COP29 SCORECARD: TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AGAINST THE AFRICAN AGENDA



POWER SHIFT AFRICA

1. Introduction

The 29th session of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) (COP29) was held in Baku, Azerbaijan from 11th to 22nd November 2024 under the theme "In Solidarity for a Green World". It attracted over 75,000 participants from across governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, academia, the private sector, Indigenous peoples, and the media.



The summit also hosted the 6th Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6), the 19th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), and the 61st sessions of both the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 61) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 61). COP29, billed as a "Climate Finance COP", occurred amidst a significant midpoint of the critical decade to 2030 for climate action, with an agreement on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance taking centre stage.

Unfortunately, COP29 took place against the backdrop of growing mistrust in multilateralism, widespread record-breaking climate change-induced events, and the urgent need for enhanced global action on solidarity and finance, particularly for the most vulnerable and the least responsible. This urgency was further compounded by a petrochemical state as host country, a shifting geopolitical landscape - including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine - as well as the rise of far-right leadership in Europe and the United States, with the election of President Trump standing out. These overlapping complexities casted a shadow over Baku's ability to meet the high expectations of the new finance goal. Nonetheless, the conference adopted the **Baku Climate Unity Pact,** comprising critical outcomes on the NCQG, the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, and the global goal on adaptation.

Prior to the conference, African stakeholders, among them CSOs, had published a report titled **Africa's Demands for COP29** that clearly stipulated the continent's key priorities and expectations to ensure that the outcomes from the summit reflected their needs and aspirations, and were geared towards achieving sustainable development in the face of climate change. The position papers stressed the urgent need for substantial growth in both quantity and quality of climate finance to meet developing countries' needs for a just transition towards sustainability and resilience to climate change. Most importantly, the NCQG outcome was poised to unlock the true scale of finance and actions required to deliver COP28's first global stocktake (GST) outcomes. The 'UAE Consensus' is hailed as the most ambitious and comprehensive set of negotiated outcomes to keep the 1.5°C temperature limit alive.

To this end, this report aims to assess COP29's outcomes against the African demands paper, critically evaluating the progress and identifying gaps where further action is required to meet the continent's unique climate action and justice challenges.

1.1 The African Agenda at COP29: An Overview

Going into COP29, Africa and other developing countries had climate finance negotiations as top priority. COP29 was mandated to deliver a new climate finance goal for the post-2025 period, replacing the existing USD100 billion per year.[1] Developing countries called for an ambitious, needs-based and optimally structured NCQG on climate finance that responds to the ever-increasing climate vulnerabilities and restores trust in the multilateral climate regime.

1 Decision 1/CP16, paragraph 98, the Cancun Agreement, and Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53.

In view of the above, the paper called for progressive outcomes at COP29, including requisite ambitious financing modalities for implementation of all the GST outcomes; advancing adaptation efforts and financing; further capitalization of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage; supporting African just transitions and sustainable development; and the global financial architecture reform agenda. The specific strategic demands for Africa are summarized below:

1.1.1 A Commitment to Enhance Support to Africa and other Developing Countries

The **African Climate Finance Agenda for COP29**[2] emphasized that the new finance goal must acknowledge and remedy the failures of the current USD100 billion climate finance commitment, particularly on its inadequacy, disproportionate flows to vulnerable regions like Africa, quality, accessibility, and accountability gaps. Africa's utmost priority is to ensure that the NCQG strengthens the implementation of the Convention as it is the basis for the Paris Agreement and global climate action. Therefore, the general context of setting the NCQG and its key features must be predicated upon the foundational principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), and the obligation on developed country Parties to provide new and additional financial resources under the Convention and its Paris Agreement.[3] Furthermore, the goal should support the promotion of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty as enshrined in the Convention.

To this end, the African climate finance agenda defined the essential criteria that a fit-for-purpose NCQG outcome must fulfil to ensure it triggers sustained and enhanced climate action that is aligned with the Paris Agreement goals. Africa, therefore, demanded for a new finance goal that:

- aims to mobilize and deliver climate finance to support effective and full implementation of Article 2, in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.
- is truly needs-based and responsive to the immediate and evolving needs and priorities, in line with developing countries' climate strategies and plans.
- is ambitious to mobilize at least USD1 trillion to USD1.5 trillion, to be delivered annually by developed countries to developing countries by 2030, aligning with the UNFCCC's needs assessment reports (NDR)[4].
- Includes the international public finance provision target of USD500 billion per annum by 2030 in grant and grant-equivalent terms[5].
- embeds a sub-goal of at least USD400 billion annually in grant-based public finance for adaptation, loss and damage, and mitigation to guarantee balanced and accelerated ambition and financing.
- incorporates debt sustainability considerations and prioritizes mobilization of high-quality and debt-free climate finance in the form of grants and highly concessional instruments for the developing countries.
- rapidly stimulates the reform of the broader global financial architecture, as a secondary measure, to address the current systemic barriers and dis-enablers of climate finance additionality, accessibility and responsiveness to the needs of developing countries.
- establishes robust transparency and accountability arrangements, including commonly agreed definitions of climate finance and accounting methodologies, grant equivalent reporting, and appropriate burden sharing mechanisms as key principles of assessing progress towards the NCQG.

2 See Africa Climate Finance Priorities for COP29 accessible at https://www.powershiftafrica.org/s/COP29-Finance-Position-Paper-Digital-3cte.pdf

3 Article 4.3 and Article 4.4 of the Convention, and Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

4 See UNFCCC Second Needs Determination Report 2024 accessible at https://unfccc.int/documents/640757

5 See Defining an African Agenda for COP 29 accessible at https://www.powershiftafrica.org/s/Defining-an-African-Agenda-For-COP29.pdf

1.1.2 Addressing the Full Spectrum of Impacts, Adaptation and Loss and Damage

Africa's climate vulnerability, rising climate death toll, and widening adaptation finance gap make adaptation and loss and damage critical priorities for the continent. COP29 served as a pivotal moment for both, marking the midpoint of the UAE–Belém work programme on GGA indicators and an opportunity to review progress in achieving the goal to double adaptation finance by 2025. There were also strong hopes that COP29 would drive progress on National Adaptations Plans (NAPs) to regain lost time, while finalizing modalities to fully operationalize the Loss and Damage fund amid escalating climate impacts.

The African agenda on adaptation and loss and damage identified key priorities and outcomes for COP29. These positions were informed by evidence of Africa's unique vulnerability to climate change; the realities of frequent climate events, including droughts, higher-than-global-average temperatures, and flooding; and rising adaptation costs. African demands emphasized the need for ambitious adaptation outcomes at COP29 on adaptation finance, matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), national adaptation plans, agriculture and food systems, and loss and damage.

Key adaptation priorities included:

a) Parity of mitigation and adaptation:

- Scales adaptation finance under the NCQG, with an emphasis on grant-based finance and setting of adaptation and loss and damage sub-goals based on developing countries' needs.
- Establishes a clear relationship between the NCQG and achievement of GGA targets.
- Recognizes Africa's vulnerability to the climate crisis due to its reliance on climate-vulnerable sectors.
- Advances work on the Framework for Global Climate Resilience, with clear parameters for implementation.
- Provides clearer guidance to experts for the development of indicators under the UAE-Belém Work Programme.

b) Upholding international commitments:

- Addresses gaps in Means of Implementation and support for adaptation with outcome-based indicators across GGA targets.
- Developed countries share a progress report on their efforts to meet the Glasgow commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025, along with a roadmap with a clear delivery and implementation plan.
- Fast-tracks progress on National Adaptation Plans with the necessary MoI support for developing countries, technical and financial support to countries that have not yet submitted theirs, and calls for NAPs to align with GGA targets, NDCs, and GST outcomes.

c) Transform food and agriculture systems to build resilience:

- Prioritize agroecology as a key adaptation and resilience tool, expand the Sharm el-Sheikh work plan to include a food systems approach, update the roadmap to be in line with GGA targets and 1.5°C, and increase climate finance for food system actors.

d) Bolster the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage:

- Key priorities included fully operationalizing the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, turning COP28 pledges into contributions, garnering new, additional pledges, reconsidering the location for the secretariat of the Santiago Network, and fast-tracking the operationalization of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD).

