism.
There was, however, no commensurate advance in terms of concrete actions on adaptation support, loss and damage support and finance, or technology transfer, all of which are crucial if developing countries are to strengthen climate action while at the same time meeting their sustainable development and poverty eradication priorities.

For the most part, the decisions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, and loss and damage merely put in place new negotiating processes that will take place over the next few years; while decisions relating to mitigation were more immediately actionable.

There were also decisions that put the finishing touches to the implementation modalities of the Paris Agreement, such as on NDC timeframes, national climate action reporting under the enhanced transparency framework, and on voluntary cooperation arrangements (including for carbon emissions reductions trading) under Article 6.

The new global mitigation target of 45% below 2010 levels by 2030, including the language referring to the phasedown of unabated coal and the phaseout of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, coupled with the near-term ratchet and review mechanism and the carbon trading rules finalized at Glasgow, does not differentiate between developed and developing countries nor reflect the historical responsibility of today’s developed countries for their overuse of the global atmospheric carbon space since the dawn of the pre-industrial era.

In doing so, by highlighting vague pledges of 2050 net zero targets (without any corresponding near-term rapid and more ambitious emission reduction commitments) coupled with what will likely be a reliance on the use of carbon trading mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries are continuing to shrug off their historical responsibility. They have laid the foundations for
Assessing COP26 Outcomes on the basis of the Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity

COP26 has laid the groundwork for creation of a multilateral legal regime for climate action that is imbalanced.

a “great escape” from undertaking the rapid and ambitious emissions reductions that they are obliged to make under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and are increasingly shifting that obligation to developing countries. This is contrary to equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) that are at the heart of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.

There were some gains for developing countries at Glasgow, largely in the face of much opposition by developed countries. These include having a new process for defining the Global Goal on Adaptation, institutionalising the functions of the Santiago Network on loss and damage, continuing discussions on long term finance till 2027, setting out a process for defining the new collective goal on finance post-2025, ensuring the operationalising of flexibilities in the enhanced transparency framework, and so on.

The mitigation-focused negotiated outcomes of COP26 are also reflected in the non-negotiated outcomes – i.e. in the variety of voluntary plurilateral announcements and pledges made during the conference. For example, of the 34 voluntary announcements and pledges made at COP26, 23 concern mitigation, including 15 relating to mitigation efforts in transportation, energy, technology, product standards, aviation and shipping, and eight in relation to forests and agriculture-oriented mitigation. Additionally, six concern climate finance, of which three relate to private sector financing for mitigation. By contrast there was only one focusing on each of adaptation, health, just transition, and education – and none on loss and damage.

COP26 has potentially laid the groundwork for the creation of a multilateral legal regime for climate action that is imbalanced in its focus on making mitigation action more quantifiable and therefore subject to Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), and giving less policy focus, attention, and action on the issues that are of greater priority to developing countries – adaptation, loss and damage, response measures, and the means of implementation (finance and technology).

This needs to be challenged and redirected.
The mitigation-focused multilateral climate regime, backed by the mitigation-focused MRV system set up at COP26, looks to be marked by the following:

- **Unambitious mitigation ambition by developed countries, not based on ‘fair shares’** - general pledges of achieving “net zero by 2050” are not matched by developed countries providing real and ambitious mitigation actions within this decade that reflect their fair share of global emission reductions based on their historical responsibility.

- **Reliance on carbon trading** – to meet even their inadequate mitigation targets, developed countries look to the use of carbon trading mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement that would essentially free them from the need to enact real emission reductions domestically, instead purchasing credits from emission reductions in developing countries.

- **Reliance on private sector finance** – a greater reliance by developed countries on private sector financing to support technological shifts relevant to mitigation in developing countries, rather than provision from public sector budgets.

- **Controlling carbon technology unicorns** – a greater focus on a technology-driven approach in developed countries to mitigation, focusing on new and emerging but often speculative technologies such as geoengineering, carbon capture and storage and ‘blue’ hydrogen. This technology-driven approach ties in with a greater reliance on private sector financing for mitigation action, which in turn could lead to a greater level of technology control and dominance by private sector patent and other intellectual property rights holders, thereby exacerbating inequity. Additionally, a technology-driven approach to mitigation assumes and requires access to the raw materials (such as rare earths) needed to produce, for example, batteries for energy storage used in electric vehicles, solar power or wind power installations. This need for raw materials access and control, particularly for raw materials coming from developing countries, would then require extension and maintenance of existing international arrangements and policy approaches such as trade liberalization, investment liberalization and investor protection, intellectual property rights enforcement with respect to technologies, freedom of capital flows, and other measures that tend to create and intensify global inequity in favour of developed countries.

- **Use of unilateral carbon-based climate response measures** – the race to control new and emerging mitigation technologies and thereby secure competitive advantages, and avoid perceived "carbon leakage", are triggering developed countries to consider the imposition of Carbon Border Adjustment Measures (CBAMs) such as an additional import levy against the exports of developing countries. The EU has already taken an in-principle decision, and other developed countries are reportedly considering such measures. Such measures provide very minimal mitigation outcomes but can create substantial barriers to developing countries’ engagement in international trade, which in turn compromises their ability to fund their own climate action as export revenue falls.

Jointly, the negotiated and non-negotiated outcomes of COP26 present a picture of the prevailing political and economic dynamics and interests. They carry within them the potential for making the multilateral climate regime even more a place for broader strategic geopolitical and economic competition rather than strengthened climate change cooperation. Without concerted action to reset and rebalance, these will determine over the next decade at least the direction of travel for the multilateral climate regime. Such a regime will exacerbate existing development inequalities between developed and developing countries, which have already widened in recent years, due to the COVID-19 pandemic falling alongside current impacts of climate change, the lingering effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, and, for many, an emergent debt crisis.

This is the context in which we seek to assess the extent to which COP26’s outcomes deliver against the five-point plan set out in July 2021 for a solidarity-based COP.
II. COP26 OUTCOMES ASSESSED AGAINST THE FIVE-POINT SOLIDARITY, FAIRNESS AND PROSPERITY PLAN

Prior to the start of COP26, African civil society organizations, backed by over 100 vulnerable countries from Africa, the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Climate Vulnerable Forum, issued a call for a “Five-point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity”. The plan laid out five areas in which all governments, especially those of nations that became prosperous through the untrammelled burning of fossil fuels, needed to deliver on their promises before and during COP26:

1. CUTTING EMISSIONS:
   The Five-point Plan observed that despite welcome recent progress, the sum total of climate policies in place across the world was not sufficient to keep global warming within the limits that governments agreed in Paris. It called for urgent acceleration in line with the 1.5-degree goal, with developed countries basing national actions on their fair shares.

