AFRICAN PRIORITIES FOR COP30



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African Priorities for COP30: Policy Brief

POWER SHIFT AFRICA

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Executive Summary

The **30th Conference of the Parties** to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30) in Belém, Brazil, marks the first "Implementation COP" following the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement, completion of the first Global Stocktake (GST) in COP28 and the adoption of the New Collective Quantified Goal on finance (NCQG) at COP29 in Baku. It takes place at a critical juncture for the multilateral climate regime, when the global focus must shift from sheer pledges and commitments to concrete delivery, and from ambition to equitable, urgent implementation. As such, COP30 aims to advance three key priorities: (i) strengthening multilateralism; (ii) connecting the climate regime to people's daily lives; and (iii) accelerating climate implementation.

For Africa, COP30 is an important opportunity to ensure that climate action aligns with the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), and the right to sustainable development. Africa's overarching message is that delivery of the means for implementing climate action, including capacity building, technology transfer, and finance, must match commitment and the evolving needs of the most vulnerable.

The continent approaches Belém at a critical juncture for global climate action. The current geopolitical environment, marked by slowing economic growth, rising protectionism, and shifting development finance priorities, constrains fiscal and policy spaces for climate ambition. And, with a new cycle of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) due this year, COP30 presents a unique opportunity to reorient the UNFCCC process towards implementation and real-world impact. It also has the opportunity and the platform to send a clear message that multilateralism and climate solidarity still exist and work.

In this regard, then, we need to call on parties and all actors to make COP30 a true 'Implementation COP' that delivers tangible outcomes for developing countries, anchored in justice, transparency, and accountability. It must also operationalise the provision of the means of implementation, including finance, technology, and capacity-building to developing countries as legally binding obligations of developed countries, not simply aspirational goals.

Africa's increasing vulnerability demands urgent adaptation and loss and damage action and support. With the continent warming at twice the global rate (+0.3°C per decade during 1991-2022), adaptation needs are escalating. Africa's estimated US$70 billion annual adaptation needs contrast starkly with average flows of only US$14.8 billion in 2023, and loss and damage costs are projected at US$290-440 billion between 2020 and 2030. In that context, Africa heads to Belem with a call for immediate tripling of adaptation finance beyond the doubling pledge by 2030, coupled with establishment of a robust process for determining an evolving needs-based regime post 2030, robust Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators for assessing adequacy of action and support, and clear pathways for significantly scaling up the resources of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).

Key African priorities for COP30 are as follows:

- **Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA):** Adopt a set of adaptation indicators to assess global progress towards the GGA; link progress to predictable, quality finance; and achieve parity with mitigation while aligning with the responsibilities provided under the Paris Agreement, the principle of CBDR-RC, and equity.
- **Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP):** Convert dialogue into delivery through a Belém Action Mechanism and Just Transition Technical Assistance Network (JT-TAN). Ensure just transitions are nationally determined, development-centred, job-creating, and fully financed.
- **Article 9.1:** Operationalise Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement as a binding obligation for developed countries.
- **Technology Implementation Programme (TIP):** Develop the TIP into a means to remove structural barriers, address intellectual property constraints, and empower Africa as a producer and innovator through regional technology hubs and South–South cooperation.
- **Trade and Unilateral Measures:** Reaffirm Article 3.5 of the Convention. Challenge unilateral climate-related trade measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Regulation on Deforestation-free Products (EUDR), which undermine Africa's development and trade competitiveness.
- **Recognition of Africa's Special Needs and Circumstances:** Seek formal political recognition under the COP/CMA to ensure Africa's vulnerabilities and support needs are addressed coherently and consistently across all agenda items.
- **Engagement with the COP30 Presidency's Action Agenda:** Engage constructively but critically with Presidency-led initiatives, including demanding transparency in the Baku–Belém Finance Roadmap; cautious engagement to reshape the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) into a rights-based, multilateral mechanism under COP oversight; principled engagement in the Integrated Forum on Trade and Climate to promote Africa's industrialisation and fair-trade agenda; and ensuring that the NDC synthesis report accurately reflects the differentiated circumstances of Africa.

To enhance Africa' voice at COP30, the unity and coordination of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN) across finance, adaptation, and trade should be strengthened, including through South–South alliances. The AGN should also engage civil society, youth, and Indigenous Peoples to amplify justice and equity narratives.

Africa's ambition is not in question, and what remains missing is delivery. If Belém is to be remembered as the 'Implementation COP', it must also be remembered as the COP where Africa's voice helped turn promises into action, building a just, inclusive, and development-oriented global climate order.


Introduction



Baku, Azerbaijan November 23, 2024. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

This Policy Brief seeks to provide an African perspective on the forthcoming 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP30) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), slated for November 2025 in Belém, Brazil. It highlights the key priority issues that will be on the formal negotiating agenda while also analysing the COP Presidency's voluntary "Action Agenda,"[1] which seeks to generate political momentum around implementation. In doing so, this Policy Brief aims to support African negotiators, policymakers, and civil society in advancing a coherent and justice-centered strategy for COP30.

COP30 takes place at a critical juncture in the climate regime. At COP29 in Baku, Parties agreed on the contours of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, setting an aspirational trajectory towards mobilising at least US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035 "from all public and private sources"[2] and an extended climate finance goal "with developed countries taking the lead" of at least US$300 billion annually by 2035 for developing countries' climate actions.[3] This NCQG has been critiqued by both developing country governments and civil society observers as severely inadequate and adopted through a non-transparent and undemocratic process.[4] The decisions taken in Belém will therefore be the first test of whether these new finance commitments can be translated into credible delivery mechanisms, replenishment pathways, and accountability frameworks.



Beyond finance, COP30 is expected to grapple with the adoption and operationalisation of adaptation indicators under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA),[5] the modalities of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP),[6] and responses to the growing use of unilateral climate-related trade measures.[7]

Brazil has framed COP30 as an "implementation COP" and seeks to position itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries.[8] For Africa, this carries particular resonance. The continent has historically been among the regions whose communities are facing the largest adverse climate impacts despite contributing the least to cumulative global emissions.[9] For instance, over 110 million Africans were affected by climate-related disasters such as floods, droughts, and heatwaves in 2024 alone. Also, the continent is warming faster than the global average, with North Africa experiencing a rise of 1.28°C above the 1991-2020 average, according to the World Meteorological Organisation.

The increasing climate burden has further led to declining agricultural productivity, rising food insecurity, and more displacement, especially in fragile states, with women being most affected. For instance, cereal crop yields have dropped by up to 50% in Southern Africa, and climate-related displacement has affected over 700,000 people in 2024.[10] The symbolism of a COP held in and chaired by a key developing country with many similar climate change impact characteristics and development challenges, as well as long historical ties to Africa, cannot be overstated, for it provides African countries and civil society with both leverage and visibility to advance long-standing demands around adaptation, loss and damage, technology transfer, and fair climate finance.

Africa has consistently been a key global player, shaping multilateral climate negotiations and anchoring its positions on the principles of climate equity and justice. Together with other developing countries, Africa has been a longstanding and consistent champion of the foundational principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and equity, arguing that developed countries bear the primary responsibility for reducing emissions while developing countries require support for their climate actions and sustainable development pathways.

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 at COP21, Africa has consistently highlighted the implementation gap, namely, the gap between developed countries' treaty commitments and pledges under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement and their actual delivery on finance, technology, and capacity-building related to these commitments and pledges to developing countries, including those in Africa.

At COP26 in Glasgow, African negotiators pushed for doubling of adaptation finance and elevation of just transition as a formal agenda item, while at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Africa's advocacy helped secure the landmark decision to establish a Loss and Damage Fund, a long-standing demand of the continent and all other developing countries around the world. COP29 in Baku further consolidated Africa's calls for a headline NCQG number that reflected the scale of developing countries' needs, even if the adopted number fell short of such called for scale. COP30 in Belém thus represents both the continuation and escalation of Africa's negotiating history. The continent's long-standing priorities — finance, adaptation, technology transfer, and equity — remain unchanged, and the urgency of moving from commitments on paper to delivery in practice on the means of implementation remains, as the AGN has often stressed both before and after Baku. The challenge in Belém therefore will be to secure binding decisions that operationalise past commitments while also engaging with the Brazilian Presidency's Action Agenda in a way that safeguards Africa's interests and prevents dilution of developed countries' obligations.

To guide analysis, this Policy Brief distinguishes between two interlinked but distinct tracks of intergovernmental discussions that will be taking place at COP30. The first consists of formal negotiated outcomes, or, more specifically, official decisions taken under the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), under these bodies' official agenda.[11] These decisions are considered politically binding on the Parties. The second is the non-negotiated Action Agenda, a suite of voluntary initiatives being developed by the Brazilian

COP30 Presidency. This agenda seeks to mobilise finance and political commitments from a wide range of actors, including governments, businesses, cities, and Indigenous Peoples, but does not carry the same legal authority as COP/CMA decisions. Instead, it operates as a complementary track intended to showcase ambition, garner political will, and catalyse implementation.[12]

For Africa, the dual-track nature of COP30 presents both opportunities and risks. On one hand, the negotiated track offers a venue to secure politically binding commitments on climate finance, adaptation, and just transition modalities. On the other hand, the non-negotiated and voluntary Action Agenda can be used to mobilise attention and resources for African priorities, such as forests, food systems, and trade diversification. However, there is also a danger that voluntary initiatives could be used to substitute or dilute developed country obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement. This underscores the need for a carefully calibrated African strategy that leverages both tracks while maintaining a clear line between legal obligations and voluntary political pledges.