1.1.3 Supporting African Just Transitions and Sustainable Development

Dubbed 'The Finance COP', COP29 presented a crucial opportunity to secure adequate climate finance, ensuring that Africa's transition is just, equitable, and aligned with the Paris Agreement goals. African civil societies' **common position** highlighted the continent's priority, including sustainable development, green industrialization, renewable energy expansion, and just transitions.

A core element of Africa's demands was equitable access to climate finance and technology, particularly in the context of the NCQG. Africa argued that the existing global financial system disproportionately limits its access to renewable energy investments, green manufacturing, and climate resilience funding. High capital costs, debt burdens, and structural barriers have led to a scenario where, despite possessing 40% of the world's renewable energy potential, Africa has received only 2% of global renewable energy investments over the past decade. The position paper emphasized that Africa must break free from its historical role as a mere raw materials supplier and instead leverage critical minerals, local manufacturing, and technology transfer to build sustainable, self-sufficient green economies.

The position also rejected "false solutions" such as large-scale green hydrogen exports, carbon markets, and geoengineering, which often prioritize external economic interests over Africa's energy sovereignty. Instead, it called for people-centered renewable energy solutions that empower communities, create decent jobs, and drive industrialization rather than repeating past models of resource extraction without local benefits. At its core, the African position demanded a just transition that ensures climate action does not come at the expense of social and economic rights. It urged COP29 negotiators to adopt ambitious measures to scale up adaptation finance, support industrial policies linked to the Just Transition Work Programme (JT-WP), and eliminate fossil fuel subsidies while securing commitments for renewable energy financing.

In line with the **African Agenda for COP29**, Africa's engagement at COP29 pushed for the following key priorities:

- **Balanced transition pathways:** The Just Transition Work Programme (JT-WP) should incorporate all three transition pathways under Article 2 of the Paris Agreement—mitigation, adaptation, and finance—ensuring equitable distribution of both the burdens and benefits of climate action.
- **Enhanced international cooperation:** The JT-WP must strengthen international collaboration on financing low-emission and climate-resilient development, ensuring that climate finance flows align with the 1.5°C target while promoting economic diversification and reducing inequality between nations.
- **Increased and accessible finance and technology:** African countries must receive new, additional, adequate, and appropriate financial and technological support from developed nations. This includes direct investment in economic diversification, industrialization, and greater inclusion of Africa in renewable energy technology supply chains.
- **Guidance on trade and finance cooperation:** The JT-WP outcomes should shape the Troika's political engagement on the Roadmap to Mission 1.5, ensuring that global trade and finance frameworks align with the Paris Agreement goals in an equitable manner.
- **Fair carbon taxation mechanisms:** African negotiators should reject unilateral, unjustified, and indiscriminate carbon border taxes, advocating for a fair and transparent global framework that considers Africa's unique developmental context.



2. COP29 Outcomes: Key Highlights

COP29 witnessed both progress and stalemates in several critical issues on climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, and mitigation. The quantity and quality of the outcomes realized in response to deepening climate needs of vulnerable countries shows this mix. This section provides a summary of key outcomes achieved at COP29.



2.1 Agreement on the New Climate Finance Goal

The conference's headline was the adoption of the NCQG on climate finance[6], set to take effect from 2025 as an extension of its predecessor, the USD100 billion finance goal, that ends in 2025. The new finance goal will see developed countries taking the lead in mobilizing at least USD300 billion annually from a wide variety of sources for climate action in developing countries by 2035, in the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation.

Additionally, the outcome included a second complementary call on all actors to scale up mobilization of finance to at least USD1.3 trillion per year by 2035 from public and private sources, including through non-debt-creating instruments in the context of relevant multilateral initiatives. This call was cemented by the decision that launched the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T". The Baku-to-Belem Roadmap aims to scale up climate finance to developing countries to support low greenhouse gas emission and climate resilient pathways. The decision also mandates COP30 to consider a report on its implementation.

Moreover, the NCQG outcome entailed other key commitments, including: support of the implementation of country-driven strategies and plans in response to the needs, priorities, and national circumstances of developing countries; prioritization of the financial mechanisms and enhancement of access features for all finances; sustaining of the global reform agenda; improvements to transparency arrangements; and setting the goal review to 2030 as part of the GST periodic assessments.

6 See Advance unedited version of the Decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal accessible at https://unfccc.int/documents/644460

2.2 Key Outcomes for Adaptation and Loss and Damage

COP29 made key strides forward to accelerate the implementation of the Framework for Global Climate Resilience by addressing gaps in Means of Implementation and support for developing countries' adaptation efforts. The decision on GGA affirmed that the final outcome of the UAE– Belém work programme should support the assessment of progress across the goal's thematic targets (water, food, infrastructure, ecosystems, poverty eradication and cultural impacts) and dimensions of adaptation cycle (impacts, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation of adaptation plans and policies, and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation efforts) by all Parties by 2030.[7]

The final decision further defines the work ahead for developing indicators for the GGA, aimed at tracking progress toward global adaptation action. This includes providing additional guidance to experts on refining the adaptation indicators, developing or identifying "indicators for enabling factors for implementation of adaptation action, including Means of Implementation".[8] Although the wording is vague and open to interpretation, the reference to and inclusion of MoI is an important win for adaptation. Further noteworthy outcomes on matters relating to the GGA include the decision to have a standing agenda item on adaptation, launch of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and high-level dialogues, as well as guidance and clarity provided to experts on the purpose and outputs of the UAE-Belém work programme on indicators.

On matters relating to Loss and Damage, COP29 resulted only in a procedural decision that vaguely recognized the progress of the work of the WIM and the Santiago Network. Substantive negotiation issues, including the governance of WIM and consideration of the Joint Annual Report (JAR) of the Executive Committee and the Santiago Network, were deferred to SBs 62.

Parties to the Paris Agreement also reached a decision on the first guidance to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage at COP29. The decision confirms the selection of. The Philippines as the host country and calls for the rapid operationalization of the Fund through adoption of its work plan, which aims to implement the Fund governing instruments and approving funding proposals as soon as possible.[9]

Moreover, the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action and food security concluded with constructive, though meagre, outcomes, which were largely centred on making the online portal more accessible and functionable.

2.3 Energy and Just Transition

Just Transition Work Programme

At COP29, the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) faced significant challenges and ultimately concluded without a consensus. This outcome was described by some observers as a "betrayal" to those most affected by the transition to a low-carbon economy.

The impasse was primarily due to differing perspectives among developed and developing countries. Developing nations advocated for a comprehensive approach that encompassed not only labour transitions but also adaptation and financial support. They emphasized the need for the JTWP to move beyond discussions and lead to actionable plans that support the implementation of low-emission and climate-resilient actions that also contribute to the achievement of sustainable development and poverty eradication. Conversely, developed countries, including the European Union and the Environmental Integrity Group, focused more on mitigation efforts. They expressed concerns that developing a detailed work plan might be premature.

This deadlock underscores the complexities inherent in balancing diverse priorities within international climate negotiations. The absence of an agreement on the JTWP at COP29 highlights the ongoing challenges in formulating a unified strategy and approach that ensures a just and equitable transition for all countries and stakeholders involved.

Mitigation Work Programme Outcomes

At COP29, the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), established at COP26 to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation, faced significant challenges. Parties agreed to a decision that urges the revision and strengthening of NDCs to address the emissions gap between the current commitment and the Paris temperature goal. The decision underscores the necessity of supporting developing countries to increase their

7 Decision 2/CMA5, paragraph 9 and 10, Global Goal on Adaptation accessible https://unfccc.int/documents/637073

8 See Advance unedited version of the Decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal accessible at HYPERLINK "https://unfccc.int/documents/6

See Advance unedited version of the Decision on Report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the Fund accessible at https://unfccc.int/documents/644464.

9 See Advance unedited version of the Decision on Report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the Fund accessible at https://unfccc.int/documents/644464

mitigation ambition and implementation. However, it lacks specificity regarding the nature and scale of support mechanisms, which are essential for African countries to undertake mitigation actions without jeopardizing their development goals.