2. ADAPTATION:
   With climate impacts increasing, the Plan said that provisions to help the most vulnerable adapt, including through increased financial support, needed to be strengthened, including:
   1. Establishing a clear process to define the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) contained in the Paris Agreement
   2. Commitments from governments to allocating at least 50% of climate finance to adaptation, with regular reviews
   3. Allocate proceeds from market mechanism activities under the Paris Agreement’s Article 6 to the Adaptation Fund

3. LOSS AND DAMAGE:
   The consequences of the developed world’s historical failure to cut their emissions adequately are already resulting in losses and damage for the most vulnerable. The Plan called for responsibilities to be acknowledged and promised measures to be delivered, through:
   1. Confirming that the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism is under joint oversight of the UN climate convention (COP) and Paris Agreement (CMA)
   2. Establishing Loss and Damage as a permanent standalone agenda item under the UNFCCC
   3. Appointing a special COP26 loss and damage envoy to mobilise and enhance political will
   4. Adequate loss and damage financing to be provided
   5. Providing operational technical assistance to developing countries through the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage

4. FINANCE:
   The promises made in Copenhagen in 2009 and again in the Paris Agreement are unequivocal, and the Glasgow Plan called for them to be delivered: at least $100bn per year by 2020 up to 2024, with a clear delivery plan, with at least half going to adaptation, with increased annual sums from 2025. The debt consequences of Covid-19 meant, the Plan said, that action outside the UN climate process was also essential. It called on governments at COP26 to:
   1. Deliver the twice-promised commitment to provide at least $100bn per year by 2020
   2. Commission a synthesis report on delivery of finance to 2020, commit to enhancing transparency and accountability in relation to climate finance, and establish a process to identify and negate problems faced in access
   3. Commit countries providing climate finance, particularly developed countries, to increasing provision of grants rather than loans
   4. Commit, particularly developed countries, to scaling up annual financing in the period 2021-2025, with a minimum of US$ 100bn per year, including through a clear delivery plan for the period
   5. Agree to initiate negotiations on a new, higher global finance goal for 2025 onwards as mandated in the Paris Agreement
   6. Acknowledging the impact of Covid-19 and other factors, pass a resolution calling on Parties to provide additional liquidity to developing countries in forms that include Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and debt relief

5. IMPLEMENTATION:
   After several summits of stalling, the Plan called on governments to finalise rules on transparency, carbon trading and common timeframes for accelerating action, in a way that safeguards development and nature. In particular:
   1. Conclude Article 6 [markets] negotiations in a manner that promotes ambition, safeguards real emission cuts, environmental integrity and provides substantial financial resources to adaptation actions in vulnerable developing countries
   2. Conclude transparency negotiations in a way that reflects reporting flexibility
A woman wades through a submerged field with her son after floods brought by the strong rains that were effective last week in the southeast of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, continue to affect life negatively on August 03, 2020. (Photo by Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
### Table: Five-Point Plan and Relevant COP26 Outcomes

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<th>Five-Point Plan</th>
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<td><strong>1. MITIGATION</strong></td>
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| Setting more ambitious targets across the board in line with the 1.5-degree goal and enact policies to meet them, with developed countries basing national actions on their fair shares | Addressing the inadequacy of the current set of pre-existing or updated mitigation pledges in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) was among the major issues at COP26. Many civil society organizations called for developed countries to show leadership in submitting updated NDCs commensurate to their fair share of the mitigation burden — shares that would reflect in an equitable way developed countries’ individual and collective historical responsibility for more than two thirds of cumulative GHG emissions and their resultant greater economic and technological capacity to undertake more extensive, rapid, and ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions than developing countries. There were some notable mitigation-related negotiated outcomes at COP26. These include:  
- A more direct indication that the long-term temperature goal to aim for under the Paris Agreement is 1.5°C rather than 2°C\(^9\)  
- The establishment of two targets for “rapid, deep and sustained” global emissions reductions linked to the 1.5°C goal — i.e. the reduction of global CO₂ emissions by 45 percent below 2010 levels by 2030, and a further reduction of such global CO₂ emissions to net zero around mid-century, as well as deep reductions in other GHGs\(^10\)  
- Recognition that such emission reductions need to accelerate this decade on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty\(^11\)  
- A call for governments to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems. By measures including rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition\(^12\)  
- Governments were invited to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane\(^13\)  
- Establishment of a work programme under the CMA to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, with the details for such work programme to be considered and adopted by the CMA in 2022 “in a manner that complements the global stocktake”\(^14\)  
- Governments were urged to communicate new or updated NDCs in 2022\(^15\) and requested to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2022 taking into account different national circumstances\(^16\). If they have not yet done so, governments were also requested to communicate during 2022 their long term low GHG emission development strategies based on just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances\(^17\)  
- Commitment to have an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition beginning at COP27 in 2022,\(^18\) for which the secretariat would annually update its synthesis report on NDCs\(^19\) and prepare a synthesis report on long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.\(^20\)  
These mitigation-related outcomes under the Glasgow Climate Pact lay the basis for a more central focus on mitigation in the work of the COP and CMA processes from 2022 onwards to 2030, with both developed and developing countries being subject to the expectation of providing in 2022 updated NDCs with strengthened 2030 targets. However, developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the US and EU look to be among those who will not be updating their respective NDCs in 2022, even though they were among those most persistent on setting up the accelerated pre-2030 mitigation work programme and will likely make this the political focus of COP and CMA sessions in the next few years.\(^21\) It is therefore likely that even as they insist that their own NDCs are sufficiently ambitious, developed countries will seek to use the pre-2030 mitigation work programme to exert more political pressure on developing countries to continually update their NDCs.  |
### Five-Point Plan

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| This would completely turn the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities on its head, with those most responsible for the problem now pushing the least responsible to do more to address it. This is highly hypocritical, especially considering the recent record of developed countries on climate change action.  
Furthermore, unless adequate and appropriate financing and technology support are provided to developing countries to support energy transition in the context of a carefully thought out sustainable development plan appropriate to national circumstances, phasing down unabated coal use and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies could adversely impact their economic and social stability. |