In the sections that follow, this Policy Brief first examines the key issues expected to dominate the formal negotiations in Belém, including on GGA indicators, JTWP modalities, the UAE Dialogue, the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), finance under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, the inclusion of unilateral measures as an agenda item, and Africa's special needs and circumstances. It then analyses some of the core elements of the Brazilian Presidency's Action Agenda that would be especially of interest for Africa, namely the Baku to Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 trillion, the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, the Trade and Climate Forum, and the NDC synthesis process. The paper concludes with cross-cutting recommendations and a mapping of African interests, positions, and suggested strategies for both negotiators and civil society.

II

Negotiated Agenda Items at COP30



A. Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) Indicators


COP30 marks a key make-or-break political moment for adaptation that comprises two critical milestones: the finalisation of indicators to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) targets, and the deadline to deliver on the Glasgow commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025. Established in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement[13], the GGA resembles both a lifeline and a Southern Cross guiding light for climate-vulnerable regions like Africa. Central to the Brazil Presidency's vision for COP30, adaptation decisions in Belém must reflect the priorities, lived experiences and needs of those most affected. Ultimately, COP30 must secure the political will and finance needed to unlock ambitious adaptation outcomes if we hope to accelerate global adaptation efforts and move closer to bridging the vast finance and implementation gap.

On matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), the primary focus of negotiations will centre on Parties' adoption of a set of indicators to assess progress towards achieving the GGA and its 11 targets under the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. a critical exercise as it will determine how adaptation ambition, action, and support are assessed and compared globally. For African countries, this process must reflect the continent's priorities and realities. Adaptation indicators should not be externally imposed metrics of compliance, but rather tools that can help assess progress and gaps in meeting African development needs and lived climate vulnerabilities and realities, particularly in relation to food security, water availability, public health systems, resilient infrastructure, and achievement of the right to development.

From an African standpoint, the GGA indicators must be globally applicable to ensure adaptation progress and support in the context of the temperature goal that remains a global responsibility. Flexibility and context-specificity through disaggregation of indicators is key, allowing each country to identify the metrics most relevant to its national circumstances.

Ultimately, the GGA decision at COP30 must adopt a set of robust and fit-for-purpose indicators that capture crosscutting aspects and vulnerabilities such as gender, Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, children and youth, local communities, and ethnic and racial dimensions. Importantly, the final set of indicators must include a sizeable proportion that explicitly tracks means of implementation (MoI), including finance, technology transfer, and capacity building in relation to Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement. These indicators must measure both provision and receipt of support from developed to developing countries, recognising their importance for effective implementation of the GGA, its framework targets, and identifying barriers to action. Additionally, Africa must insist that the GGA indicators are clearly linked to a new adaptation finance commitment or a process that assesses the costs involved in achieving the seven thematic and four-dimensional targets. The decision on GGA and MoI indicators should also be connected to dedicated finance streams under the NCQG, ensuring that measurement of adaptation outcomes goes hand-in-hand with predictable, accessible, and grant-based support. If these two threads are not meaningfully linked to each other, the GGA risks becoming ineffective and yet another unfunded mandate.

The modalities and work programme of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) present an opportunity for Africa to push for the operationalisation of the GGA targets and indicators as a central focus. Africa should advocate for a formal process under the BAR to review and further refine the indicators beyond COP30, with clear timelines, modalities and guidance to ensure their continued relevance as adaptation science and evidence evolves. This process should also clarify how the indicators will be used, reported on, and integrated into Parties' National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), and assessment of progress under the Global Stocktake. Strengthening alignment between international frameworks and national planning and reporting systems will be instrumental in ensuring coherence, usability, and strengthening local capacity.



Africa must also champion for the BAR to serve as a vehicle for adaptation action, support and implementation of the GGA framework, targets and indicators. The Roadmap must include coordination across adaptation agenda items, such as the Nairobi Work Programme, NAPs and the Adaptation Committee, while providing practical guidance on how to integrate indicators into national systems and building institutional capacities for both implementing GGA targets and reporting on indicators. Crucially, it must also embed justice and inclusion into its design and operationalisation, ensuring the meaningful participation of vulnerable groups and addressing barriers that hinder equitable engagement in adaptation decisions. For instance, civil society, particularly the most vulnerable, must be involved in further refinement and application of these indicators, including supporting data readiness and the next phase of their operationalisation. Locally led adaptation should be recognised as both a guiding principle and a measurable outcome, with indicators that capture community participation, social inclusion, and empowerment. Data collection should also be disaggregated by gender, by Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and by other relevant socio-economic categories to ensure that adaptation monitoring truly reflects equity and justice outcomes on the ground.

The GGA is considered the brainchild of the African Group, and the continent must ensure a strong outcome comprising an indicator framework that is flexible with a process for further refinement and operationalisation, and inclusive to enable countries to track not only physical resilience but also the delivery of support and the strengthening of social systems that underpin long-term climate resilience.

B. Loss and Damage

The rising global temperature implies that losses and damage will escalate, especially in developing countries. With the completion of institutional arrangements for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), including the hosting of the fund by the World Bank, and for the Santiago Network, focus must now shift towards delivery of funds and other support to frontline communities that incur losses due to climate change impacts. Therefore,

- Developed countries must deliver on their pledges and commitments to the FRLD at a scale that matches the true extent of damages. While it is equally important to have more countries committing towards resourcing the fund, these must translate into real finances delivered to the fund.
- Arrangements for the delivery of the FRLD must provide a greater window for direct access by communities that need it. This should be designed in ways that avoid the bureaucracies and barriers common with other financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC.
- The Santiago Network is currently hosted in Geneva but tasked with providing technical support for averting, minimising, and addressing Loss and Damage at local, national, and regional levels in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Parties must pursue regional spread of the network with the aim of providing tailored technical support that matches actual damages and losses, including accounting for non-economic losses. The Network and its secretariat should also be adequately resourced with the needed funding to scale up the provision of technical assistance to developing countries.
- COP30 must also use the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism to align and strengthen coordination, coherence, and complementarity between the FRLD, SNLD and national mechanisms. This is critical to enhance access, outreach, and support to climate-vulnerable countries.
- Therefore, COP30 should urge enhanced delivery of the existing US$749 million pledges to the FRLD and call for additional, and even more ambitious, pledges for loss and damage finance that match the current and projected losses from climate change.
- It is important for Africa to reiterate Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC in the same vein as Articles 9.1 and 9.4 of the Paris Agreement in respect of obligations for developed countries to provide finance for developing countries in response to climate impacts, including for adaptation, to have transparency on actual amount and quality of financial support delivered and the actual needs based on temperature scenarios.
- COP30 should consider developing a roadmap for integrating loss and damage into national policies and international reporting frameworks.
- Since loss and damage is a recognised third pillar of climate action, Africa should emphasize the need for updated reporting systems to capture slow-onset and non-economic impacts, noting gaps in data collection, coordination, and inclusion. African countries lack national policies on loss and damage, with data fragmentation and limited public participation being major challenges.

C. Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)

At COP30, Parties will need to agree on how to translate the outcomes of the dialogues under the multi-year Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) into concrete and specific actions. This is a key agenda item that will determine how just transition efforts are conceptualised, operationalised, and supported under the Paris Agreement.[14] For Africa, this debate is not only about how to transition away from high-emission activities, but also about how to ensure that climate action contributes to the continent's broader goals of energy access, industrialisation, adaptation, and development, and decent job creation. The African position must therefore emphasise that just transitions are development transitions. They should not be narrowly interpreted as the managed decline of fossil fuel sectors, but as comprehensive strategies to build new, inclusive, and sustainable economies. This means aligning the JTWP with Africa's realities, where millions still lack access to electricity and industrial capacity remains limited.

The continent's priorities will therefore centre on ensuring that the JTWP outcomes operationalise equity, provide institutional support for implementation, and secure dedicated and accessible financing for just transition measures aligned with national circumstances and development pathways. Africa's foremost priority is that COP30 transforms the JTWP from a space for dialogue into a platform for implementation. Over the past two years, Parties and stakeholders have generated extensive insights through JTWP dialogues on workforce transitions, social inclusion, and the economic diversification challenges that accompany shifts away from fossil fuels. These lessons must now be translated into tangible, time-bound actions, particularly in terms of having an operational package of priority measures that can be delivered by 2026–2027, including:

- **Voluntary methodologies for assessing social and economic impacts of energy transitions and equitable adaptation pathways, including foregone wellbeing due to diversion of resources from key development sectors to address climate risks.**
- **Practical guidance for social dialogue and stakeholder inclusion.**
- **Tools for assessing and addressing the effects of unilateral trade measures such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).**
- **Support measures to help developing countries identify and mobilise just transition funding. They should also mandate an annual progress report or stocktake on JTWP implementation to maintain accountability and transparency.**

For Africa, the operationalisation of the JTWP should aim for concrete outcomes such as enhancing access to energy, clean cooking technologies and technology transfer; and ensuring provision of the means of implementation (MOIs) that includes adaptation support consistent with needs while also addressing the barriers to just transitions through technical papers and knowledge products, in addition to the dialogue. Africa has previously reiterated the need for additional finance and MOI for just transitions such as

social protection, access to energy, and clean cooking, and has recommended that the work programme continue beyond 2026 through a proposed institutional arrangement. Africa has proposed a **Global Just Transition Framework,** along with supporting guidance, to help implement actions beyond the UNFCCC. The aim is to ensure equity and fairness through international arrangements that align just transition initiatives with different means of implementation (MOIs). This framework is intended to strengthen the process and advance goals that embed fairness into climate action, in line with the principles of the Paris Agreement.