On the Global Stocktake consideration, discussions were marked by disagreements over whether to incorporate the outcomes of the MWP. Ultimately, references to the GST were removed from the MWP text, reflecting ongoing debates over the programme's direction and effectiveness.

Energy and Just Transition in the NCQG

The NCQG outcome represents a step forward in climate finance as it advocates for sustained support for just transitions across all sectors and thematic areas. Although this is welcomed, the pledged USD300 billion falls significantly short of the developing countries' financing needs, estimated at between USD5.1 trillion and USD6.8 trillion, to effectively address climate challenges, and USD4 trillion per year as investment in clean energy technologies by 2030.[10] This shortfall is expected to have several implications, among them:

- **Delayed energy transitions:** Insufficient financing may hinder the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure, slowing the shift away from fossil fuels.
- **Equity concerns:** The limited financial support could exacerbate disparities, leaving vulnerable communities without the necessary resources to adapt to climate impacts.
- **Economic strain:** Developing countries might face increased debt burdens if they resort to loans to finance their climate initiatives, potentially leading to economic instability.

Outcome of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

COP29 finalised guidance and rules to fully operationalize Article 6 of the Paris Agreement relating to carbon markets. On Article 6.2, which sets the accounting rules for 'cooperative approaches,' Parties agreed to set up a dual international registry system, with both accounting and transaction functions (to hold and transfer accounts). Parties also decided on the timing for applying crediting adjustments, the levels and elements that this authorization would have to contain, and transparency and reporting elements for Parties. On Article 6.4, rules on removals and methodological requirements were adopted. On the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), Parties agreed to allow the transfer of credits issued by afforestation and reforestation activities under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to the PACM if they align with Article 6.4 standards on removals and methodological requirements. Parties also adopted the work programme for Article 6.8, which sets a framework for collaborative non-market approaches to support Parties achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

2.4 Cross-Cutting Outcomes

Gender and climate change

COP29 acknowledged the important role of the enhanced Lima Work Programme (LWP) on gender and its Gender Action Plan (GAP) in advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in the UNFCCC process. Consequently, the COP decided to extend the enhanced LWP on gender for a period of 10 years and initiate the review of its implementation and conclusion to identify progress, challenges and further work to be undertaken at SBI 70 and 71, respectively.[11] The COP further requested the SBI to initiate the development of a new GAP and organize technical workshops in the June 2025 sessions, considering the inputs to and outcome of the review of the enhanced LWP and its GAP. It also emphasized the urgency of scaled-up support for developing countries to implement the LWP on gender and any subsequent GAP, consistent with relevant provisions of the Convention. Further negotiations and outcomes on the Gender Action Plan (GAP) were deferred to COP30. A key challenge remains including specific provisions on financing the implementation of GAP.

Indigenous peoples and local communities' platform

COP29 renewed the mandate of the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) and approved a new 2025-2027 workplan. The decision underscores the leadership of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in addressing the climate crisis and will help to further elevate voices of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in climate action.

10 See International Energy Agency. 2022. World Energy Outlook 2022. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022.

11 Advance unedited version of the Decision on Gender & Climate Change at https://unfccc.int/documents/644433

3. Analysis of COP29 outcomes against the African Agenda's priorities

Generally, COP29 demonstrated the functionality and efficacy of international cooperation backed by intensified global climate advocacy and diplomacy to advance responses despite the prevailing complexities. Nonetheless, the critical agreement on climate finance goal was viewed by many developing countries as disappointing, a compromise, and a less ambitious outcome to respond to the magnitude of the climate change challenge. Consequently, the strides made in Baku failed to meet Africa's expectations and priorities.

This section presents a comparative analysis of the outcomes of COP29 against the priorities set forth in the African demands paper, evaluating the extent to which the summit's resolutions align with and address the specific needs and expectations of African governments and stakeholders in the global climate discourse. This analysis sheds light on the progress made towards achieving the continent's priorities and identifies areas requiring further attention and effort.

3.1 Adoption of the NCQG, an Unambitious Climate Finance Goal

The COP barely boosted climate finance by adopting the mobilization goal of at least USD300 billion per year by 2035, albeit stressing the urgency of enhancing climate ambition and action. The NCQG significantly fell short of the USD1.3 trillion annual ambition initially proposed and adopted by Africa and all developing countries as a befitting and responsive quantum that would adequately keep the 1.5°C temperature rise limit within reach. Unfortunately, the NCQG, just like its predecessor, is unresponsive to the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries, yet it notes the prevailing science and estimated overall costed needs in its context.

The adopted quantum is incomparable to even the conservative annualized figures of USD455 billion to USD584 billion per year as the estimated needs of developing countries in the 2nd NDR, as well as the USD400 billion annual adaptation and loss and damage sub-goals demanded by Africa. Additionally, the quantum is far from the estimated needs level of USD5 trillion to USD6.9 trillion, and USD1.6 trillion to USD1.9 trillion for developing countries and Africa, respectively, to implement current NDC commitments by 2030[12]. This implies that the NCQG is yet another political compromise outcome that is informed by neither science nor needs assessment, much like its USD100 billion predecessor.

Further, despite reaffirming the outcomes of the first GST in the overall context of the NCQG decision, the COP failed to advance and address the critical elements on concrete timelines and requisite financing for the implementation of the COP28 deal, including a key pledge to transition away from fossil fuels under the UAE dialogue. Instead, the dialogue was marred with contentious and divergent views on the interpretation of its scope and outcomes, including its placement in the agenda, with developed countries proposing that the discussion focuses on all GST outcomes whereas developing countries wanted it to focus on finance only. The Presidency resolved this hurdle with a disclaimer in the footnote to keep the scope of the dialogue open.

Consequently, the COP's finance outcome downplays the IPCC's warnings on the inadequacy of current policies and actions that are projected to increase the warming beyond the 1.5°C limit towards 2.4°C–2.6°C by the end of the century[13]. It further signals worrying trends and uncertainty of support for so called ambitious and economy-wide NDCs and NAPs that are aligned with the 1.5°C limit that developing countries are expected to submit in February 2025 as part of the UAE consensus.

On a more positive note, however, the outcome contains some commendable decisions and complimentary actions that could potentially boost the NCQG if operationalized appropriately. These include:

a) The COP recognises the huge scale of overall finance required and calls for collaborative efforts towards achieving the overarching target of at least USD1.3 trillion per year by 2035, in line with developing countries' needs-informed inspirations. This was fortified by the launch of the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T" which provides a possible pathway for scaling up finance from all public and private sources, including through grants; concessional, non-debt-creating instruments; and measures to create fiscal space, in the context of multilateral initiatives.

12 See 2nd UNFCCC Needs Determination Report (NDR) 2024 accessible at UNFCCC Second Needs Determination Report 2024

13 See IPCC AR6 Report 2023 accessible at https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf

However, this is just a call to all actors and not a commitment from developed countries, hence it lacks the differentiation of responsibilities which would negatively affect the transparency and accountability arrangements in tracking this progress. Notably, Africa appreciates this call as it is envisioned to provide strong and clear signals to a wider basket of stakeholders who could unlock and shift sufficient global financial flows towards climate-related investments in developing and vulnerable countries.

b) The COP29 and COP30 Presidencies, in consultation with Parties, are mandated to produce a report summarizing the work on the Roadmap by COP30. The Belém COP, therefore, is crucial as it sets to define the future landscape of climate finance through the structure of the roadmap and processes of its operationalization. The roadmap should also build on and complement the ongoing reports, including NAR by the SCF, the USD100 billion report, the progress report on doubling of adaptation finance, and deliberations on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement. However, as a priority, the process of developing the roadmap and report must be comprehensive and inclusive to ensure it integrates Africa's perspectives. Africa must play an active role in shaping the roadmap and defining subsequent actions to effectively scale up qualitative financing that supports climate action in the region.

c) Both the adopted NCQG target and the complimentary call, framed as "at least", represent a floor as opposed to a ceiling, and hence provide an opportunity for enhancing ambition based on the best available science and the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries. Additionally, the COP sets 2030 as a timeline to review the goal as part of the GST periodic assessments, and to initiate deliberations prior to 2035. Therefore, Africa expects that the 2030 review will consider the NCQG's broader features, including its quantum, quality and adequacy.