### 2. ADAPTATION

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<th>Establishing a clear process to define the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) contained in the Paris Agreement</th>
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<td>Adaptation has long been a key priority for developing countries. COP26/CMA3 resulted in the launch of the two-year Glasgow-Sharm el Sheikh work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), to be carried out by the subsidiary bodies, commencing immediately after COP26 and running up to COP28/CMA5. This work programme is intended to clarify the scope, definition, progress review, communication, and reporting with respect to the GGA that is referred to in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, with the following objectives:</td>
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| (a) Enable the full and sustained implementation of the Paris Agreement towards achieving the Global Goal on Adaptation, with a view to enhancing adaptation action and support  
(b) Enhance understanding of the GGA, including of the methodologies, indicators, data and metrics, needs and support needed for assessing progress towards it  
(c) Contribute to reviewing the overall progress made in achieving the GGA as part of the global stocktake referred to in Article 7, paragraph 14, and Article 14 of the Paris Agreement with a view to informing the first and subsequent global stocktake(s)  
(d) Enhance national planning and implementation of adaptation actions through the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans and through nationally determined contributions and adaptation communications  
(e) Enable Parties to better communicate their adaptation priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, including through adaptation communications and nationally determined contributions  
(f) Facilitate the establishment of robust, nationally appropriate systems for monitoring and evaluating adaptation actions  
(g) Strengthen implementation of adaptation actions in vulnerable developing countries  
(h) Enhance understanding of how communication and reporting instruments established under the Convention and Paris Agreement related to adaptation can complement each other in order to avoid duplication of efforts. |

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<th>Commitment from governments to allocate at least 50% of climate finance to adaptation, with regular reviews</th>
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| There was clear recognition at COP26 that the current provision of climate finance for adaptation remained insufficient to respond to the worsening climate change impacts in developing countries. The provision of adaptation financing to developing countries is an obligation of developed countries under Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC and Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.  
Despite this, COP26 resulted only in essentially hortatory rhetoric urging developed countries to “urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the needs of developing country Parties as part of a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans,” while welcoming the adaptation climate finance increases pledged by many developed countries, including to the Adaptation Fund and the LDC Fund. Some of these pledges were acknowledged as a doubling of the relevant developed country’s adaptation financing. The CMA also urged developed countries “to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources.” Countries were also encouraged to provide voluntary support for adaptation to the Adaptation Fund that would be additional to the share of proceeds levied on certified emission reductions coming from the Paris Agreement’s Article 6.4 voluntary cooperation mechanism. There were no firm commitments from developed countries to scale up adaptation financing, although the aim of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance remains. |

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Assessing COP26 Outcomes

Five-Point Plan

Allocate proceeds from market mechanism activities under the Paris Agreement’s Article 6 to the Adaptation Fund

The modalities agreed for implementation of the voluntary cooperation approach under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement included agreement that the Adaptation Fund would receive a share of the proceeds levied on the issuance of certified emission reductions. This would comprise:

- a mandatory levy of 5 per cent of Article 6.4 emission reductions at issuance
- a monetary contribution set by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body related to the scale of Article 6.4 activities or the number of Article 6.4 emission reduction credits issued
- and a periodic contribution from the remaining funds received from administrative expenses for the operation of the Supervisory Body.

However, there was no similar mandatory levy for a share of the proceeds on carbon reduction credits that would be traded under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. Such a levy under Article 6.2 had been proposed by developing countries to complement the levy under Article 6.4 and thereby provide a greater revenue stream for adaptation. Such proposals from developing countries were however opposed by developed countries, including at COP25 and COP26. Developed countries opposed the mandatory levy of a share of proceeds from Article 6.2 transactions for adaptation funding, seeing such a levy as a transaction tax that would limit or make carbon trading more expensive. Reports from the huddle between developing country officials led by Guinea and Senegal and John Kerry show that the US opposed the proposal to have an Adaptation Fund levy on Article 6.2 transactions, preferring instead that contributions to the Adaptation Fund from Article 6.2 transactions be voluntary.

In the end, the modalities for the Article 6.2 carbon trading mechanism only require governments to provide information in their transaction reports and biennial transparency reports about how carbon trading arrangement in which they participate will contribute resources for adaptation, “if applicable”. Governments and stakeholders participating in carbon trading under Article 6.2 were only “strongly encouraged to commit to contribute resources for adaptation, in particular through contributions to the Adaptation Fund, and to take into account the delivery of resources under Article 6, paragraph 4, to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation”. This confirms that contributions to the Adaptation Fund from the proceeds of Article 6.2 transactions would be voluntary rather than mandatory.

3. LOSS AND DAMAGE

Confirming that the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism is under joint oversight of UN climate convention (COP) and Paris Agreement (CMA)

Loss and damage continued its trajectory of becoming a key policy issue in the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement regime, based on the work done since the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) at COP18 in 2013, inclusion of Article 8 on loss and damage in the Paris Agreement, and establishment of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage at COP25. At COP26, developing countries continued to highlight the importance of addressing loss and damage as a key pillar in international cooperation on climate change under both the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, including through having an effective and operational technical assistance network and creating a loss and damage financing facility.

COP26 acknowledged – and IPCC Working Group II report has since re-emphasised – that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage and that, as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat.

During COP26, developing countries pushed to have a clear confirmation of their long-standing understanding that the WIM is under the joint governance of both the COP and the CMA. This would recognize that the treatment of loss and damage is not limited to implementation of Article 8 of the Paris Agreement but is also part of the implementation of the mother treaty, the UNFCCC, and that such implementation is linked to the existing obligations of developed countries under both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement (including on finance and technology transfer). Joint governance was opposed by developed countries, which stated that the inclusion of Article 8 in the Paris Agreement means that the WIM is now solely under the authority of the CMA. Consultations undertaken by the COP26 Presidency during the conference proved fruitless, with both groups of countries holding on to their respective interpretations.