A key point of negotiation at COP30 will be the establishment of institutional arrangements to anchor the implementation of just transition actions. Africa could highlight the importance of creating a just transition technical assistance network under the JTWP, an institutional platform that moves beyond ad hoc dialogues to provide structured, Party-led coordination, technical assistance, and policy guidance in relation to just transition implementation. Procedural, recognitional, distributive and restorative justice dimensions must be embedded into the design and operationalisation of the institutional platform.

This would be a network for knowledge sharing, coordination, technical assistance and capacity building to support countries in implementing just transition policies through technical assistance, policy examples, assessment of justice pathways for adaptation, and access to finance and technology. This would catalyse and connect developing countries with technical assistance, access to finance, and exchange of best practices to support just transitions, monitoring and assessing gaps in just transition support aligned with the principles of equity, CBDR, and the right to development, while recognising the diverse starting points and national contexts of developing countries and the differentiated impacts of transitions across sectors and communities.

It could also include establishing and providing access to an open-access database of evaluated just transition policy instruments and a matching platform to facilitate the mobilisation of technical assistance, capacity building, establishment of a global coordination platform for transition minerals, and financial and technological resources between developed and developing countries to provide rapid, country-owned and -tailored support. Such a network would be crucial for sharing best practices, building technical expertise, and facilitating international cooperation on climate change response measures. Africa could propose that a key aspect of such a network would be having regional implementation hubs (in Africa, for example, this could be in cooperation with African institutions such as the African Union Commission, UNECA and its ACPC, and the AfCFTA Secretariat), and also push for the structured participation of formal and informal workers, cooperatives, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, farmers, and other rights-holders in all stages of implementation. This institutional design would give effect to the principle of CBDR-RC and ensure that the JTWP delivers tangible support to developing countries rather than remaining an open-ended dialogue process.

In this context, as financing will be a central issue at COP30, Africa should advocate for embedding finance directly into the JTWP outcome, not merely as a voluntary or aspirational element. Guidance could be provided to the operating entities of the Financial

Mechanism, as well as multilateral development banks (MDBs), to establish dedicated Just Transition Windows within existing funds such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund, and the Loss and Damage Fund. These facilities should feature simplified access modalities for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Africa, enabling support for both national-level and community-based just transition projects. Africa could also request a mapping of just transition finance sources, including grants, concessional finance, guarantees, and debt relief mechanisms, to inform resource mobilisation strategies before COP31.

Discussions around transitioning away from fossil fuels are expected to be politically charged in Belém. For Africa, any reference to time-bound fossil phaseout pathways must be explicitly linked to the provision of the means of implementation, including finance, technology transfer, capacity-building, and social protection. Many African economies remain dependent on fossil fuel revenues to finance essential public services, while simultaneously facing severe energy access deficits. Hence, just transition pathways for transitioning away from fossil fuels must be nationally determined, equity-based, and sequenced in line with development needs.

At the same time, since the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) provides a framework for aligning climate action with equitable economic transformation, including transition minerals and adopting the UN Panel on Critical Minerals within the COP30 outcome text could ensure that the clean energy shift creates real value for producing countries, workers, and communities. Recognising minerals like lithium, cobalt, and chromite under the JTWP would link decarbonisation to industrialisation, decent work, and technology access, addressing inequality and enabling Africa to benefit fairly from global green value chains.

Finally, Africa's negotiating position should emphasize that a just transition must be people-centered, rights-based, and inclusive of all forms of work, therefore civil society and local community stakeholder participation is crucial to the success of any just transition pathway. The voices of formal and informal workers, women, youth, and communities on the frontlines of transitions should be included in the design, monitoring, and review of just transition strategies. Their inclusion will ensure that the JTWP remains grounded in equity, participation, and human rights, and that no one is left behind as countries pursue pathways toward low-emission, climate-resilient development.



The CMA7 decision in relation to the JTWP should hence also adopt clear standards for meaningful social dialogue and guarantee participation of informal and formal workers and rights-holders in planning and implementation of just transition. Special attention must be paid to the realities of Africa's informal and care economies, which sustain the livelihoods of millions but are often invisible in formal just transition planning. Africa could hence propose that relevant UN agencies such as the UNFCCC secretariat, the ILO, the UN's regional economic commissions such as UNECA, work together to develop and propose specific modules and indicators for integrating informal and care work into national just transition plans. These should cover dimensions such as social protection coverage, access to reskilling and education, and income security.

D. UAE Dialogue on Implementing GST outcomes

The UAE Dialogue, established at COP28 in Dubai as part of the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake (GST) under the Paris Agreement[15], was intended to be a discourse "on implementing the global stocktake outcomes", notably in relation to its placement under the finance section of the GST outcome decision. While its establishment signalled an effort to maintain political momentum for the implementation of GST outcomes, particularly on finance, between GST cycles, the modalities of how this Dialogue will operate, its scope, participation, and reporting arrangements remain to be defined at COP30 after negotiations at COP29 in Baku and in Bonn in June 2025 could not be concluded.[16]

For African countries, clarifying these modalities is essential to ensuring that the Dialogue complements, rather than undermines, the Party-driven multilateral process under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Africa has emphasised that the Dialogue should be focused on the finance aspects of the GST outcome, particularly on financing implementation of the NDCs and NAPs of developing country Parties and agreed climate goals, since the mandate for the Dialogue as detailed in paragraph 97 of the GST outcome was in the finance section of decision 1/CMA.5.

In this context, from an African perspective, the Dialogue must be anchored in the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. This means the UAE Dialogue, in its scope and modalities, should be a space for sharing experiences, best practices, and cooperative initiatives in relation to the implementation of the climate finance obligations of developed countries to support developing countries seeking to inform and update their national climate action plans and international cooperation on climate change based on the GST outcomes. The UAE Dialogue should be supportive of, and not replace, the existing institutional architecture for the delivery of finance commitments under Articles 4.3 to 4.5 and Article 11 of the UNFCCC and Article 9 of its Paris Agreement.

Africa should also be conscious of the institutional process architecture with respect to the GST under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, which envisions that GSTs take place on a five-year cycle beginning in 2023 (hence the second GST would be in 2028), and that the GST outcome "shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined

manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action."[17] Under the existing GST modalities, the cycle for the second GST would commence in late 2026.[18]

Hence, while Africa may remain committed to constructive engagement in discussions on the scope and modalities of the UAE Dialogue, it is essential to ensure that UNFCCC processes remain coherent, efficient, and fit for purpose. As Parties prepare to launch the second Global Stocktake (GST2) in 2026, it is important to avoid unnecessary duplication between processes. If Parties are unable to reach agreement at COP30 on a clearly defined and time-bound mandate for the UAE Dialogue that adds tangible value to implementation, Africa should be open to considering the closure of the Dialogue, recognising that its objectives can be more effectively pursued through the structured, Party-driven processes of GST2 and related mechanisms under the Convention and its Paris Agreement. The resources, political attention, and institutional energy should instead be redirected toward strengthening the mechanisms that will underpin the next phase of global climate implementation, particularly those that deliver finance, technology, and capacity-building support for developing countries.

E. Technology Implementation Programme (TIP)

The Technology Implementation Programme (TIP)[19] was established as part of the outcomes of the first GST "to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism."[20] It represents a critical next step in advancing the Paris Agreement's commitment to accelerate technology development and transfer for climate action. At COP29 in Baku, the Parties decided to launch a process to elaborate the TIP.[21] However, its modalities have not yet been agreed upon, and consideration of this issue is to be taken up again in Belem.[22]

As Parties continue to negotiate on the modalities of the TIP, the debate will determine how the programme supports developing countries in accessing, adapting, and deploying the technologies necessary for both mitigation and adaptation. For Africa, these modalities are central to ensuring that the continent's technology needs, spanning clean energy, resilient agriculture, water management, health, and climate data and early warning systems, are met in ways that are affordable, accessible, equitable, and locally empowering in terms of triggering and supporting domestic technology innovation and development.

Hence, from an African perspective, the TIP must go beyond pilot projects and market-based technology diffusion. Its modalities should ensure affordable access to climate technologies, explicitly address intellectual property barriers, and foster domestic and regional manufacturing capacity. The ability to produce, adapt, and maintain technologies within the continent is indispensable for long-term self-reliance and resilience. Africa cannot remain a passive recipient of imported technologies and must become an active participant in innovation, design, and production. This vision of African scientific and technology innovation and development is outlined in, for example, the African Union's

Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2034. In the climate action area, the Strategy notes that "building climate resilience requires the implementation of robust flood and drought early warning systems".