3.1.1 Key Features of the NCQG

The detailed analysis of the key features of the goal and its potential implications for Africa are as explained below:

a) Overall context and objective of the Goal

The basis of setting the NCQG is firmly anchored on the Paris Agreement, with the decision affirming that the objective of the NCQG is to contribute to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 in accordance with Article 9 of the Agreement, while reflecting the principle of equity and CBDR-RC, in the light of different national circumstances. In addition, its mandate comes from the obligations under the Convention that require developed countries to provide new and additional climate finance to developing countries for the achievement of their climate action.



The COP29 decision further confirmed that the NCQG will support the implementation of developing countries' nationally determined climate strategies and plans, including the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Adaptation Communications (AdComs), which include those submitted as adaptation components of the NDCs. As such, the goal prioritises the evolving needs and priorities as reflected in these strategies while recognizing the unique vulnerabilities and capacity constraints of least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDs). Therefore, the context and objective of the goal fulfils and aligns with Africa's vision for a finance goal that triggers long-term transformational outcomes for both climate and sustainable development aspirations.

b) Mandate, sources and quality of climate finance in the NCQG

The quality of finance, mostly pegged on the sources delivered under the current climate finance regime, has been a thorny issue for the global south in climate discourse. At the heart of Africa's demands for COP29 was, therefore, a call for a responsive new goal that prioritizes scalability, predictability, additionality, quality, and accessibility of the finance provided and mobilized in tandem with the quantum. The call was also adamant that these features must also reflect the context of a limited fiscal space and the unsustainable debt levels of vulnerable developing countries.

Conversely, the NCQG outcome entailed several significant, albeit conflicting, elements that speak to the mandate and responsibility, sources and qualitative aspects of the goal. The major ones are:

- **Lack of differentiation and responsibility of developed countries:** The formulation of the NCQG goal stipulates that the developed countries will take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, such as public, private, bilateral and multilateral institutions. However, this formulation distinctly differs from the previous goal, where developed countries committed to jointly mobilize the finance, thus showing a clear differentiation of their responsibilities in this context.[14] The vague language on developed countries' 'taking the lead' and generalization of the contributors is problematic as it depicts the failure of the decision to precisely apportion rich countries their fair share of global responsibility and financial capability to collectively deliver on the goal. Most regrettably for the global south, the language overlooks its persistent call for an appropriate burden-sharing arrangement, provided for in the Convention, to safeguard adequacy, predictability and additionality of climate finance to the existing Official Development Assistance (ODA). The approach, therefore, illustrates the lack of genuine commitment by rich countries to robustly lead in the global response to climate change; hence shielding them from transparency and accountability actions.
- **Expected contributions from climate-vulnerable countries:** The opaque formulation of the goal set the stage for the counting of developing countries' efforts towards the NCQG, including contributions to Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). As such, the decision called on all, including developing countries, to enhance their enabling environments for expanding climate finance based on their national context. It further encouraged developing countries to make voluntary contributions to the goal, including through "South-South cooperation." These declarations shift the incremental burden of addressing climate-induced costs from developed countries to already vulnerable countries. Moreover, they disregard poor countries' negligible contribution to the climate crisis by forcing them to bear a disproportionate financial burden amid their prevailing sovereign debt and economic challenges. This not only waters down the financing obligations of developed countries but also negates the foundational principles and values of equity and CBDR-RC, including the right to development, climate and social justice, and just transition processes.
- **Lack of public finance provision core in the goal:** The lack of a distinct public finance provision target in the NCQG quantum reflects poorly on the quality and quantity of finance expected under this commitment. This was viewed by critics as a deliberate move by the rich countries to diminish the catalytic function of public interventions and innovative instruments as appropriate incentives and policy signals for enhancing their domestic finance mobilization efforts. Instead, the decision targets private sector financing and all climate-related outflows from, and climate-related finance mobilized by, the multilateral development banks (MDBs), including from developing countries as shareholders, as a contribution towards the achievement of the goal. This view risks repeating the blunders of the USD100 billion finance goal that incentivized debt-creating instruments at market terms from the MDBs and private sector, and the diversion of ODA from socio-economic development objectives.[15] It also undermines the need for newness and additionality of climate finance, thus further exacerbating the severity of the debt and climate crisis. Moreover, it shifts the NCQG focus to investment objectives as opposed to the provision of public, grant-based, concessional, and new and additional finance to ODA for climate needs in vulnerable countries.

14 .See Copenhagen Accord; and Cancun Agreements

15 Africa Climate Finance Priorities for COP29 accessible at https://www.powershiftafrica.org/s/COP29-Finance-Position-Paper-Digital-3cte.pdf

On the upside, the NCQG decision notably features several significant elements that improve the quality of finance under the goal. These include:

- **Acknowledging the need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance:** The outcome acknowledges this important financing need, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage needs in developing countries. It further underscores the critical importance of substantially reducing the cost of capital and increasing the mobilization ratio of finance from public sources by 2030. Moreover, it includes 'other alternative sources' as a potential contribution to the goal, and this provides a great avenue for developed countries to revamp their public finance provision efforts in upwards of trillions of dollars towards the goal by leveraging on the alternative sources. These include via appropriate global measures towards tax justice, solidarity levies, and redirection of existing public finance from fossil fuels subsidies and other harmful spending to climate efforts.
- **Making a case for innovative financial instruments:** The outcome upholds the urgent need for creating fiscal spaces in developing countries through application of innovative instruments, such as first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing and foreign exchange risk instruments while considering national circumstances. Similarly, the outcome encourages the exploration, use and scaling up of innovative sources and instruments of finance, as appropriate, including under the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T".

c) Lack of a thematic sub-goal for adaptation and loss and damage in the NCQG

The NCQG is set in the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation. This strongly demonstrates the dedicated support for adaptation actions beyond mitigation in the NCQG, as opposed to the previous goal that focused solely on mitigation actions. The decision also recognizes the urgency to significantly enhance action and financing for adaptation and mitigation, and averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. Additionally, the outcome recognizes the importance of sustaining efforts to meet other cross-cutting needs, including readiness, transparency, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer, in developing countries.

Yet, the NCQG structure regrettably fails to integrate specific finance commitments with the sub-goals of annual provision of public finance of at least USD400 billion each for adaptation and resilience, and loss and damage in grant equivalent terms as demanded by the global south. Moreover, the outcome falls short of distinctly providing for appropriate mechanisms and modalities for achieving the 50/50 balance, despite stressing the need for balanced provision of scaled-up financial resources between adaptation and mitigation. This risks making the NCQG yet another mitigation-centric goal with no prioritization of grant-based finance for adaptation and loss and damage, just like the unmet USD100 billion goal.



d) Accessibility and inclusivity of climate finance under the NCQG

The NCQG outcome entailed commendable actions with respect to enhancement of accessibility and inclusivity of climate finance that matches the priorities of the global south. The most important actions are:

- The NCQG outcome *recognizes the critical role of the multilateral climate funds (MCFs)* in enhancing climate finance access to developing countries, thus prioritizing them as the main delivery channels for the NCQG while encouraging their enhanced complementarity and coherence. These include operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, Adaptation Fund (AF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). Consequently, the COP decided to significantly *increase the public resources* that are provided through these Funds and pursue efforts *to at least triple annual outflows from these Funds from 2022 levels by 2030*.
- The NCQG decision also underscores the *importance of reducing existing constraints, challenges, systemic inequities and barriers to efficient and effective access* to climate finance such as high cost of capital, co-financing requirements and application processes. While appreciating the ongoing efforts, the COP issued targeted calls to the various providers, including bilateral sources and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), to strengthen their efforts for improving access to climate finance for developing countries in a transparent manner. These include appropriate measures by:
    - i) MCFs to scale up and prioritize direct access; simplify and harmonize application pre-approval and post-approval requirements and disbursement processes; establish flexible information requirements; promote programmatic approaches; and streamline reporting requirements.
    - ii) Bilateral climate finance providers to increase support for locally led approaches and institutions, especially for adaptation measures; sustain demand-led capacity-building, technical assistance and readiness programmes; expand multi-year, country-led programmatic approaches; and streamline reporting requirements.