Instead, in response to the proposals and concerns raised by the developing countries on this joint governance issue, the Glasgow Pact welcomed the further operationalization of the Santiago Network, including the agreement on its functions and the process for further developing its institutional arrangements, and endorsed the CMA’s decisions with respect to the WIM – including the further work on the Santiago Network and the launch of the Glasgow Loss and Damage Dialogue.
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<td><strong>Establish Loss and Damage as a permanent standalone agenda item under the UNFCCC</strong></td>
<td>Loss and damage issues have been discussed on an ad-hoc basis based on the reports of the WIM EXcom, which has limited scope and mandate for concrete decisions to effectively address loss and damage. Therefore, there is need to have a standalone loss and damage agenda item under the SBs and the COP.</td>
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<td><strong>Appoint a special COP26 loss and damage envoy to mobilise and enhance political will</strong></td>
<td>The UK COP26 Presidency has informally suggested to some governments and NGOs that the UN Secretary General should appoint a special envoy for loss and damage, to mobilize and enhance the UN system and other actors to support developing countries on this issue. However, no discussion took place among governments during COP26 for the COP on requesting the UN Secretary-General to make such an appointment.</td>
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<td><strong>Call for adequate loss and damage financing to be provided</strong></td>
<td>Loss and damage financing – i.e. the provision of financial support from developed to developing countries under the UNFCCC regime earmarked specifically to help developing countries address loss and damage caused by climate change – has long been called for by many developing countries. The first iteration of the concept dates back to the late 2000s. It has subsequently been raised in 2013 during the COP18 negotiations that established the WIM, and more recently at 2019’s COP25 in Madrid. At COP26 this call received a significant political boost when the Group of 77 and China rallied around proposals from the small island developing states and least developed countries for a loss and damage finance facility, and tabled a clear textual proposal for inclusion in the COP and CMA decisions relating to loss and damage. The G77/China, on behalf of 134 developing countries and 6 billion people, proposed that the COP and CMA decide “to establish the Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility under the Financial Mechanism pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention, to provide new financial support under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, in addition to adaptation and mitigation finance, to developing countries to address loss and damage and requests the Subsidiary Bodies to jointly undertake work in 2022 with the aim of providing recommendations to COP27 on its operationalization.” In support of this call, five philanthropies offered to provide “kick-start finance” for the facility (US$ 3 million), the Wallonia region of Belgium committed EUR1 million, and the Scottish government committed GBP2 million. However, developed countries, including the US, EU, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland and Japan, opposed establishment of the Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility. They claimed that it was a last-minute proposal for which they had no mandate to negotiate. Some observers noted that these countries have consistently opposed having a dedicated financing stream for loss and damage, preferring instead that it be lumped under adaptation finance, not least due to concerns that it could open the door to claims against them for liability and compensation. Due to this opposition and the consequent lack of consensus, the UK as COP26 President did not include language on establishing a loss and damage finance facility in the CMA and COP decisions relating to the WIM. Instead the Presidency proposed and included in the CMA Glasgow Pact decision the establishment of the Glasgow Dialogue “to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change, to take place in the first sessional period of each year of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, concluding at its sixtieth session (June 2024). This CMA decision was endorsed by the COP. Both the COP and CMA recognized “the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects”. They also urged “developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations entities and intergovernmental organizations and other bilateral and multilateral institutions, including non-governmental organizations and private sources, to provide enhanced and additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.” The COP and CMA also noted the efforts of the GCF Board to provide resources for activities relevant to addressing loss and damage.</td>
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<td>The COP emphasized the particular challenge in deriving cost estimates for climate adaptation and enhancing resilience needs and, in this context, deriving cost estimates for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage needs. The CMA decided that information related to enhancing understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage could be included by Parties in their biennial transparency reports as “additional information” in the common tabular formats for the reporting of finance, technology transfer, and capacity building provided and mobilized. Additionally, the open-ended listing of elements that could be considered in the deliberations to be undertaken by the CMA on setting a new collective quantified climate finance goal opens the door for loss and damage finance to be included as an element in such goal.</td>
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### Provide operational technical assistance to developing countries through the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage

An important step in the further institutionalization of loss and damage within the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement architecture and the delivery of needed support to developing countries was the establishment of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) in 2019 at COP25. This was the result of protracted negotiations at COP25 in which a united Group77/China group pushed forward its proposal for the establishment of such a network. The SNLD would “catalyse the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”

Concerned that the SNLD’s mandate was too vague and ambiguous to provide it and its members with the needed guidance on the activities to undertake, G77/China proposed that at COP26, the COP and CMA take a decision to further clarify functions of the SNLD so that its institutional arrangements could be made fit for purpose. Constructive though protracted negotiations ensued, with developed countries generally saying initially that the mandate for the SNLD from COP25 was sufficient, but subsequently agreeing on the following set of functions for the SNLD:

- (a) Contributing to effective implementation of the WIM by catalysing the technical assistance of organizations, bodies, networks and experts
- (b) Catalysing demand-driven technical assistance including of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, by assisting in identification, prioritization and communication of technical assistance including types, needs and priorities and establishing support connections based on needs.
- (c) Facilitating the consideration of a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, including but not limited to current and future impacts, priorities, and actions
- (d) Facilitating and catalysing collaboration, coordination, coherence and synergies to accelerate action by organizations, bodies, networks and experts, across communities of practices, and for them to deliver effective and efficient technical assistance to developing countries
- (e) Facilitating the development, provision and dissemination of, and access to, knowledge and information on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, including comprehensive risk management approaches, at the regional, national and local level
- (f) Facilitating, through catalysing technical assistance, of organizations, bodies, networks and experts, access to action and support (finance, technology and capacity building) under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement, relevant to averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage, including urgent and timely responses to impacts of climate change.

To ensure that the SNLD’s institutional arrangements would be fit for purpose in light of the functions agreed at COP26, governments also agreed to continue discussions through the SBI and SBSTA on the SNLD’s institutional arrangements and financing after COP26, to culminate with a COP/CMA decision thereon at COP27. These discussions would substantively focus on the following:

- operational modalities and structure
- the role of the WIM Executive Committee and its subsidiary bodies
- the role of loss and damage contact points and other relevant stakeholders at subnational, national and regional level
- possible elements for the terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body that may provide secretarial services to facilitate the SNLD’s work
- modalities for the management and the terms for the disbursement of funds provided for technical assistance under the SNLD