Noting the importance of early warning systems, the strategy continues: "These systems can provide timely and accurate information to communities, helping them prepare for and mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events. This will include utilising satellite technology, remote sensing, and ground-based observations for data collection and monitoring. It means developing advanced predictive models to forecast the likelihood and severity of these events; establishing efficient communication networks to disseminate warnings and advisories to at-risk communities; and educating communities on interpreting warnings and implementing safety measures. The goal is to foster a culture of preparedness and resilience. It also involves data collection and monitoring, predictive modelling, communication networks, and community training and engagement."[23]

To achieve this, African countries should press for TIP modalities that explicitly incorporate TRIPS flexibilities and compulsory licensing provisions as these are tools already recognised in international law to enable developing countries to access patented technologies critical for climate and development objectives. These modalities should also support endogenous technology innovation and development, providing funding and institutional backing for local research institutions, universities, and entrepreneurs who are developing context-appropriate technologies. This approach aligns with the broader principle that technology transfer must not only be about importing products but about building domestic capability and innovation ecosystems, as clearly indicated in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC[24] and Article 10.5 of its Paris Agreement.

Africa should also advocate for the creation of regional technology hubs under the TIP, serving as centers for training, testing, and co-development of technologies across the continent. Such hubs could link universities, private sector actors, and public research institutions, facilitating knowledge sharing and regional cooperation while reducing duplication and dependency on external suppliers.

African civil society, for its part, can play a vital role in shaping the TIP's inclusiveness and social accountability, particularly for open-source and community-accessible technologies, ensuring that innovations are shared broadly rather than monopolised by a few corporations or countries of primarily the Global North. This would help democratise access to knowledge, enable local adaptation, and support community-driven technological solutions, especially in rural and vulnerable areas.

In essence, the TIP's modalities must operationalise technology equity: breaking down the structural barriers that have long restricted developing countries' access to climate technologies, while empowering Africa to become a producer and innovator in its own right. A well-designed TIP should thus bridge the gap between global commitments and local capabilities.

F. Climate Finance:

Inclusion of Agenda Item on Implementation of Article 9.1 of Paris Agreement

A central priority for Africa at COP30 includes advancing the inclusion of an explicit agenda item on the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which establishes the legal and foundational obligation of developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation.[25] Unlike voluntary pledges or ad hoc initiatives, Article 9.1 enshrines the provision of climate finance as a legally binding duty and a fundamental part of the Paris Agreement that enables effective global climate action and ambition while reflecting the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. The legally binding nature of this obligation of developed countries has also been highlighted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its recent Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.[26] The push for this agenda item stems from the growing frustration among developing countries over the persistent implementation gap between developed countries' treaty commitments[27] to provide climate finance and actual delivery of the same, reflected in the proposals from Parties for the inclusion of such an agenda item on Article 9.1.[28]

For Africa, the inclusion of this agenda item is not merely procedural, but foundational. The continent faces acute adaptation and development challenges that cannot be met through debt-inducing instruments by multilateral development banks or uncertain market-based flows by the private sector. Reinforcing the legal nature of developed countries' obligations is therefore essential to restoring trust and ensuring that climate finance is treated with the same rigour as mitigation and transparency obligations. The debate at COP30 provides an opportunity to move beyond the political narratives of "mobilisation" and "pledges" to reaffirm that finance provision is a legally binding obligation of developed countries grounded in equity and the principle of CBDR-RC, and reflected in the treaty commitments that they have assumed.



Africa should thus strongly support the inclusion of a stand-alone agenda item on Article 9.1 under the COP and CMA as proposed by group of G77+China. This would create a formal space for Parties to review and assess compliance by developed countries of their climate finance obligations under the Paris Agreement, rather than allowing the issue to remain buried within broader finance discussions. Within this agenda item, Africa and other developing countries could call for the establishment of a work programme on modalities of Article 9.1 implementation under which Parties would be able to:

- Obtain information to clarify the extent of provision of finance under Article 9.1 and what is needed to be done in terms of finance provided by developed countries to developing countries since the adoption of the Paris Agreement.
- Address the existing barriers that developing countries face in accessing resources, specifically noting the apparent lack of political will.
- Gain clarity on the forms of finance provided and channels of provision, and the leverage ratios that can be achieved through the provision of finance in mobilisation.
- Enhance and ensure the predictability of financial support for climate action in developing countries through guaranteeing finance for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and tripling adaptation finance, while also providing a home for a new commitment with the strongest legal basis.
- Define the burden-sharing approach among developed countries to establish respective "fair shares" of their collective obligations to provide climate finance, which would allow predictability, transparency, and accountability.
- Ensure equitable geographical and thematic distribution of finance provision among developing countries by providing clear policy directions to developed countries to better account for geographic balance in their climate finance support while considering the different needs, priorities and pathways of developing countries.
- Clarify and ensure the provision of support for the implementation of developing countries' NDCs, NAPs, and other instruments under the Convention.
- Enhance the accountability of developed countries with respect to their provision of climate finance under the Convention and Paris Agreement

At the same time, African civil society movements have a crucial role in shaping the political and moral narrative around this issue. Civil society actors should mobilise narratives grounded in historical responsibility and the principle of CBDR-RC, emphasising that those who have historically contributed most to the climate crisis bear a legal and ethical duty to finance the solutions. This advocacy can help build public and political pressure for a stronger compliance architecture and for the scaling up of public, grant-based climate finance that truly responds to the needs of the most vulnerable.

Ultimately, including Article 9.1 as a distinct agenda item at COP30 is not about revisiting old debates, but restoring balance, credibility, and justice to the Paris Agreement. For Africa, this is a necessary step toward ensuring that climate finance obligations are fulfilled not as acts of charity, but as acts of responsibility and treaty compliance integral to the global climate regime's legitimacy and effectiveness.

Follow up on Accountability and Transparency for NCQG implementation

The provision and mobilisation of adequate and quality financial support by the developed countries is a prerequisite for enabling submission and implementation of ambitious updated NDCs. As such, the overall success at COP30 hinges on ensuring a dedicated negotiated space for Parties to deliberate on development of a concrete annual delivery plan as a follow-up process to secure the implementation of the NCQG decision and its upscaling to US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035 while upholding high transparency and accountability measures. This delivery plan should clearly outline individual and collective actionable, long-term, and predictable funding mechanisms for delivering the required scale of finance that is grant-based and highly concessional through the multilateral climate funds (MCFs) towards achieving the goal of tripling their annual flows from 2022 levels by 2030. This should include multi-year contributions from developed countries to ensure predictable disbursement to facilitate long-term adaptation planning and scaling interventions in developing countries.

This space is crucial to identifying and addressing the gaps and ambiguities of the NCQG goal itself in relation to preserving the differentiation and responsibility of different contributors while safeguarding public finance provision for adaptation and loss and damage. It also provides opportunity to clarify on the operationalisation of all the qualitative elements of the NCQG, including share of grants, with clear differentiation between public finance provided by developed countries and mobilised private finance, additionality aspects, concessionality, and a common definition of climate finance, exclusion list, and grant equivalence accounting and reporting methodology to prevent double counting.

Further, this should be strongly linked to the deliberation on a standing agenda on Article 9.1 to uphold and accelerate the full implementation of developed country parties' public provision obligations while clarifying gaps in predictability and additionality of finance.

Scaling Quality and Accessible Adaptation Finance

COP30 marks a decisive moment for adaptation finance, given the deadline for the Glasgow goal pledge to double adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025. As such, a top priority for Africa will be ensuring that COP30 deliberately prioritises and delivers scaled-up equitable, accessible and transparent adaptation finance in grant and grant-equivalent terms in the context of broader climate finance goals. This could be achieved through different approaches such as:

- **Ensuring that the GGA outcome includes a strong language on provision of public finance in grant and grant-equivalent terms in line with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement and anchored on the NCQG outcome to guarantee scale-up predictable, equitable, accessible and transparent adaptation finance for implementing the GGA and the thematic and dimensional targets under the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.**

- **Calling on developed countries, in the context of implementing the NCQG and the roadmap to US$1.3 trillion, to:**

  - dramatically scale up quality adaptation finance to bridge the widening gap by ensuring a 50/50 balanced allocation of financial resources between adaptation and mitigation actions through long-term programmatic approaches, enhancing coherence, complementarity and effective access from all sources as well as accountability and transparency

  - commit to establishing a new post-2025 adaptation finance pledge that triples the doubling pact from 2025 levels by 2030 and is strongly anchored on public finance provision within the existing frameworks of NCQG and the Baku to Belém US$1.3 trillion Roadmap, during the Leaders' Summit ahead of COP30. This should be coupled with a robust process to set a longer-term target based on the evolving adaptation needs of developing countries as expressed in IPCC assessments, the GST outcome, and progressive NDCs and NAPs. This is crucial to demonstrate the shared principles of justice, equity, and global solidarity that must guide collective actions and support in achieving adaptation objectives.

  - significantly increase provision of public financial resources through multilateral climate funds while prioritising adaptation actions and support. This calls for developed countries to fast-track capitalisation and replenishment of these funds through multi-year contributions towards achieving the goal of tripling their annual outflows from 2022 levels by 2030.

  - streamline access and expand direct access modalities through simplification and harmonisation of application procedures, accreditation processes, project approval times, accelerated disbursements and prioritisation of direct access channels. Moreover, bolster current readiness support delivered through the MCFs for long-term capacity building and institutional strengthening of developing countries via enhanced direct access modalities for national and local entities to institutionalise GGA in their planning, implementation, and reporting of adaptation actions.