The decision further strengthens the access features of the NCQG to guarantee equity and inclusiveness of climate finance access for the most vulnerable communities and countries that face capacity constraints. These include:

- i) Providing special considerations for increasing access to climate finance for LDCs and SIDs from bilateral sources as well as highly concessional and grant finance from the MDBs.
- ii) Urging all actors to promote the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups in climate finance efforts. These include women and girls, children and youth, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants and refugees, climate-vulnerable communities and people in vulnerable situations.

e) Transparency and reporting arrangements of climate finance under NCQG

Robust transparency and reporting arrangements as the core element of the NCQG are another set of crucial demands by the global south, owing to existing varied accounting definitions and methodologies that have largely affected the delivery of the current finance goal. In Baku, Africa called for the adoption of a five-year timeframe for the finance goal, with periodic reviews and annual milestones for transparency and accountability. While this was not achieved, the NCQG outcome leverages on the existing Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) and Biennial Reporting (BA) under Article 13 and Article 9.5 provisions of the Paris Agreement, respectively, in assessing the progress towards all the elements of the decision. As such, the outcome:

- *Established biennial reporting by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), commencing in 2028*, to assess the collective progress towards achieving the goal, considering all relevant and available data sources, as well as regional balance, in efforts to increase finance in line with the two finance targets. The outcome also directs the SCF to include in the BA *progress on enhancing access to climate finance* and the impacts, results and outcomes of climate finance flows for addressing the needs and priorities of developing countries.
- The COP further committed to undertaking *a special assessment of access to climate finance in 2030* with a view of identifying further opportunities for enhancing access to climate finance in accordance with the objective of the NCQG and in line with Article 9, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement.
- Moreover, the COP acknowledged the progress made by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in supporting developing country Parties to implement the ETF. To advance this, the COP launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform to provide technical and capacity-building support to developing countries, while emphasizing the need for transition from ad hoc to institutionalized reporting systems to ensure sustainability and alignment with national priorities.

However, the transparency arrangements of the NCQG did not factor in other contentious issues related to the lack of commonly agreed accounting methodologies and approaches, including an operational definition of climate finance and grant equivalent reporting for concessional finance.

- In the absence of an agreed definition, developing countries demanded an exclusion list as an essential element in the NCQG decision to ensure the quality, transparency and accountability of climate finance. These include what should not be counted as climate finance, such as market rate loans, export credits, fossil fuel financing, and subsidies to remedy the chronic issues of additionality, climate specificity, greenwashing, and environmental integrity. The outcome, however, did not finalize the work on the definition of climate finance and failed to provide for an exclusion list, and this could potentially jeopardize the real delivery of the goal.
- Notably, the current ETF guidelines provide for climate finance reporting in grant-equivalent terms but on a voluntary basis, and this provides room for making this mandatory during the expected review in 2028, especially for MDBs and private sector finances.

f) The NCQG builds momentum towards global financial architecture reform

For Africa, COP29 presented a momentous step towards aligning the NCQG and the broader global financial architecture with ambitious climate action aimed at achieving just and country-owned transitions. Africa and the global south expected COP29 to build on the progress achieved since COP27[16] and COP28[17], by advancing the global reform agenda as a secondary measure to the NCQG decision and establishing strong interlinkages with the deliberations on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.

To this end, the NCQG outcome partly met these expectations as it contains, albeit still on an ad hoc basis, stances aimed at sustaining the global reform agenda, in response to the urgency to scale-up climate finance.

- The outcome reiterated the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture and underscores the need to remove barriers and address dis-enablers faced by developing countries in financing climate action, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space, unsustainable debt levels, high transaction costs and conditionalities for accessing climate finance.
- The COP also invited the IFIs, including MDBs, to continue to align their operational models, channels and instruments to be fit-for-purpose for urgently addressing global climate change, development and poverty, in accordance with their mandates and the direction of their governing bodies. These include by deploying a range of non-debt-inducing instruments; expanding risk appetites in the context of climate finance; enhancing the effectiveness of climate finance provided and mobilized; simplifying access to finance; scaling up highly concessional finance for developing countries; and increasing grant financing disbursed to LDCs and SIDs.
- Furthermore, the outcome encouraged countries as shareholders of the MDBs to continue advancing efforts to promote an evolution agenda for more effective and fit-for-purpose MDBs to address global challenges and poverty eradication while maximizing impact in developing countries. In addition, the roadmap is envisioned to consider relevant multilateral initiatives during execution. These will wholesomely enhance affordable finance at scale for climate action and ensure delivery of finance in fair terms, cognizant of developing countries' growing indebtedness and fiscal constraints to support climate action.
- The affirmed objective of the NCQG provides a basis for further progress, conclusion and potential decision on the operationalization and implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) in 2024–2025 at COP30. Moreover, the COP noted the progress made so far and encouraged Parties to continue constructive engagement towards enhancing a common understanding of the scope of this Article and its complementarity with Article 9, where relevant, including under the strengthened Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue.



16 See Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan in Decision 1/CP.27, Paragraph 40 & 41

17 See Decision 1/CMA.5, Paragraph 95

Table 1: Summary comparison of the African Climate Finance Priorities for COP29 against the outcome:

Africa's demands for COP29 on key elements of the NCQG	COP 29 outcomes on NCQG	Progress achieved (Color rating)
A Structure of quantum with a public finance core: » Adoption of a substantial NCQG of between USD1 trillion and USD1.5 trillion annually by developed countries for developing countries by 2030. » A quantum with core international public finance provision target of USD500 billion and thematic sub-goals of at least USD400 billion per annum for each adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage and just transition financing in grant and grant-equivalent terms.	» Adopted NCQG of at least USD300 billion per year by 2035, with developed countries taking the lead in mobilization from a wide variety of sources. » Additionally, the COP launched the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T" as a complimentary action and called for collaborative efforts to scale up the finance to reach at least USD1.3 trillion per year by 2035. » The outcome advocates for sustained support for just transitions across all sectors and thematic areas. Yet, the goal did not integrate specific targets for public finance as well as thematic sub-goals for adaptation and loss and damage.	
Sources of finance: » Underscore continuation of the existing sole obligations of developed countries to provide and lead in the mobilization of climate finance, in the context of principles of equity, CBDR-RC, sustainable development and poverty eradication.	» Mandates developed countries to take lead in mobilization from public, private, bilateral, multilateral, and alternative sources. » Calls on all, including developing countries, to enhance their enabling environments for expanding climate finance based on national contexts, in addition to their voluntary contributions.	
Quality of finance: » A finance goal that incorporates debt sustainability and prioritizes mobilization of high-quality climate finance in the form of grants and highly concessional instruments for developing countries. » Appropriate burden-sharing mechanisms to operationalize newness and additionality of climate finance to existing ODAs.	» Underscores the critical importance of substantially reducing the cost of capital and increasing the mobilization ratio of finance mobilized from public sources by 2030. » Determines that the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T" considers grants, concessional, non-debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space. » Advocates for the urgent need of creating fiscal space through application of innovative instruments, such as first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing and foreign exchange risk instruments, considering national circumstances. » Excludes appropriate burden-sharing arrangements and prioritizes expansion of contributor base.	