Additionally at COP26 governments recognized the importance of demand-driven technical assistance in building capacity to implement loss and damage-related approaches and welcomed the further operationalization of the SNLD, including agreement on its functions and the process for developing its institutional arrangements. They decided that the SNLD will be provided with funds to support provision of technical assistance for the implementation of loss and damage-related approaches, with such funds and their disbursement to be administered by the body that would serve as the SNLD secretariat. They urged developed countries to provide funds for the operation of the SNLD and for the provision of loss and damage-related technical assistance.
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<td><strong>4. FINANCE</strong></td>
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<td>Deliver the twice-promised commitment to provide at least $100bn per year by 2020</td>
<td>Before COP26 it was already clear that developed countries had not met their long-standing commitment, coming from Copenhagen in 2009 and formalized in the COP decision from Cancun in 2010 and again in the Paris Agreement, “to a goal of mobilizing jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.”</td>
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<td>Commit, particularly developed countries, to scaling up annual financing in the period 2021-2025, with a minimum of US$ 100bn per year, including through a clear delivery plan for the period</td>
<td>Various analyses confirmed that the US$ 100 billion commitment was not met in 2020. The COP noted that developed countries were continuing their efforts to reach this goal, and further noted “with serious concern the gap in relation to the fulfilment of the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020, including due to challenges in mobilizing finance from private sources.” The COP and CMA additionally noted “with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 … has not yet been met” and urged developed countries to “fully deliver on the US$ 100 billion goal urgently and through to 2025.”</td>
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<td>Commission a synthesis report on delivery of finance to 2020, commit to enhancing transparency and accountability in relation to climate finance, and establish a process to identify and negate problems faced in access</td>
<td>Developed countries sought to paper over this failure by reaffirming the continuation of their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 and putting forward a Climate Delivery Finance Plan that would enable them to meet the 2020 goal only by 2023. The COP and CMA welcomed this climate finance delivery plan. The COP and CMA urged developed countries to enhance their support, including finance, technology transfer and capacity building, to assist developing countries in mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and emphasized the need to mobilize and significantly increase climate finance to support developing countries beyond US$ 100 billion per year. In this context, the COP endorsed the key findings of the SCF’s first report on the determination of the climate finance needs of developing countries. It also noted that the NDCs of developing countries include 4,274 needs for climate finance (with 1,782 costed needs identified across 78 NDCs), cumulatively amounting to US$ 5.8–5.9 trillion up to 2030; and that although developing country Parties identified more adaptation needs than mitigation needs, more costs were identified for the latter. The COP also decided its discussions on long-term climate finance will continue and conclude in 2027.</td>
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<td>To monitor progress towards the (delayed) delivery of developed countries’ US$ 100 billion by 2020 climate finance goal, the COP requested the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) to prepare a progress report in 2022, and to convene high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in 2022, 2024 and 2026 with the summaries of the deliberations thereof to be considered by the COP in 2023, 2025 and 2027.</td>
<td>The COP and CMA called on developed countries to provide greater clarity on their public climate finance pledges, while the COP called on developed countries and other climate finance providers to continue enhancing the harmonization of methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance provided and mobilized. In this context, the CMA invited developed countries to improve the information contained in their biennial public climate finance reports. A key element in enhancing the transparency and accountability of developed countries is having a clear and agreed definition of what constitutes climate finance. Having such a definition will help avoid double-counting, or mis-categorization as climate finance of other types of financing (such as official development assistance) provided by developed to developing countries. In this regard, the COP recognized the lack of such a multilaterally agreed definition of climate finance. It requested the SCF to continue working on definitions of climate finance (to be considered by COP27), and invited institutions providing finance (such as the GCF, the GEF, the Adaptation Fund, etc.) to consider the SCF’s operational definitions of climate finance. The challenges faced by developing countries in accessing climate finance, particularly with respect to eligibility and the ability to access concessional forms, were emphasized by the CMA and the COP. Both bodies encouraged further efforts by relevant providers of climate finance to enhance access. However, no process nor any guidance were provided for such enhancement.</td>
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## Five-Point Plan

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<td>Commit countries providing climate finance, particularly developed countries, to increasing provision of grants rather than loans</td>
<td>The COP and the CMA called for a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources globally, including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance.(^8) and encouraged relevant multilateral institutions to consider how climate vulnerabilities should be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights.(^9)</td>
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<td>Agree to initiate negotiations on a new, higher global finance goal from 2025 onwards as mandated in the Paris Agreement</td>
<td>Deliberations were initiated at COP26 on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance with the establishment of an ad-hoc work programme thereon that would operate from 2022 to 2024 and would include four technical expert dialogues per year.(^8) There would also be annual high-level ministerial dialogues on the new collective quantified goal from 2022 to 2024 that would guide implementation of the ad hoc work programme.(^9) The CMA would also continue in 2022 to 2024 its deliberations on setting the new quantified collective goal.(^2) The CMA also decided that the new collective quantified goal should contribute to accelerating achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement,(^3) and that its consideration would take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. These needs and priorities would include, inter alia, quantity, quality, scope and access, as well as sources of funding. They will also include transparency arrangements to track progress towards achievement of the goal, without prejudice to other elements that will also be considered as the deliberations evolve and taking into consideration the submissions made by countries and non-party stakeholders.(^4)</td>
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<td>Acknowledging the impact of Covid-19 and other factors, pass a resolution calling on Parties to provide additional liquidity to developing countries in forms that include Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and debt relief</td>
<td>Both the COP and CMA noted with concern the growing climate finance needs of developing countries, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic.(^5) Partly in this context as well as in the context of the failure of developed countries to fulfil their US$ 100 billion goal, the COP and the CMA called for a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources globally, including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance.(^6) They also encouraged relevant multilateral institutions to consider how climate vulnerabilities should be reflected in the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights.(^7)</td>
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## 5. IMPLEMENTATION

Conclude Article 6 (markets) negotiations in a manner that promotes ambition, safeguards real emission cuts, environmental integrity and provides substantial financial resources to adaptation actions in vulnerable developing countries

Five years after they started in 2016, the negotiations on the modalities and rules for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were finally concluded at COP26.

The guidance on cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (relating to internationally traded mitigation outcomes – e.g. carbon emission reductions trading):

- a) recognizes that cooperative approaches can apply to different types of NDC\(^9\)
- b) requires governments to ensure that the use of cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions of participating countries within and between NDC implementation periods or across participating countries
- c) requires governments to ensure transparency, accuracy, consistency, completeness and comparability in tracking progress in implementation and achievement of its NDC by applying safeguards and limits.\(^9\)

The safeguards and limits that countries and entities engaged in carbon trading have to respect, and which governments are required to report, include:

- minimizing and, where possible, avoiding negative environmental, economic and social impacts
- reflecting human rights issues
- ensuring consistency with the sustainable development objectives of the country
- noting national prerogatives
- applying safeguards
- contributing resources to adaptation
- delivering overall mitigation in global emissions.\(^1\)
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<td>Countries and stakeholders participating in the use of Article 6.2 cooperative approaches were “strongly encouraged to commit to contribute” resources – i.e. voluntarily rather than mandatorily – for adaptation, in particular through the Adaptation Fund. They were also encouraged to report on such contributions. The CMA adopted rules, modalities and procedures for the voluntary cooperation mechanism for carbon trading by governments under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, after five years of negotiations. Important features of the mechanism under Art. 6.4 include:</td>
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<td>• having a Supervisory Body to oversee its implementation</td>
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<td>• allowing stakeholders, activity participants and participating governments to appeal decisions of the Supervisory Body or request that a grievance be addressed by an independent grievance process</td>
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<td>• levying a share of proceeds to contribute to adaptation finance through the Adaptation Fund</td>
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<td>• delivering overall mitigation of emissions through mandatory and voluntary cancellations of emission reduction credits.</td>
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<td>The work programme under the framework for non-market approaches under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement was also adopted with the initial focus areas including, among others:</td>
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<td>• adaptation, resilience and sustainability</td>
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<td>• mitigation measures to address climate change and contribute to sustainable development</td>
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<td>• development of clean energy sources.</td>
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<td>Implementation of the work programme would be subject to certain principles. Each non-market approach (NMA) facilitated under this framework would be subject to specific objectives, such as promoting mitigation and adaptation ambition, assisting governments to implement NDCs in an integrated, holistic and balanced manner, and contributing to sustainable development and poverty eradication. Such NMAs are, among other things, required to be conducted in a manner that respects, promotes and considers respective obligations of Parties on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity, and minimizes and, where possible, avoids negative environmental, economic and social impacts.</td>
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<td>The last remaining part of the Enhanced Transparency Framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement was also agreed at COP26/CMA3. Measures adopted included:</td>
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<td>• common reporting tables</td>
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<td>• common tabular formats</td>
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<td>• outlines for the biennial transparency reports, national inventory documents and technical expert review report</td>
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<td>• the training programme for technical experts participating in the technical expert reviews of biennial transparency reports.</td>
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<td>The term of reference (ToRs) of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) to support capacity building to developing countries was adopted. The CGE will provide support developing countries implement the new transparency measures under the Paris Agreement. Flexibility for developing countries that need it was explicitly recognized and reflected.</td>
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<td>Conclude transparency negotiations in a way that reflects reporting flexibility and provides a requisite support package for developing countries</td>
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<td>Agree a common 5-year timeframe for NDCs, for all countries</td>
<td>Similarly, five years after the start of negotiations, a common yet flexible timeframe of five years for NDCs was adopted, under which governments are encouraged (not mandated) to communicate in 2025 a NDC with an end date of 2035, in 2030 a NDC with an end date of 2040, and so forth every five years. The CMA also recognized and reaffirmed that NDCs are nationally determined in nature.</td>
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Contrary to the mainstream spin that the Glasgow outcomes (called the Glasgow Climate Pact), were “historic”, it is clear that the decisions reached fell short of what is needed, particularly with respect to equity and the correct reflection of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. As outlined above the Glasgow Pact has action-oriented, implementation-focused outcomes with respect to mitigation, but the same cannot be said with respect to adaptation and loss and damage – issues that are crucial for developing countries, yet not given the same treatment as mitigation.