"Matters" related to Adaptation Fund (AF)

COP30 should:

- urge developed countries, during the AF Contributor Dialogue at COP30, to commit to increased new pledges and promptly translate existing pledges to multi-year contributions to scale up adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources for the AF additional to the share of proceeds. This will ensure timely disbursement to facilitate long-term adaptation planning and scaling of concrete adaptation interventions in developing countries.
- fast-track the conclusion of negotiations on matters related to all transition arrangements, including trustee, governance arrangements and the fifth review of the fund, in readiness for the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once monetisation of the first share of proceeds under Article 6.4 is triggered. These are crucial as they affect the future resourcing of the fund through Article 6.4, and other voluntary contributions, including Article 6.2.
- call on the AF board to adopt a regular replenishment mechanism and cycle to ensure the sustainability and adequacy in resourcing of the fund. The AF, despite its crucial role in delivering dedicated support for adaptation, remains heavily underfunded, hence fell short of its annual funding target of $300 million in both 2023 and 2024. The fund depends almost exclusively on voluntary contributions from donor countries and generates additional financial resources from receipt of 5% of the CER traded under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement and potential voluntary contributions under Article 6.2. These resources are unstable, subject to market fluctuations and variable demand, and hence cannot serve as a reliable basis for long-term planning.
- call on the GCF board to continue enhancing the 50/50 balance allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation actions in grant-equivalent terms and expand readiness support for adaptation planning in line with the GGA. Also, call for the streamlining and simplifying of access procedures for GCF with other funds to enhance access to and utilisation of adaptation finance at national and local levels.

G: Unilateral Measures: Inclusion of Agenda Item

A key emerging concern for African countries in the lead-up to COP30 is the increasing use of unilateral climate-related trade measures by developed countries, such as the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)[29] and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR)[30], that would have significant implications for developing economies. These measures are often framed as environmental or climate initiatives, but in practice they exert extraterritorial effects on trade and production systems in Africa, effectively imposing new compliance costs and market barriers on exporters from developing countries.

Africa's economies are increasingly exposed to the social and economic impacts of unilateral climate-related trade measures, including the EU's CBAM and due-diligence regulations. These measures threaten export revenues, industrial competitiveness, and jobs in energy-intensive and resource-based sectors.

The issue has long been flagged by developing countries as of concern to them,[31] while developed countries have generally refused to discuss the issue at the UNFCCC[32]. Under Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, the Parties "should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." As part of the GST1 outcomes under the Paris Agreement, the Parties reiterated Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC when the CMA explicitly recognised that "Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change, noting that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."[33]

The issue goes beyond trade competitiveness; it strikes at the heart of the equity principles of the climate regime, particularly CBDR-RC.[34] Unilateral measures introduced by developed countries risk undermining Africa's policy space to design its own climate and development pathways. They can penalise African economies that depend on exports of basic materials and commodities while offering little support for low-carbon industrialisation or value addition. For a continent already grappling with a constrained fiscal space and limited access to climate finance, such measures threaten to entrench dependency rather than enable transformation.[35]

In response, Africa should work together with other developing countries to press for the formal inclusion of this issue as a dedicated agenda item at COP30, ensuring that discussions on unilateral measures become an integral part of the official negotiating agenda rather than being relegated to side debates. This would enable the UNFCCC to provide a legitimate, multilateral forum for addressing the developmental, trade, and equity impacts of such policies, consistent with Article 3.5 of the Convention and Paragraph 154 of the outcome of the first GST under the Paris Agreement.

To operationalise this, African countries could mandate the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) to carry out comprehensive impact assessments of these unilateral measures. The Forum and KCI should also be tasked with proposing concrete support mechanisms for economic diversification, technology upgrading, and resilience-building in affected developing countries. This would ensure that trade-related climate measures do not become disguised forms of protectionism, but rather trigger genuine international cooperation to enable equitable transitions.

Additionally, the JTWP should explicitly recognise trade dimensions as part of the just transition agenda. Africa could propose the establishment of a workstream on trade-related just transition impacts under the JTWP to assess distributive effects, explore cooperative approaches, and develop mitigation measures for vulnerable sectors and workers. This would provide an evidence base for aligning trade, climate, and development policies in a fair and balanced manner.

At the same time, civil society organisations should play a pivotal role in framing this issue within a global justice perspective, highlighting the dangers of "green protectionism" and mobilising solidarity coalitions across the Global South. Such coalitions can amplify developing countries' collective voice, challenge unilateralism, and promote alternative models of cooperation based on mutual benefit, shared responsibility, and sustainable development.

In essence, the inclusion of a COP30 agenda item on unilateral measures is about defending multilateralism, equity, and development sovereignty. It seeks to ensure that climate action, however ambitious, does not come at the expense of the economic survival and policy autonomy of African and other developing countries.

H. Special Needs and Circumstances of Africa: Inclusion of Agenda Item

Africa has long proposed the inclusion of a dedicated agenda item on addressing Africa's special needs and circumstances in relation to climate change, reflecting the continent's growing call for equitable recognition within the multilateral climate regime.[36] African negotiators have long stressed that such needs and circumstances have been recognised in Article 4.1(e) of the UNFCCC and in various COP decisions.



The political basis of this position is the call for recognition of Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change. While Africa contributes the least to global greenhouse gas emissions, it remains the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, facing escalating threats to food security, water availability, public health, and economic stability. Africa's unique situation arises from a combination of biophysical vulnerability, economic dependence, development status, and limited adaptive capacity. The continent faces intensifying droughts, floods, cyclones, and heatwaves that threaten agricultural production and human livelihoods. At the same time, limited access to finance, technology, and infrastructure constrains adaptation and resilience-building, forcing governments to choose between development and climate action. African countries are also confronted with a narrowing policy and fiscal space due to debt burdens, volatile commodity markets, and new extraterritorial climate-related trade measures that undermine export revenues and industrialisation efforts. These interlocking crises make it imperative for the UNFCCC process to systematically recognise and address Africa's special needs and circumstances, ensuring that global climate action frameworks respond to the continent's realities and priorities.

Africa's overarching interest is to secure formal recognition and operational support for its special circumstances under both the Convention and the Paris Agreement. This recognition should translate into enhanced access to finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building, alongside tailored mechanisms for monitoring, reporting, and reviewing progress in addressing the continent's adaptation and development challenges. Africa also seeks to ensure that its needs are mainstreamed across all thematic areas, including adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation, and just transitions, rather than treated as an afterthought. Equally important for Africa is the integration of the continent's special circumstances into global stocktake processes, transparency frameworks, and financial mechanism replenishments, ensuring differentiated treatment based on vulnerability and capacity

Despite this, Africa has yet to be accorded a distinct, institutionalised space under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement processes to address its specific vulnerabilities and structural constraints, unlike other recognised categories such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the latter of which are predominantly based in Africa. Progress in advancing Africa's special needs and circumstances proposal has often stalled due to both political and technical constraints unique to the UNFCCC negotiations process. Parties that have opposed this proposal have done so because of one or more of the following:

- **It could set a political precedent, in that new regional groups of countries would then have a basis for asking for similar consideration. The opposition, comprised mainly of developed countries, generally prefers to address all such concerns under existing cross-cutting agenda items such as adaptation, finance, capacity-building, or response measures, rather than through region-specific processes, to avoid fragmenting the UNFCCC agenda**

- The proposal is legally sensitive as it could result in allowing for or introducing a new "category" of Parties. The developed country opposition mainly argues that the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement already identify specific categories of Parties with "special needs and circumstances" such as the LDCs and SIDS, and that adding Africa as a new formal category would require amending existing legal texts or COP decisions. They claim that the African continent includes both LDCs and middle-income countries, so a blanket recognition of "Africa" would not be consistent with the Convention's existing differentiation structure among developing countries

- There is concern about the financial consequences of such recognition. Developed countries are concerned that recognising Africa's special needs and circumstances could strengthen calls for region-specific finance quotas, technology transfer obligations, or differentiated reporting obligations, hence reinforcing the CBDR-RC principle that developed countries often seek to minimise or move away from. A formal agenda item could eventually lead to dedicated finance windows, special access modalities, or quantitative targets for Africa. Developed countries fear that this would institutionalise additional resource commitments, possibly through earmarked contributions to the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, or a new Africa-specific facility. Instead, they prefer to channel climate finance through global thematic windows such as adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage rather than geographically defined ones to preserve flexibility and avoid regional quotas

- Opposing Parties often argue that this agenda item would be procedurally inconvenient as Africa's issues are "mainstreamed" through existing bodies and agenda items, such as the LDC Expert Group, Adaptation Committee, Finance Standing Committee, and Technology Mechanism, and therefore do not need a separate track. They point out that Africa is represented in these bodies and can submit regional inputs through those channels. Additionally, developed country delegations often cite "agenda inflation," claiming that adding new items would further overload negotiators and secretariat resources. They push for "streamlining" rather than expanding the agenda, using this procedural argument to block new Africa-specific items.

- Some developing countries and other developing country groups have been neutral or non-committal, concerned that Africa's recognition might create a hierarchy among developing countries or divert attention and resources from LDCs and SIDS. This internal fragmentation within the G77 weakens Africa's push and provides justification for developed countries to say the issue "does not have consensus."