Access features: Enhance accessibility, inclusiveness, and responsiveness of climate finance for all developing countries and local vulnerable groups by: » boosting the operating entities of financial mechanisms to serve as the main delivery channels for a significant share of the NCQG. » committing to urgently addressing the underlining existing challenges in accessing climate finance from all sources. » ensuring inclusive and equitable access to climate finance by marginalized groups that face capacity constraints.	» Strengthens access features of the NCQG through: » designating multilateral climate funds as the main delivery channel, and pursues efforts to at least triple annual outflows from these Funds from 2022 levels by 2030. » targeted calls on different actors to strengthen their efforts aimed at reducing existing constraints, challenges, systemic inequities and barriers to efficient and effective access to climate finance. » urging all actors to promote the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups in climate finance efforts.	
Transparency and accountability arrangements: Establish strong reporting and accountability mechanisms as key principles of assessing progress towards the NCQG, including: » leveraging on the existing ETF and biennial reporting under the SCF. » adoption of a clear definition of climate finance and methodologies. » mandatory grant-equivalent reporting standard in the ETF. » a five-year review period for the goal in line with the NDC and NAP cycles.	The NCQG outcome: » leverages on the ETF and establishes biennial reporting by the SCF, commencing in 2028, on collective progress towards achieving the goals. » commits to a special assessment of access to climate finance in 2030, focusing on equity, effectiveness, and regional balance. » launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform to provide technical and capacity-building support to developing countries on ETF. » excludes adoption of climate finance definition and grant-equivalent reporting standard. » sets 2030 as a timeline to review the goal as part of the GST periodic assessments and to initiate deliberations prior to 2035.	
Global financial architecture reforms: » Stimulates the reform of the broader financial architecture, as a secondary measure, to address the current systematic barriers and dis-enablers of climate finance additionality, accessibility and responsiveness to the needs of developing countries.	The NCQG outcome: » reiterates the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture. » underscores the need to remove barriers and address dis-enablers faced by developing countries in financing climate action. » encourages countries as shareholders of the MDBs to continue advancing efforts towards MDBs reforms to address global challenges and poverty eradication while maximizing impact in developing countries.	



3.2 A mixed bag of outcomes for Adaptation and Loss and Damage

There were five key areas addressed under adaptation at COP29, with the most significant being adaptation finance under the NCQG, matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation, and National Adaptation Plans. Other adaptation elements, namely the adaptation fund, adaptation committee, and review of its progress and effectiveness, are not assessed in this report as they were deferred to the Bonn climate conference. Additionally, while agriculture and food security, as well as loss and damage, were negotiated under separate tracks, they are included here as they were recognised as key adaptation priorities in the African agenda and common position.

3.2.1 Adaptation Finance in the NCQG

It is noteworthy that the NCQG decision recognizes the need to dramatically scale up adaptation finance to bridge the gap, including considering the global goal on adaptation and the thematic and dimensional targets under the UAE-Belem Work Programme.[18] The outcome also advocates for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, acknowledging the fiscal constraints and increasing costs to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. This is particularly crucial for adaptation and responding to loss and damage in developing countries, especially for LDCs and SIDs, where adaptation finance largely comes in the form of loans.[19]

Nonetheless, the progress report on doubling the adaptation finance pact[20] showed that almost two-thirds of the USD32.4 billion provided and mobilized as adaptation finance in 2022 are in the form of loans, with more than half being non-concessional funding.[21] The report also indicates that the financing level of USD32.4 billion represents a 54% increase from the 2019 levels of approximately USD18.8 billion, and that more efforts are being undertaken towards reaching USD40 billion by 2025. However, the achievement of the adaptation pact would only cover a small share of 5 to 10%, given the huge size of the current adaptation finance gap[22], and there is no clear commitment for progression beyond the doubling by rich countries.

Moreover, the Adaptation Fund, despite its crucial role in delivering dedicated support for adaptation, remains heavily underfunded, with outstanding pledged contributions of USD122.57 million against the unambitious resource mobilization target of USD300 million for 2024. The COP welcomed new financial pledges of USD132.85 million made towards the Fund and urged developed countries to fulfill these pledges in a timely manner to facilitate effective implementation of concrete adaptation activities.[23] However, the consistent failure to meet the resource target, lack of developed countries' commitment for progression beyond the doubling, the absence of an adaptation finance sub-goal under the NCQG, and uncertainty about when and how much resources will be shared through the 5% share of the proceeds from Article 6, send an alarming signal to vulnerable countries' lifeline, which is locally led adaptation.

This dire situation justifies the urgent need to adequately resource the Adaptation Fund (AF) and its transition to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, to enable it to provide full-cost, grant-based adaptation funding without worsening the debt crisis of developing countries.

Additionally, more avenues exist for revamping adaptation and resilience finance from public, private, development, MDBs, and innovative sources in the context of just transition pathways and global reforms by leveraging on the Roadmap to 1.3T, operationalizing Article 2.1c, and linking with ongoing complimentary initiatives outside the UNFCCC, including under the G20.

Moreover, the COP's guidance to the GCF includes streamlining funding processes and maintaining a balance between mitigation and adaptation financing. Also, the COP welcomed the GCF's progress, including recorded pledges for its second replenishment; and acknowledged the Fund's efforts to enhance access to climate finance, increase private sector investments, and promote readiness support for adaptation planning.

3.2.2 Matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation

African expectations for GGA outcomes at COP29 were based on three key priority areas. The top priority was closing the adaptation finance gap, with hopes for a clear link between GGA targets and the new finance goal under the NCQG, alongside inclusion of Means of Implementation (MoI) indicators in the UAE-Belém Work Programme. Another key expectation for the work programme was clearer guidance for experts on indicator development

18 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA_11%28a%29_NCQG.pdf

19 https://devinit.org/media/documents/Concessional_loans_for_Africas_climate_crisis_Whose_fiscal_effort.pdf

20 See 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact Decision 1/CMA.3 accessible at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf

21 See Doubling Adaptation Fund Report 2024 accessible at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Doubling%20Adaptation%20Finance_Efforts%20to%20Respond%20to%20the%20Call%20of%20the%20Glasgow%20Climate%20Pact.pdf

22 See Adaptation Gap Report, 2023 accessible at https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023

23 See COP29 Decision on matters relating to Adaptation Fund accessible at https://unfccc.int/documents/644466

in 2025. And, lastly, African groups sought progress on advancing implementation of the GGA, referred to as the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience since COP28. While COP29 fell short in delivering on each of these priorities, the final GGA decision was an important stride forward.

a) Progress and limits under the UAE-Belém Work Programme

As hoped, COP29 provided experts with clearer guidance on the purpose, criteria for indicators, and expected outputs for the UAE-Belém work programme. The programme will feature additional workshops and expert consultations, aiming to finalize a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators. These indicators must align with agreed criteria, be globally applicable, and remain flexible enough to cover diverse adaptation contexts.

Although the purpose of the GGA indicators was partially clarified, gaps remain. For instance, the text states that indicators should inform the next global stocktake (para 22-23), but it also allows Parties to choose which indicators to report on (para 20b), potentially compromising the effectiveness of the next global stocktake. Although flexibility is key to address diverse national contexts, the full picture of adaptation progress may be incomplete without some form of mandatory reporting.

In addition to those identified at SB60 in Bonn, the COP decision identifies additional criteria for experts to consider, emphasizing measurability and availability of data, data accessibility, use of existing metrics, relevance across thematic targets, and indicators with outcome-output orientation. All of these are vital for transparent monitoring and effective adaptation tracking.

COP29 reinforced the need for an inclusive and robust process undertaken for indicator development and refinement. Aside from the ad-hoc technical expert group that leads the indicator development work, COP29 identified more stakeholders, including official statistical bodies and the Indigenous Peoples.

b) Reflections on the outcome for Means of Implementation

For the first time, the final GGA text explicitly states that "quantitative and qualitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation", must be included as final outcomes of the work programme.[24] Given that deep divisions over MoI indicators nearly derailed GGA negotiations, securing their inclusion in the final decision represents a breakthrough for adaptation. This outcome not only reinforces the critical link between adaptation ambition and the resources needed to achieve it but also marks a significant victory for African and global south priorities, reflecting years of advocacy for stronger commitments on adaptation finance, technology, and capacity-building.

However, while this inclusion marks a crucial step forward, gaps remain, with the language in the text remaining vague and open to interpretation. Notably, the reference to enabling factors raises concerns that focus could shift toward assessing national governments' policies, governance, and technology choices, potentially diverting attention away from the urgent need for external means of implementation support. Evidently, the inclusion of "means of implementation" was a strategic compromise that kept negotiations on track and created an opening for continued dialogue. While COP29 did not deliver a definitive resolution on MoI indicators, this outcome provides a critical foundation to build on in the lead up to COP30.