COP26 was the year of the “great escape” by developed countries from their Convention and Paris Agreement obligation to do more on mitigation compared with developing countries, as evinced by their ambiguous pledges of 2050 net zero targets coupled with the potential use of nature-based offsets, including forests and oceans, through trading in the international carbon market.

From the perspective of developing countries, the pledges and actions coming out of COP26 regarding adaptation, finance and loss and damage were simply insufficient, being almost all talk and no real action. By COP27, concrete and actionable steps must be agreed upon and taken so that developing countries will be better supported in adaptation and loss and damage measures commensurate with achieving their sustainable development and poverty eradication priorities. Failing this, COP26 might well be seen as the COP that created a new form of 21st century carbon capital colonialism.
To avert this, here are some recommendations for COP27 to be able to correct the failures of COP26:

- COP27 should be seen as the “Adaptation COP.” This means it should deliver an agreement containing an elaborated outline of elements with respect to the scope, definition, progress review, communication, and reporting of the Global Goal on Adaptation. This elaborated outline of elements would be developed in the course of 2022 for adoption at COP27, and subsequently fleshed out and provided with more detail through negotiations taking place in 2023, with a decision on the Global Goal on Adaptation to be adopted at COP28. Developed countries should provide scaled up, predictable, grant-based funding for implementation of adaptation actions in vulnerable developing countries.

- On finance, the work programme on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance should be jumpstarted and accelerated in the course of 2022 and at COP27, particularly through the development and identification of key elements that should be reflected in the goal. These include, but are not limited to, quantity, quality, scope and access features, as well as sources of funding, and transparency arrangements to track progress towards the achievement of the goal, without prejudice to other elements. These should be captured in a working text that would then be carried forward to 2023 as the basis for continuing negotiations, to conclude at COP30 in 2025.

- At COP27, the COP and the CMA should have a clear call to specify the balance between grants and other highly concessional forms of finance vis-a-vis loans as the modalities through which climate finance would be delivered. This should include stressing that the provision and mobilization of concessional financial resources and other forms of support, including special drawing rights, debt cancellation, and royalty waivers, should be covered as innovative climate financing modalities.

- Leading up to COP27, stakeholders and institutions should contribute to the work of the SCF on definitions of climate finance that would then be considered at COP27 in Egypt.

- COP27 should result in a clear call to developed countries to scale up annual financing in the period 2021-2025, with a minimum of US$ 100bn in each year and ensuring that the total for the period is at least US$ 500bn, and to accelerate implementation of the Climate Finance Delivery Plan.

- On the SNLD, COP27 should conclude discussions through the SBI and SBSTA on the SNLD’s institutional arrangements and financing, resulting in a COP/CMA decision at COP27. The decision should provide for the following:
  - operational modalities
  - structure
  - the role of the WIM Executive Committee and its subsidiary bodies
  - the role of loss and damage contact points and other relevant stakeholders at the subnational, national and regional level
  - possible elements for the terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body that may provide secretarial services to facilitate the SNLD’s work
  - the modalities for the management and the terms for the disbursement of funds provided for technical assistance under the SNLD.

- On the Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage, there should be significant advancement in the course of 2022 (including at COP27) in terms of the process for the Dialogue, the issues to be discussed particularly in relation to the establishment and operationalization of a loss and damage financing facility, and the modalities for the discussion – i.e. setting out a clear workplan for the Dialogue that will allow it to develop a robust set of recommendations to the COP for consideration and adoption with respect to the establishment of an international loss and damage finance facility by COP27.

- COP27 should confirm that the WIM is under joint oversight of the COP and the CMA.

- The mitigation-related outcomes under the Glasgow Pact should be implemented in a manner that reflects the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibility, so that developing countries’ concerns and interests are also reflected and taken into account. For example, there could be a call at COP27 for new, additional and adequate financing and technology support to be provided to developing countries to support their economic diversification and energy transition, in the context of a carefully thought-out sustainable development and energy transition plan appropriate to national circumstances.
IV. END NOTES

1. See e.g. UK COP26 Presidency, COP26: The Glasgow Climate Pact (2021), at The Glasgow Climate Pact; Meena Raman, Glasgow Pact: A setback for equity, the poor and the planet (TNW Glasgow Climate News Update, 24 November 2021), at The Poor and the Planet; ISSA, A Brief Analysis of COP 26 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 16 November 2021), at A Brief Analysis of COP26; Paula Dupraz-Dobias, Why COP26 leaves humanitarians wanting more (The New Humanitarian, 15 November 2021), at Humanitarians want more: ActionCOP26; COP26 outcome ‘an insult to those whose lives are being torn apart by the climate crisis’ (ActionAid, 13 November 2021), at COP26 outcome an insult; Christian Aid, What happened at COP26? And what’s next? (Christian Aid, 16 November 2021), at What happened: Amnesty International, COP26 outcome: 12 months to take climate action that delivers on human rights (Amnesty International, 18 November 2021), at AI COP26 outcome; Simon Evans et al., COP26: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Glasgow (CarbonBrief, 15 November 2021), at Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Glasgow; Antonia Gawel, COP26 outcomes aren’t satisfying, but they should leave us hopeful. Here’s why (WEF, 19 November 2021), at COP26 outcomes aren’t satisfying; Helen Mountford et al., COP26: Key Outcomes From the UN Climate Talks in Glasgow (WRI, 17 November 2021), at Key Outcomes From the UN Climate Talks.