To respond to the arguments opposing the inclusion of Africa's special needs and circumstances agenda item, Africa could stress the following:

- Recognising Africa's special needs and circumstances through a dedicated agenda item under the COP and CMA is both justified and necessary to ensure the effective and equitable implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. This proposal is not about creating new legal categories of Parties or imposing new obligations on others.
- Africa's situation is unique. It is the only continent composed almost entirely of developing countries that face multiple, overlapping vulnerabilities such as limited fiscal and institutional capacity, heavy dependence on climate-sensitive sectors, low adaptive capacity, and an ever-widening finance gap. These circumstances are quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of any other region. Recognising them formally within the UNFCCC process is therefore consistent with the principles of equity and CBDR-RC enshrined in the Convention.
- The proposed agenda item would not create a new legal category of Parties. Rather, it seeks political recognition similar to that already afforded to Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and economies in transition through COP decisions. Such recognition can be achieved without amending the Convention. It would simply acknowledge Africa's specific context and provide a structured space within the UNFCCC process to address the continent's distinct implementation challenges.
- Far from fragmenting the agenda, a dedicated Africa item would bring coherence and efficiency. Africa's concerns currently appear in multiple, scattered agenda items on adaptation, finance, capacity-building, and response measures, with no integrative mechanism to track overall progress. A single agenda item would consolidate these discussions, enhance coordination, and reduce duplication. It would make the agenda leaner and more outcome-oriented by focusing attention on real gaps in delivery.
- Establishing this agenda item would not automatically entail new financial commitments or obligations. Recognition would simply allow Parties to assess how existing obligations, particularly those under Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the Convention and Article 9 of its Paris Agreement, are being met in the African context. It would improve the efficiency and transparency of finance delivery, helping to ensure that existing mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, and Loss and Damage Fund respond effectively to Africa's priorities. In this way, the agenda item would strengthen implementation rather than create new burdens.

- The proposed recognition also supports cooperation, not division. It provides a practical platform for partnerships between Africa and development partners on technology, capacity-building, and just transition initiatives. By creating an institutional space for results-based collaboration, it enhances trust and demonstrates that the multilateral system can respond to regions most in need. Recognition of Africa's special circumstances is thus an opportunity for developed and developing countries alike to operationalise the Paris Agreement's commitment to leaving no one behind.
- This recognition is fully consistent with the Convention's principles and the Paris Agreement's implementation logic. Both instruments already identify Parties that are "particularly vulnerable" to climate impacts. Acknowledging Africa's circumstances would give operational meaning to those provisions and help align global implementation efforts with the realities on the ground. It would also help integrate Africa's development, adaptation, and resilience priorities into global frameworks such as NDCs, long-term strategies, and just transition workstreams.
- This proposal complements, rather than competes with, existing recognition of LDCs and SIDS. Many African countries fall within those categories and others share similar constraints. Recognition of Africa's circumstances strengthens, rather than weakens, developing-country solidarity by ensuring that each region's specific context is visible and addressed in a coordinated way.

Africa should stress that it is open to pragmatic, streamlined arrangements for implementing this agenda item. It could propose "light touch" procedural modalities, such as a biennial stocktake format or concise synthesis reports, to ensure that the process remains efficient and does not overburden the COP agenda. Having a specific agenda item would facilitate a structured, ongoing discussion leading to formal recognition through a COP/CMA decision and an accompanying work programme or platform. This platform would then provide the space through which actions such as the following could be fostered:

- Periodic assessments of Africa's climate vulnerabilities and capacity gaps.
- Recommendations for scaling up support, including through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund.
- Monitoring and reviewing of how multilateral climate actions and financial mechanisms address Africa's specific circumstances.

A review clause could be included to reassess its relevance after an initial period, demonstrating Africa's flexibility and commitment to an efficient process.

In summary, Africa's call for a dedicated agenda item is not about creating divisions or demanding privileges. It is about ensuring that the Convention and the Paris Agreement remain responsive to empirical realities and moral imperatives. Recognition of Africa's

special needs and circumstances would enhance coherence, improve delivery of support, and strengthen global solidarity. It is a necessary step to make climate action truly equitable and to ensure that the continent most affected but least responsible for climate change can pursue sustainable development and resilience on fair terms.

In essence, the inclusion of an agenda item on Africa's special needs and circumstances seeks to fill a persistent structural gap in the climate regime. It is a call for institutional recognition, not exceptionalism, for equity to be translated into practice. By articulating the proposal as a means to improve implementation, coordination, and accountability, rather than to renegotiate legal categories, Africa can build broad-based support and minimise opposition. The outcome would reaffirm that the global climate regime remains responsive to the regions most affected by climate change and least equipped to cope, thereby strengthening both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNFCCC process.

III

Presidency's Action Agenda (Non-Negotiated)



A. Baku to Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 Trillion

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 trillion[37] is a non-negotiating political cosultation process with Parties under the guidance of the Azerbaijan COP29 and Brazil COP30 presidencies. The Roadmap is aimed at "scaling up climate finance to developing country Parties to support low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways and implement the nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans including through grants, concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives as appropriate."[38] The roadmap is intended to operationalise the global aspirational goal set out in the Baku NCQG decision[39] of scaling up climate finance to developing countries to at least US$1.3 trillion per year by 2035. The COP29 and COP30 Presidencies are mandated to conclude and produce a report summarising their work under this mandate at COP30, with no further mandate for Parties to discuss how to consider or act upon such a report.

But for developing countries, and for Africa in particular, the key question is not only how much finance will be mobilised, but what kind of finance it will be, who controls it, and how equitably it will be distributed. From an African perspective, the Roadmap must be anchored in the legal obligations of developed countries under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, not reduced to a narrative of "mobilising all sources" of finance. Africa's priority should be to ensure that the $1.3 trillion target is not met through complex or opaque accounting methodologies, blended finance schemes, or repackaged private flows that fail to reach those most in need, particularly in Africa. Climate finance must be predictable, transparent, and equitable, rooted in public, grant-based flows that directly support adaptation, resilience-building, and just transition efforts across the continent.

To this end, African countries should call for the institutionalisation of annual progress reports between 2026 to 2035 on the Roadmap's implementation, with disaggregation between public and private finance, and further breakdowns showing the shares of grants, concessional loans, and market-rate instruments, and highlighting how developed countries are taking the lead in contributing to the US$1.3 trillion annually by the 2035 target. This transparency is essential to prevent the double counting of non-concessional flows and to ensure that genuine financial support rather than debt-creating instruments is provided through the Roadmap.

Africa should also demand the establishment of a minimum floor for grant-based finance specifically earmarked for adaptation and loss and damage. Given the continent's acute climate vulnerability and limited fiscal space, a defined share of public, non-debt finance is necessary to ensure that Africa is not left behind in the global financing architecture. This could be operationalised through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Adaptation Fund, and the new Loss and Damage Fund, with regular tracking against agreed benchmarks.

For civil society, the Roadmap must become a site of vigilance and accountability. Civil society organisations should expose the risks of greenwashing and double counting, particularly where private investments are presented as substitutes for public obligations. They should advocate for justice-based finance tracking, emphasising not just volumes

of finance but their distributive impact, including who benefits, under what terms, and whether the funds truly contribute to equitable, transformative climate action.

In essence, Africa's engagement with the Baku to Belém Roadmap should be principled and strategic: supportive of global ambition but firmly grounded in equity, accountability, and legal obligation. The Roadmap must not become a political cover for inaction or financial rebranding[40]; rather, it should serve as a way through which Parties can ensure that by 2035, climate finance has become genuinely fair, accessible, and transformative, advancing both climate resilience and sustainable development across the African continent.

B. Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF)

As COP30 approaches, the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF)[41] is fast becoming one of the most debated climate-finance proposals. On paper, Brazil's flagship initiative, anchored on a US$125 billion Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF), aims to reward tropical forest countries (TFCs) for keeping their forests standing, with at least 20 percent of payments directed to Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). But beneath the promise lies a complex architecture of leverage, investment, and governance which demands a careful critique[42] from the vantage point of African interests.

The TFFF/TFIF design relies on a layered capital hierarchy in which junior capital donors or sponsors provide credit enhancement, and participating TFC governments issue senior bonds to attract institutional investors. The profits or returns from these investments are intended to finance payments to participating tropical forest countries. But a core criticism is that much of the value "generated" may in fact derive from recycling funds flowing from developing countries themselves, through debt servicing and returns on sovereign bonds. In effect, the scheme may end up resulting in the TFCs themselves self-financing tropical forest conservation in an opaque way, with limited net transfers from developed to developing nations.[43] From a developing country and African perspective, this raises serious questions about additionality, accountability, fairness, and burden shifting. For Congo Basin TFCs, the stakes are especially high given both their financial constraints and their need to provide their forests, hence what they need are clear and transparent financing rather than mechanisms that obscure who ultimately pays.



Because the TFFF is explicitly structured around tropical rainforests, non-rainforest African countries such as those with savannah woodlands, dry forests, mangroves, and other biomes might find themselves excluded or marginalised. This selective framing undermines pan-African equity, as all parts of Africa's forested ecosystems face climate, biodiversity, development, and land pressures and deserve support under a forest finance mechanism that claims global ambition.

Also, the current TFFF design concentrates decision-making power with donor or sponsor countries, financial managers, large conservation NGOs, and financial institutions, with minimal participation by developing countries, Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. This structure risks turning the facility into a top-down mechanism where countries of the Global North determine priorities, eligibility, and performance metrics for forest protection in the South. The TFIF board is envisioned as being appointed largely by sovereign sponsors, with minimal or no formal role for Tropical Forest Countries (TFCs), IPLCs, or national oversight bodies. That raises red flags about accountability, conflicts of interest, and skewed incentives. Moreover, because the TFIF and TFFF are legally and institutionally separated, there is a governance gap: the TFIF may act independently (e.g. in investment policy), unmoored from the conservation and equity objectives of the TFFF. Without robust vertical accountability, i.e. the TFIF reporting to the TFFF Board, or requiring TFFF concurrence on key decisions, there is a real risk that financial profitability considerations will overmatch the TFFF's ostensible environmental purpose.