Finally, the GGA text appropriately highlights the crucial linkages between GGA and NAPs, recognizing NAPs as the primary vehicle for implementing adaptation actions at national level. However, in the absence of a defined adaptation sub-goal under the NCQG, there remains a misalignment between the adaptation action needed at the national level and finance flows.

c) Advancing implementation of the GGA

Africa, supported by other developing countries, called for a standing agenda item on the matters relating to GGA post-COP30 to ensure sustained focus on adaptation implementation and parity with mitigation. In response, COP29 established the GGA as a standing agenda item to ensure ongoing progress and adaptation discussions.

The final text also introduced the Baku Adaptation Roadmap to drive implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.[25] While African has not explicitly supported this proposal, given its dialogue focus, it welcomed the decision with the expectation that the roadmap will provide structured guidance on adaptation implementation. However, questions remain regarding its modalities and expected outcomes, which will need to be developed in the lead up to and during SB62.

Of equal importance is the Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation, which is established as an annual platform. The dialogue is expected to enhance coordination on adaptation issues and provide political momentum for adaptation discussions at future COPs. However, without stronger commitments on adaptation finance and MoI indicators, the effectiveness of this dialogue in driving real progress remains unclear.

24 https://unfccc.int/documents/644457

25 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA6_agenda_item_9a_GGA_AUV.pdf



3.2.3 National Adaptation Plans

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are vital domestic planning tools that aim to integrate adaptation into existing policies, programmes and adaptation strategies in order to build adaptive capacity and resilience. While only 61 countries have submitted their NAPs to date,[26] more than 87 per cent have at least one planning instrument in place. Among the 10 countries without any national adaptation process in place, only two are categorized as Least Developed Countries whereas five of them have featured in the top 20 Fragile States Index between 2020 and 2024.[27]

During the first week of COP29, negotiations on NAPs made significant headway. With the potential to reach agreement in sight, NAPs were forwarded to week two for further consultations, where they started to reach "critical force."[28] A six-page draft negotiation text was released containing 158 square brackets,[29] underscoring the extent of disagreement. As anticipated, one of the main points of contention was means of implementation support—encompassing capacity building, technology transfer, and finance—for the development and execution of NAPs. Unfortunately, Parties could not reach a decision on this important item at COP29, and based on the co-facilitators' recommendation, Parties agreed to resume negotiations on NAPs at SB62 in Bonn.

3.2.4 Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security

Agriculture received more attention in Baku than at previous COPs, leading to constructive yet underwhelming outcomes. There is only one negotiation track on food systems and agriculture within the UNFCCC, known formally as the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security. During COP29, discussions largely focused on the structure and functioning of the Sharm el-Sheikh online portal. The aim of the portal is to provide a platform for parties to share information on projects, initiatives and policies on how climate action can help address issues related to agriculture and food security.

The final COP29 decision provides a draft layout of the online portal and an illustration of its use.[30] Parties emphasized the need to integrate the portal with other UNFCCC portals to avoid duplication and enhance functionality. They also called for a three-tier structure (national/local, regional and global) and stressed that the portal should facilitate partnerships, not just display information. Further work on the online portal is to be carried out at SB62.

26 See https://napcentral.org/submitted-NAPs

27 See https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2024?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAxKy5BhBbEiwAYiW--8RFAhr0uaE3kX5E49uAUthO-lDYJunwqOgLjD2o7Cv0O1_anUnM9xoCEjwQAvD_BwE

28 See https://enb.iisd.org/baku-un-climate-change-conference-cop29-daily-report-19nov2024

29 See https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NAPs_cop29__.pdf

30 See https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SJWA_4.pdf

With negotiations centered on the online portal, COP29 made little progress on key African agriculture priorities and substantive issues. These included expanding the scope of the work plan to include a food systems approach, discussing sustainable models of agriculture (e.g. agroecology), updating the roadmap to be in line with the GGA targets and 1.5°C, as well as increasing climate finance food system actors.

Outside the formal UNFCCC negotiations, the Food, Agriculture and Water Day, held on 19 November in Baku, provided a significant platform to showcase the role agriculture plays in both adaptation and mitigation. COP29 Presidency's "Baku Harmoniya Climate Initiative for Farmers" (Harmoniya Initiative) promises to support collaboration between existing initiatives on food and agriculture. The unveiling of a USD1 billion package to support weather forecasting for low-income farmers by the Agriculture Innovation Mechanism (AIM) for Scale initiative also advances the progress towards addressing vulnerabilities of smallholder farmers to climate impacts.

3.2.5 Loss & Damage

Negotiations on Loss and Damage at COP29 focused on three key agenda items: the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), the report of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the fund (FRLD), and arrangements between the COP, CMA, and the Board of the Fund. However, key disagreements stalled progress. Africa pushed for reconsideration of Geneva as the host of the Santiago Network (SNLD) Secretariat, citing cost concerns, but no agreement was reached. Instead, governance discussions were deferred to COP30, leaving Africa's concerns unresolved.

The third review of the WIM aimed to assess its scope alongside the FRLD and SNLD but failed due to disagreements on integrating Loss and Damage into NDCs. Negotiations will continue at SB62 in June 2025, but this impasse also stalled accountability and coordination efforts.

Parties acknowledged the important steps towards full operationalization of the FRLD, including the formalization of World Bank's role as a host organization for the fund and the selection of the Republic of the Philippines as the host country of the Board. The Fund will operate under COP and CMA guidance, ensuring policy direction on access criteria. While the Fund aims to start disbursing finance in 2025, much groundwork remains before it becomes fully operational.

In terms of challenges and gaps in the COP29 outcomes, NCQG negotiations recognized the need for more L&D finance, but L&D was not included as a subgoal, and funding commitments remain insufficient. Additionally, the SNLD funding gap persists, with no new pledges or updates on previous commitments. The WIM review deadlock also stalled accountability efforts, though a high-level dialogue was held to set the stage for future discussions.

COP29 saw incremental progress on FRLD but deadlocks remain on governance, funding, and accountability. With key discussions now postponed to SB62 and COP30, concerns persist about whether vulnerable nations will receive timely support.



Table 2: Summary Comparison of the African Adaptation Priorities for COP29 against the outcome:

Africa's demands for COP29 on adaptation priorities	COP29 outcomes on adaptation	Progress achieved (Color rating)
Parity of mitigation and adaptation finance: » Scaling adaptation finance under the NCQG with an emphasis on grant-based finance. » Setting of sub-goals for adaptation and loss and damage based on developing countries' needs. » Establishing a clear relationship between the NCQG and achievement of GGA targets.	» COP29 acknowledged the widening adaptation finance gap and resources required to implement NAPs by 2030 but did not include a sub-goal for adaptation or loss and damage. » No concrete targets or mechanisms to increase finance flows for either. » Adaptation Fund raised less than half of its USD300 million goal. » Only a weak and poorly defined link established between GGA targets and NCQG.	🔴
Parity of mitigation and adaptation: UAE-Belém Work Programme » Provides clearer guidance to experts for the development of indicators under the UAE-Belém Work Programme.	» Experts received clearer guidance on the purpose, criteria, and expected outputs of the UAE-Belém work programme. » Additional workshops and expert consultations will take place to refine indicators to a list of no more than 100. » Indicators must align with agreed criteria, be globally applicable, and remain flexible for diverse adaptation contexts.	🟢
Parity of mitigation and adaptation: FGCR » Advances work on the Framework for Global Climate Resilience with clear parameters for implementation.	» COP29 established the Baku Adaptation Roadmap to drive implementation progress, but modalities and expected outputs remain unclear and need to be fleshed out before SB62. » Additionally, the decision introduced the Baku high-level dialogue, but questions remain on its effectiveness without increased finance flows.	🟡
Upholding international commitments: MoI indicators » Addresses gaps in means of implementation and support for adaptation with outcome-based indicators across GGA targets.	» COP29 agreed that qualitative and quantitative indicators for enabling factors, including means of implementation, should be a final output of the UAE-Belém work programme.	🟡
Upholding international commitments: » **Fast-track progress on National Adaptation Plans** with the necessary MoI support for developing countries, technical and financial support provided to countries that have not yet submitted theirs, and call for NAPs to align with GGA targets, NDCs and GST outcomes.	» Some progress was achieved during negotiations, but Parties could not find consensus on key issues. Draft text on NAPs was not agreed and forwarded to Bonn for further consideration.	🔴