2. See UNFCCC, Outcomes of the Glasgow Climate Change Conference, at Outcomes of the Glasgow Climate Change Conference.

3. UK COP26 Presidency, COP26 Outcomes: Statements and Declarations, at UK COP26 Presidency, COP26 Outcomes: Statements and Declarations.

4. See e.g. Ahmadou Sebory Toure (G77 and China UNFCCC Chair), COP26 Opening Statement of the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China, 31 October 2021), at COP26 Opening Statement and COP26 Opening Statement of the Group of 77 and China.

5. The UNFCCC notes that “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs”. Even at COP 16 in 2010, it was acknowledged “that the largest share of historical global emissions of GHGs originated in developed countries and that, owing to this historical responsibility, developed country Parties must take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”


7. See UK COP26 Presidency, COP26 Outcomes (2021), at UK COP26 Presidency, COP26 Outcomes.

8. Powershift Africa, COP26: Delivering the Paris Agreement – A Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity (July 2021), at Powershift Africa, COP26: Delivering the Paris Agreement.

9. COP26, Glasgow Pact, paras. 16 and 17; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, paras. 21 and 22.

10. COP26, Glasgow Pact., para. 17; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 22.

11. COP26, Glasgow Pact., para. 18; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 23.

12. COP26, Glasgow Pact., para. 20; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 36.


14. CMA3, Glasgow Pact. para. 27.

15. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 28.

16. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 29.

17. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 32.

18. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 31.


20. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 34.

21. Sara Schonhardt, Countries Back Away from Pledge to Update Climate Goals This Year (E&E News, 1 February 2022), at Countries Back Away from Pledge; Isabelle Gerretsen, Laggards reject Glasgow pact’s 2022 call for new climate plans (Climate News Home, 15 November 2021), at Laggards reject Glasgow pact’s 2022 call; Zia Weise, EU will not strengthen climate action plan in 2022 (Politico, 1 December 2021), at EU will not strengthen climate action plan.

22. See e.g. Joe Lo, UK, Switzerland accused of undermining EU green treaty reforms (Climate Change News, 25 January 2022), at Switzerland accused of undermining EU green treaty reforms; Imogen Foulkes, Swiss voters reject key climate change measures (BBC, 13 June 2021), at Swiss voters reject key climate change measures; The Week Staff, Is Norway a climate hypocrite? (The Week, 25 November 2021), at Is Norway a climate hypocrite?; Karen McVeigh, West accused of ‘climate hypocrisy’ as emissions dwarf those of poor countries (The Guardian, 28 January 2022), at West accused of ‘climate hypocrisy’; Euan Ritchie, A New Year’s Resolution.
on the US’s Climate Hypocrisy (Center for Global Development, 7 January 2022), at A New Year’s Resolution on the US’s Climate Hypocrisy; Euan Ritchie, A New Year’s Resolution on the UK’s Climate Hypocrisy (Center for Global Development, 7 January 2022), at A New Year’s Resolution on the UK’s Climate Hypocrisy; Jayati Ghosh, The Rich World’s Climate Hypocrisy (Project Syndicate, 15 November 2021), at The Rich World’s Climate Hypocrisy; Prabir Purkayastha, Global Warming and the Hypocrisy of Rich Countries (NewsClick, 29 November 2021), at Global Warming and the Hypocrisy of Rich Countries; Oliver Milman, US auctions off oil and gas drilling leases in Gulf of Mexico after climate talks (The Guardian, 17 November 2021), at US auctions off oil and gas drilling leases; Nick O’Malley, Australia open to charges of climate hypocrisy, says Julie Bishop (The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 2021), at Australia open to charges of climate hypocrisy.

23. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, paras. 11-12; CMA3, decision on Global Goal on Adaptation, paras. 2-9 and 17.
24. Art. 7.1 PA reads “1. Parties hereby establish the Global Goal on Adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.”
25. CMA3, decision on Global Goal on Adaptation, para. 7.
26. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 10.
27. UNFCCC, Art. 4.4 states “4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”
28. Paris Agreement, Art. 9.1 states “1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”
29. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 11; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 15.
30. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 13; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 17. The financial pledges made by developed countries to the Adaptation Fund included those made by the European Commission, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, as well as the governments of the Brussels-Capital, Flemish and Walloon Regions of Belgium and the provincial government of Quebec. See CMA3, decision on the Adaptation Fund, para. 6.
31. COP26, decision on long-term finance, para. 9.
32. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 18.
33. CMA3, decision on the Adaptation Fund, para. 10.
34. This balance is specified in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement.
35. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, para. 6(b) and Annex, paras. 66-68.
36. See e.g. Submission by Gabon on behalf of the AGN on financing for adaptation/share of proceeds (Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement), at Submission by Gabon on behalf of the AGN on financing for adaptation; and Submission by Bhutan on behalf of the LDC Group on financing for adaptation/share of proceeds (Article 6.2 and 6.4), at Submission by Bhutan on behalf of the LDC Group; see also Leslie Hook, Powerful G77+China bloc takes up position on carbon markets (Financial Times, 13 November 2021), at Powerful G77+China bloc takes up position on carbon markets.
37. See Carbon Brief, COP25: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Madrid - ‘Share of proceeds’ to fund adaptation (CarbonBrief, 15 December 2019), at COP25: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Madrid.
38. See Camilla Hodgson, Africa group seeks rich countries’ reassurance before ‘boarding the electric train”; and Jim Pickard, John Kery: ‘You can’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good’, (Financial Times, 13 November 2021), at You can’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
39. See Meena Raman, Article 6 outcomes on market/non-market approaches (TWN Glasgow Climate News Update, 22 November 2021), at Article 6 outcomes on market/non-market approaches.
40. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.2, Annex, paras. 19(j)(v), 22(j), and 38.
41. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.2, Annex, para. 37.
43. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 37; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 61.
44. COP26, Glasgow Pact, paras. 42-43.
45. COP26, decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism, first para.
47. CMA3, decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism, footnotes 1 and 10.
48. See e.g. Saleemul Huq, An appeal to the UN secretary-general (The Daily Star, 15 December 2021), at An appeal to the UN secretary-general; Powershift Africa, COP26: Delivering the Paris Agreement – A Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity (July 2021), at A Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity.
49. Daniel Puig and Erin Roberts, Loss and Damage at COP26 (UNDP-DTU, November 2021), at Loss and Damage at COP26; Alliance Magazine staff, $3m from philanthropy to kickstart loss & damage funding at COP26; public funds don’t follow (Alliance Magazine, 15 November 2021), at $3m from philanthropy to kickstart loss & damage funding at COP26

50. The EU’s reasons for opposing the G77 and China’s proposal at COP26 for the establishment of the Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility were stated on 14 January 2022 by Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans in response to a question raised on 17 November 2021 in the European Parliament. See The EU’s reasons for opposing the G77 and China’s for the question and The EU’s reasons for the reply.