For Africa, this is unacceptable. African countries should insist that any mechanism addressing forests and climate must be multilateral, transparent, and equitable, operating under the authority and guidance of the COP, the CMA, and the CBD COP. Governance should ensure full and effective participation of African and other developing countries, Indigenous Peoples, and Local Communities. The TFFF, as currently designed, appears to be hosted outside the UN system, potentially undermining the established Global Environment Facility (GEF), Green Climate Fund (GCF), and Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) structures, and setting a precedent for parallel, donor-controlled institutions. Africa should therefore question the legitimacy and accountability of the TFFF to the UNFCCC process.

While the TFFF is promoted by its proponents as a performance-based trust fund to provide stable, long-term finance for forest conservation, African countries should approach it with caution. Evidence and critiques from civil society analyses suggest that the TFFF risks reproducing the very patterns of financialisation, inequity, and neocolonial control that have undermined equitable climate and biodiversity action in the past.

For example, there are concerns that the TFFF embodies the financialisation of tropical forests, transforming ecosystems into assets whose value is defined by carbon sequestration or biodiversity credits rather than their intrinsic ecological and social importance. Its structure relies heavily on natural resource endowment-based returns, market logic, and "performance payments" that link disbursements to externally defined indicators such as avoided deforestation or emission reductions. Such an approach risks reinforcing market-based forest governance that privileges investors and financial

intermediaries over communities who live in and depend on these forests. It also builds on the same logic as REDD+ and other offset schemes that have faced widespread criticism for displacing communities, restricting customary land use, and enabling continued pollution in the North through carbon credits generated in the South.

For Africa, where most tropical forests are community-managed and integral to local livelihoods, the TFFF's reliance on market-based incentives could deepen land tenure insecurity, privatisation of commons, and social conflicts. Africa should therefore be wary of this potential commodification and financialisation of African tropical rainforests and reaffirm that conservation finance must be non-market-based, rights-centered, and directly supportive of national and local priorities, consistent with Articles 5 and 6.8 of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) Target 19 on equitable resource mobilisation.

Furthermore, the TFFF's performance-based model and donor-led design could erode national sovereignty and policy space over forest governance. By linking finance to compliance with externally determined "performance" metrics, such as measured deforestation rates or specific carbon outcomes, it could result in the imposition of externally driven policy conditionalities on African forest policies and development plans. A critique of the TFFF describes this as a form of "continuing colonialism," where control over tropical forest policy is outsourced to global financiers, auditors, and consultancies based in the North.[44] Such conditionality is reminiscent of the structural adjustment programmes of the past, substituting economic performance indicators with ecological ones but retaining the same logic of external control.

Africa should emphasize that sovereign decision-making and national ownership over forests, land, and resources are non-negotiable. Any international mechanism must respect national forest governance frameworks, customary land rights, and community-based approaches. Africa should also call for full disclosure of the TFFF's governance documents, financial flows, and decision-making processes, and demand that no country's forest policy or land-use planning should be subject to external conditionalities tied to donor funding.

The TFFF lacks clear transparency and accountability mechanisms, including provisions for independent monitoring, grievance procedures, or safeguards for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Its proposed use of private fund managers and blended finance structures risks channeling resources through intermediaries with limited public oversight, repeating previous climate finance governance mistakes of other funds. Africa should call for strong environmental, social, and human rights safeguards, participatory monitoring frameworks, and public reporting on all financial flows. It should also demand that any forest-related finance mechanism must comply with free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) standards, equitable benefit-sharing, and the protection of community land and tenure rights.

It is also worrying that the TFFF could divert political attention and resources away from existing multilateral funds, particularly the GCF, GEF, and Adaptation Fund, that are already mandated to support forest-related activities under the UNFCCC and CBD. By positioning

itself as a "permanent financing solution" for tropical forests, the TFFF risks creating parallel and competing financial architectures outside the authority of the COP and CMA. Such fragmentation should be of deep concern for Africa because it undermines the coherence and integrity of the multilateral climate finance system and weakens the ability of developing countries to oversee, coordinate, and access resources on equitable terms. Africa's position should reaffirm the centrality of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, reject any duplication of mandates, and insist that all forest finance initiatives remain subject to COP guidance and accountability.

The TFFF's framing obscures the historical and structural causes of deforestation, which lie largely in global consumption patterns, extractive industries, and unequal trade relations driven by developed countries. It risks shifting responsibility for protecting the world's tropical forests onto the shoulders of developing countries, while enabling the continued exploitation of forest-risk commodities by Northern corporations. Africa should insist that true solutions to deforestation and forest degradation must address global systemic drivers, including trade, debt, and unsustainable consumption. Any international mechanism must be based on climate and ecological justice, grounded in historical responsibility, and supportive of sustainable development in the Global South.

For Africa, the TFFF risks institutionalising a new layer of financial and ecological dependency, reinforcing market-based conservation that prioritises investors over people and the planet. African countries should therefore approach it with strategic caution while demanding full transparency, accountability to the COP, and safeguards for sovereignty, rights, and justice. Rather than accepting another donor-driven mechanism, Africa should champion a multilateral, public, and rights-based approach to forest finance that reflects the principles of equity, solidarity, and sustainable development at the core of the UNFCCC and CBD. While it can endorse the broad vision of forest finance that the TFFF seeks to achieve, Africa should insist that doing so must be on terms that protect sovereignty, ensure equity, guard against offsets, and respect community rights.

By demanding strong governance, direct access, and broad ecosystem inclusion, Africa could push the TFFF into being a genuine tool for sustainable forest futures and a credible pathway grounded in climate justice and development. In this context, Africa could propose the following key principles that the TFFF should reflect:

- **Governance:** The TFFF must not operate outside the UNFCCC and CBD frameworks. Any forest finance mechanism should be multilateral, transparent, equitable, and subject to COP and CMA authority.
- **Inclusion of all forest types:** The scope of eligible ecosystems must be broadened to include dryland forests, savannah woodlands, mangroves, and other African forest ecosystems, not just tropical rainforests
- **Finance:** Forest financing must be grant-based, predictable, and non-market, avoiding offset schemes and speculative financial instruments.
- **Sovereignty and rights:** Forest policies must remain nationally determined. Community land rights, FPIC, and local benefit-sharing must be guaranteed.
- **Accountability:** All operations must include strong safeguards, public oversight, and mechanisms for grievance and redress. Community rights, tenure security, and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) must be embedded; governance must be transparent; and communities must have participation and grievance rights. They should also monitor for greenwashing and financial opacity, ensuring that TFFF is measured by real outcomes, not just financial flows
- **Systemic coherence:** The TFFF should not duplicate or undermine existing UN funds; resources for forest protection should flow through the established Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement and/or that of the CBD.
- **Equity and justice:** Address the structural causes of deforestation rooted in global trade and consumption, rather than imposing conditionality on developing countries.

C. Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade

The COP30 Presidency has also proposed the creation of a new forum for governments to discuss how climate policy affects trade. The Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade, proposed as a Presidency-led voluntary initiative, aims to informally convene governments to explore the linkages between international trade and climate action. Framed as a collaborative space to identify best practices, mobilise investment, and promote "green trade," the Forum is expected to operate outside the formal UNFCCC negotiating structures.[45]

For Africa, engagement in the initiative must be strategic and principled. The continent's interest lies not in rejecting dialogue, but in ensuring that such voluntary initiatives do not dilute the rights, principles, and obligations enshrined under the UNFCCC and the Paris

Agreement, especially the principle of CBDR-RC. Africa's trade and climate priorities are distinct: building productive capacity, securing fair market access, and leveraging trade policy for structural transformation, not merely greening exports to fit Northern standards.

Africa should stress that any discussions in the Forum should recognise and address the risks of unilateralism, particularly the rise of climate-related trade measures such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). These measures, while presented as climate instruments, function as barriers to African exports and add constraints to national development policy spaces. Africa should use the Forum to articulate a clear, collective response, emphasising that climate and trade must reinforce, not undermine, sustainable development and equitable participation in global markets.

To this end, Africa could engage actively in the Forum but make clear that its outputs and conclusions cannot substitute for, or pre-empt, the intergovernmental negotiations under the UNFCCC, WTO, or other relevant multilateral bodies. Voluntary dialogue cannot replace legally binding obligations, nor can it set de facto standards for developing countries without inclusive multilateral decision-making.

At the same time, Africa can leverage any knowledge gained from engaging in the Forum to develop its own trade-climate agenda. This could include coordinating African regional approaches to climate-compatible industrialisation, promoting intra-African value chains in renewable energy and sustainable commodities, and strengthening collective bargaining power in global trade–climate governance. This would allow African countries to shape trade rules and climate measures on their own terms and rooted in regional priorities of resilience, diversification, and inclusive growth.

Finally, civil society organisations have a crucial watchdog role to play. They must monitor the Forum to prevent corporate capture, expose any tendencies toward trade-based green protectionism, and ensure that discussions remain grounded in justice, transparency, and people-centered development. Civil society engagement can help ensure that the Forum does not become a stage for legitimising private-sector agendas, but rather a space where developing countries' perspectives and community voices shape the global conversation on trade and climate.

D. NDCs Synthesis Report

The new NDCs Synthesis Report by the United Nations, which integrates analyses of countries' updated targets to address climate change through 2030 and new targets for 2035, confirms that only 64 countries have submitted their third round of plans, with 131 countries missing and several large-emitting emerging economies not on the submission list. With most countries yet to submit new emissions-cutting plans, it is not clear how the upcoming NDC review will happen, especially with the inclusion of 2035 emissions targets for the first time.



With the intention to showcase global progress toward the Paris Agreement goals, the NDCs Synthesis Report aggregates Parties' mitigation, adaptation, and support commitments to provide a snapshot of ambition and implementation readiness. However, for African countries, the way this synthesis is designed and presented carries profound political and practical implications, particularly regarding visibility of conditional elements, finance gaps, and implementation constraints. Africa's key concern is that these reports should faithfully reflect the differentiated circumstances, needs, and constraints of developing countries, and particularly of African states, whose climate actions are heavily conditional on the provision of finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support.

Africa's overriding interest is to ensure that the synthesis does not present NDCs as purely technical emissions inventories but as development-linked commitments conditioned on the provision of means of implementation. Most African NDCs contain unconditional actions (those achievable with domestic resources) and conditional actions (those dependent on international support). When these conditional elements are aggregated or obscured in the synthesis, the global picture misleadingly suggests that Africa's ambition is lower than it truly is, when in reality, implementation is constrained by finance, technology, and capacity gaps. Africa must therefore insist that such reports clearly distinguish between unconditional and conditional commitments, quantify the associated finance and technology needs, and highlight the scale of unmet support that continues to constrain implementation. This differentiation is essential to uphold the principle of CBDR-RC and to prevent the narrative of "low ambition" being unfairly directed at the Global South.

In this context, African countries should therefore press the COP Presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat to ensure that the synthesis reports explicitly disaggregate finance gaps by region and sector, identifying where unmet needs are most severe. This disaggregation will make visible the structural inequities in global climate finance flows and highlight the gap between developing countries' actual needs as expressed in their NDCs and what has been agreed under the NCQG, much less what is actually being provided. The reports could provide an important opportunity to make visible the financing gap for Africa's climate action. The continent's combined NDC implementation costs are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually, yet disbursements to date remain far below those levels. If the synthesis reports fail to adequately capture and disaggregate these figures, they obscure the real scale of Africa's needs. African countries could therefore advocate that the reports include a dedicated section or annex on regional finance, technology, and capacity-building needs, disaggregated by region and level of conditionality. This would ensure that the narrative around ambition is matched by an equally robust analysis of the means of implementation gap, a key African priority for COP30.

Africa should also advocate that the synthesis reports fully reflect adaptation and just transition components, not only mitigation targets. Previous synthesis reports have focused disproportionately on mitigation ambition and emissions trajectories, often treating adaptation commitments as secondary or qualitative. For Africa, which faces severe climate impacts and whose NDCs often prioritise adaptation, this imbalance undermines the holistic nature of the Paris Agreement. Africa should therefore call for future reports to give equal weight to adaptation, highlighting how countries are enhancing resilience, reducing vulnerability, and aligning national adaptation efforts with the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). The reports should also capture the co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation, the role of just transitions, and the importance of addressing loss and damage, which are central to African climate priorities. Many African NDCs prioritise climate resilience, sustainable agriculture, and social protection alongside emission reductions. Recognising these elements within the reports would help shift the global narrative from one focused narrowly on emissions to one that encompasses resilience, equity, and sustainable development.

Africa should also encourage the Presidency and the UNFCCC secretariat to hold regional dialogues following the publication of the Synthesis Report, allowing African countries to validate how their NDCs have been represented and to provide corrections or clarifications into the official record.

IV

Cross-Cutting Strategies for Africa at COP30



In the lead-up to COP30 in Belém, Africa's effectiveness will depend not only on the strength of its substantive positions but on the coherence of its cross-cutting strategies. The negotiations ahead, spanning finance, adaptation, technology, and trade, are becoming increasingly interconnected. As global processes fragment and political polarisation deepens, Africa's leverage will hinge on its ability to project unity, deepen alliances, and align its official positions with broader social and moral narratives on justice and equity.

The first pillar of this strategy is maintaining unity within the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). The AGN must continue to speak with a single, coordinated voice across thematic areas, especially finance, adaptation, and trade-related climate measures. A coherent negotiating strategy will help prevent issue fragmentation, where Africa's priorities risk being divided or traded off across different negotiating tracks. Internal coordination should ensure that Africa's stance on various negotiating agenda items all reinforce one another under a shared vision of equity and sustainable development. Unity also allows Africa to resist attempts by developed countries to isolate or divide the continent on specific issues, ensuring that its positions are recognised as representing a continental consensus rooted in common vulnerabilities and development aspirations.

The second cross-cutting strategy is to strengthen engagement with African civil society, ensuring that advocacy for climate justice is amplified through grassroots and regional voices. Civil Society Organisations play a vital role in translating technical negotiation issues into human realities, linking global decisions to their impacts on farmers, fishers, youth, Indigenous Peoples, and women. By highlighting these on-the-ground experiences, civil society can shape public opinion and global narratives around equity, loss and damage, and just transitions. Africa should therefore champion inclusive participation at COP30, ensuring that civil society, women, and youth delegates are meaningfully integrated into preparatory processes and represented in national delegations. This inclusivity not only strengthens legitimacy but also aligns with Africa's broader message that climate action must be people-centered and justice-driven.

Third, Africa's influence can be magnified through strategic South–South cooperation. The continent should work closely with other developing-country groupings, such as the G77 and China, Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), the Arab Group, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), the Least Developed Countries Group (LDC Group), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and regional groupings across Asia and Latin America, to advance shared positions on adaptation, finance, trade, and technology transfer. These alliances can help counterbalance developed country narratives and inject collective weight into demands for predictable, public finance, equitable trade frameworks, and reform of intellectual property regimes that hinder technology access. By coordinating with these blocs, Africa can ensure that its calls for fairness and implementation support are echoed across the Global South, transforming fragmented advocacy into a coherent political front.

V

Concluding Reflections: Towards an Equitable Implementation COP with an African Touch



COP30 in Belém represents more than another step in the UNFCCC process; it can be a defining moment for rebalancing the climate regime toward justice, delivery, and genuine multilateralism. For Africa, the challenge is not simply to defend existing commitments, but to turn decades of normative progress into concrete outcomes that materially improve lives and livelihoods across the continent. After years of pledges, frameworks, and dialogues, Belém must become the moment when implementation finally begins in earnest, and when the global community demonstrates that the promise of equity can be realised in practice.

Across the COP30 negotiating agenda, Africa's priorities converge around a single message: implementation and delivery must match commitment. The establishment of adaptation indicators under the Global Goal on Adaptation must translate resilience needs into measurable, finance-linked actions that reflect African realities, from food systems and water management to health and infrastructure. The Just Transition Work Programme must evolve from dialogue to delivery, grounded in development-centered transitions that expand energy access, create jobs, and safeguard communities, rather than impose externally defined fossil phase-out pathways. On finance, COP30 must move beyond aspirational mobilisation to legally anchored provision, operationalising Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement as a binding obligation of developed countries.

Africa must also remain vigilant in shaping the broader ecosystem of climate governance. The UAE Dialogue must enhance, not duplicate, the Global Stocktake and finance architecture. The Technology Implementation Programme must break through the structural barriers of intellectual property and empower Africa to become a producer and innovator in its own right. The fight against unilateral climate-related trade measures must continue as part of Africa's defense of policy space and equitable participation in the global economy. And the recognition of Africa's special needs and circumstances remains essential to ensure that implementation is guided by differentiated realities, not one-size-fits-all metrics.

Engagement with the COP30 Presidency's non-negotiated Action Agenda must be equally strategic. Africa can use the Baku–Belém Roadmap to press for accountability and transparency in the US$1.3 trillion finance goal, demanding clarity on grant-based finance and equitable distribution. The continent should critically engage the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, not to reject it outright, but to reshape it into a multilateral, rights-based, and transparent mechanism under COP oversight. Likewise, participation in the Integrated Climate Change and Trade Forum should advance Africa's own agenda for fair trade, regional industrialisation, and sustainable economic diversification.

To succeed in this complex landscape, Africa's greatest asset will be unity and coherence. The AGN must continue to act as one voice, articulating shared positions that link finance, adaptation, technology, and trade under a single narrative of climate justice and sustainable development. Civil society, Indigenous Peoples, and youth movements must remain integral partners, translating technical debates into moral imperatives and ensuring that the human face of climate impacts and solutions remains visible. Africa's alliances across the Global South, through G77 and China, LMDC, BASIC, Arab Group, LDC Group, and others, must be strengthened to amplify collective leverage and resist efforts to dilute or reframe the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.

Ultimately, COP30 offers Africa a moment to reaffirm that climate action must be both ambitious and just. Implementation cannot be measured only in gigatons of carbon reduced, but in livelihoods protected, communities empowered, and development pathways made sustainable. The continent's engagement in Belém should therefore rest on a clear and confident vision: a climate regime that delivers real resources, respects sovereignty, promotes fairness, and leaves no African behind.

If Belém is to be remembered as the "Implementation COP," then it must also be remembered as the COP where Africa's voice shaped the path from promises to practice, where equity moved from principle to reality, and where the foundations of a more just global climate order were strengthened for the decades ahead.

Endnotes

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