51. For observer and participant accounts of the COP26 loss and damage negotiations and the result, see e.g., TWN, Loss and Damage Fight at COP26 (TWN Glasgow Climate News Update, 19 November 2021), at Loss and Damage Fight at COP26; Saleemul Huq, What did COP26 do to deal with loss and damage? (The Daily Star, 1 December 2021), at What did COP26 do to deal with loss and damage?; Megan Rowling, Climate ‘loss and damage’ earns recognition but little action in COP26 deal (Reuters, 13 November 2021), at Climate ‘loss and damage’ earns recognition but little action; Zia Weise and Karl Mathiesen, EU, US block effort for climate disaster funding at COP26 (Politico, 13 November 2021), at US block effort for climate disaster funding at COP26; Damian Carrington, What is ‘loss and damage’ and why is it critical for success at Cop26? (The Guardian, 13 November 2021), at What is ‘loss and damage’; Liane Schalatek and Erin Roberts, Deferred not defeated: the outcome on Loss and Damage finance at COP26 and next steps (Heinrich Boelle Stiftung, 16 December 2021), at Deferred not defeated; Chloe Farand, Climate reparations become a crunch issue as Cop26 goes into overtime (Climate Change News, 12 November 2021), at Climate reparations become a crunch issue; Olivia Serdeczny et al., Facing the facts – the need for loss and damage finance can no longer be denied (Climate Analytics, 9 December 2021), at Facing the facts; CAN International, Civil society reacts to latest draft text from COP26: Developed countries erase proposal for loss and damage fund in new text (CAN International Press Release, 13 November 2021), at Civil society reacts to latest draft text from COP26; Jayanta Basu, COP26: Not on official agenda but Loss & Damage comeback gives hope, say experts (DownToEarth, 1 December 2021), at Not on official agenda; Edie newsroom, Loss and damage and keeping 1.5°C alive: Sharma outlines priorities for remainder of COP presidency (Edie, 24 January 2022), at Loss and damage and keeping 1.5°C alive; Andrea Lindblom and Cleo Verkuil, COP26: What it delivered and what’s next (Stockholm Environment Institute, 13 December 2021), at COP26: What it delivered and what’s next

52. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 73.

53. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 43.

54. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 39; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 63.

55. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 40; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 64.

56. COP26, decision on the Green Climate Fund, para. 10; CMA3, decision on the Green Climate Fund, para. 4.

57. COP26, decision on the Standing Committee on Finance, para. 16.

58. CMA3, decision on the enhanced transparency framework, para. 24, and Annex, Tables III.1 to III.11, “Additional information” column with relevant footnotes.

59. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, para. 16.

60. CMA, decision 2/CMA.2, para. 43.

61. For accounts of the loss and damage-related negotiations at COP25, see e.g., Dawn Pierre-Nathoniel et al., Loss and Damage at COP25 – a hard fought step in the right direction (Climate Analytics, 20 December 2019), at Loss and Damage at COP25; TWN, Developing countries outline elements for decision on loss and damage mechanism (TWN Madrid News Update, 5 December 2019), at Developing countries outline elements for decision on loss and damage mechanism; Evelyn The, Developing countries submit formal proposal on Loss and Damage Mechanism (TWN Madrid News Update, 9 December 2019), at Developing countries submit formal proposal on Loss and Damage Mechanism; TWN, Loss and Damage decisions adopted after intense and difficult negotiations (TWN Madrid News Update, 20 December 2019), at Loss and Damage decisions adopted after intense and difficult negotiations

62. CMA, decision 2/CMA.2, para. 43.

63. CMA3, decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism, para. 9.

64. CMA3, decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism, paras. 10.

65. CMA3, decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism, para. 10(a), and CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 68.

66. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 41; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 65.

67. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 42; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 66.

68. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 43; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, paras. 67-70.

69. COP, decision 1/CP.16, para. 98

70. See e.g., OECD, Developed countries likely to reach USD 100 billion goal in 2023 (25 October 2021), at
Developed countries likely to reach USD 100 billion goal; Jocelyn Timperley, The broken $100 billion promise of climate finance = and how to fix it (Nature, 20 October 2021), at The broken $100 billion promise of climate finance:

71. COP26, decision on long-term finance, paras. 3 and 4.
72. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 26; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 44.
73. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 27; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 46.
74. COP26, decision on long-term finance, para. 7.
75. Climate Delivery Finance Plan: Meeting the $100 Billion Goal (2021), at Climate Delivery Finance Plan.
76. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 26; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 44.
77. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 22; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 40.
78. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 25; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 43.
79. COP26, decision on the Standing Committee on Finance, para. 11.
80. COP26, decision on the Standing Committee on Finance, para. 12.
81. COP26, decision on long-term finance, para. 18.
82. COP26, decision on long-term finance, paras. 19-21.
83. CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 45.
84. CMA3, decision on the Standing Committee on Finance, para. 5.
85. CMA3, decision on Art. 9.5, paras. 13-14.
86. COP26, decision on the Standing Committee on Finance, paras. 6-8.
87. COP26, Glasgow Pact, paras. 30-32; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, paras. 51-52.
88. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 28; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 47.
89. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 29; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 48.
90. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, paras. 1-5.
91. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, para. 10.
92. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, para. 12.
93. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, para. 15.
94. CMA3, decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, para. 16.
95. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 23; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 41.
96. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 28; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 47.
97. COP26, Glasgow Pact, para. 29; CMA3, Glasgow Pact, para. 48.
98. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.2, Annex, paras. 8-10.
100. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.2, Annex, para. 18.
102. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.2, Annex, para. 38.
103. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, para. 1.
104. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, paras. 2-5.
105. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, Annex, paras. 62.
106. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, Annex, paras. 66-69.
107. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.4, Annex, paras. 69-72.
108. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.8, para. 2.
109. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.8, para. 3.
110. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.8, Annex, paras. 1-3.
111. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.8, Annex, para. 2.
112. CMA3, decision on Art. 6.8, Annex, para. 3(e).
113. CMA3, decision on the enhanced transparency framework, para. 1.
114. CMA3, decision on the enhanced transparency framework, para. 5, and relevant footnotes in Annexes II, IV, and V.
115. CMA3, decision on common timeframes for NDCs, para. 2.
116. CMA3, decision on common timeframes for NDCs, para. 1.
Assessing COP26 Outcomes on the basis of the Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity

MAY 2022

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