🔴 Least aligned 🟡 Moderately aligned 🟢 Most aligned

Transform food and agriculture systems to build resilience: » Prioritize agroecology as a key adaptation and resilience tool, expand the Sharm el-Sheikh work plan to include a food systems approach, update the roadmap to be in line with GGA targets and 1.5°C, and increase climate finance for food system actors.	» The Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action and food security concluded with meagre outcomes, largely centred on making the online portal more accessible and functionable.	
Full operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund Key priorities included fully operationalizing the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, turning COP28 pledges into contributions, garnering new, additional pledges, and re-evaluating the host location of the Santiago Network secretariat.	» Limited progress on the third WIM review and FRLD operationalization at COP29. » No new pledges or updates on the delivery of COP28 commitments to SNLD. » NCQG negotiations recognized the need for more L&D finance, but L&D was not included as a subgoal, and funding commitments remain insufficient. » Selection of a host country for the Fund, The Philippines, and decision on the arrangement of the Fund with COP and CMA for receiving guidance on implementation.	



3.3 Energy and Just Transition

3.3.1 Energy and Mitigation

Governments agreed on a decision under the mitigation work programme. The COP acknowledged the role played by the work programme as a key platform for enhancing pre-2030 mitigation ambition, particularly through dialogues and investment-focused events. The 2024 sessions focused on *"Cities: Buildings and Urban Systems,"* exploring opportunities and challenges in reducing emissions through energy-efficient design, low-carbon infrastructure, spatial planning, and clean technology adoption. The decision recognized the critical importance of international collaboration, capacity-building, and tailored solutions to national circumstances, particularly in developing countries.

The key outcomes included the publication of annual reports summarizing the actionable solutions, barriers, and opportunities discussed. The decision further called for expanded participation and inclusivity, highlighting the need for regional and gender balance among experts and increased engagement from developing countries. However, there remains a lack of common understanding amongst parties on the role of the work programme in discussing and taking follow-up actions related to the mitigation aspects of the GST decision agreed at COP28 in Dubai.

While COP29 made strides in advancing the energy transition and mobilizing climate finance, the outcomes did not fully align with Africa's demands for substantial financial support and concrete commitments to reduce industrial emissions. The progress achieved can be characterized as moderately aligned with Africa's agenda on energy and just transition. The outcomes included pledges by multilateral development banks to increase climate-related lending to USD120 billion annually for low- and middle-income countries. However, the agreed-upon USD300 billion annual climate finance pledge by 2035 fell short of the USD500 billion public finance target advocated by developing nations, leading to criticism over the adequacy of the financial commitments.[31]

Regarding the energy transition, COP29 witnessed a surge in the deployment of affordable solar and wind energy, contributing to the global goal of tripling renewable capacity and doubling energy efficiency by 2030. Notably, seven Mediterranean countries committed to developing one terawatt of renewable capacity by 2030 through the TeraMed initiative. However, the conference fell short in making significant commitments to reduce industrial emissions, which account for over 30 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Energy access and the promotion of renewable energy remain central to Africa's climate agenda. However, while COP29 saw substantial commitments on renewable energy, Africa's demand for a clear financial and technological support framework to ensure that these resources are accessible and affordable to all was only partially addressed. While the renewable energy sector received strong global backing, the gap between ambitious targets and the funding to achieve them remains significant, especially for developing nations.

3.3.2 Just Transition Work Programme

Since the Paris Agreement at COP21, just transition has made notable progress as a key negotiation item. At COP24 in Katowice, the "Silesia Declaration on Solidarity and Just Transition" marked its formal recognition as a concept within the UN climate framework. The momentum continued with the formation of the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) at COP26. The Work Programme on Just Transition Pathways was established at COP27 to consider pathways towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement in the context of equity, Common but differentiated Responsibilities and Respective capabilities. At COP28 in Dubai, parties agreed on the scope and modalities of the work programme. The UAE Just Transition Work Programme aims to contribute towards the full and integrated implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, and strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

The focus for COP29 was to move the conversation forward, including by agreeing on action plans and implementation based on the agreed scope. But the COP failed in this regard. Even though governments agreed on an ambitious JTWP, parties could not agree on how to get there. While developed countries focused on mitigation, energy and elements of the Global Stocktake (GST), developing countries called for just transitions pathways that support ambitious climate action while promoting sustainable development and support efforts to eradicate poverty. Meanwhile, civil society insisted on the inclusion of food sovereignty as a key pillar.

These divergences scattered any hopes for an outcome. A planned roundtable between ministers and heads of delegations intended to iron out the differences and lend impetus to the just transition discussions as a last resort did not happen. In the end, developing countries felt the texts produced for negotiation were "imbalanced" for omitting their concerns and proposals. They also felt the text attempted to from the decision adopted at COP28.[32]

Ultimately, no progress was made on developing actionable work plans or operational guidance for Just Transition frameworks. With the unbalanced text by the facilitators

31 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/657880dcd408ac495a5cc888/t/673208ab8063433362a67e97/1731332296590/Defining+an+African+Agenda+For+COP29.pdf

32 https://twn.my/title2/climate/news/Baku01/TWN%20update%2014.pdf

and the COP presidency, the efforts ended with no decision on how to advance the JTWP discussions and further discussions were deferred to SB62. The decision to consider this matter for discussion next year appears, at best, half-hearted. Amid the frustration, Africa and the rest of the developing world stood their ground. They insisted that the Just Transition discussions must be as ambitious, inclusive and broad as possible.

3.3.3 Critical Minerals

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, set up a Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals (CETMs) to develop stronger and clearer principles and actionable recommendations for guidance to stakeholders up and down the critical energy transition minerals value chains and speed up their implementation. The Panel is comprised of 39 members, including, most notably for Africa, the African Union, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; as well as civil society representation of CAN International, which Power Shift Africa (PSA) is a member of. PSA was invited to send suggestions on the principles and recommendations, while CAN International requested that we write an opinion piece on Africa's position concerning critical minerals, which received good feedback and support. The Panel's report was released in September and presented at COP29. Some of the views that PSA, alongside civil society, had argued for, such as value addition and rights for artisanal miners, are reflected in the report. An advisory board is to be set up in Q1 of 2025 to discuss the best way to implement the Panel's report.



Table 3: Summary comparison of the African Energy and Sustainable Development for COP29 against the outcome:


Africa's demands for COP29 on key elements of on Energy and Just transition	COP 29 Outcomes on Energy and Just Transition	Progress achieved
Balanced Transition Pathways: address all three pathways in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement in a balanced manner, considering equity and sustainable development, with a view of understanding a fair distribution of burdens and opportunities in the transition. The JTWP should enhance international cooperation, increase and make more accessible finance and technology, offer guidance on international trade and finance cooperation, and include fair carbon taxation mechanisms.	No outcome from COP 29 under JTWP	🔴
Enhanced mitigation ambition and an enabling environment for the 1.5C goal. » Establish early net-zero targets for developed countries. » Strengthen renewable energy investment. » Align Finance with the Global Stocktake. » Integrate mitigation in political engagements, including through Roadmap to Mission 1.5	Largely procedural decision on MWP adopted, no net-zero target set for developed countries, weak outcomes on RE investments and the NCQG outcome not aligned with the GST outcome on energy. There was enhanced political debates on mitigation at COP29 despite the divergences and Roadmap to Mission 1.5C under the Troika includes mitigation and international cooperation.	🟡
Other CSOs demands for COP 29		
Promote the development of critical energy transition minerals-manufacturing value chains » where concerted efforts are made to ensure that locally owned value chains in Africa are developed to buttress the manufacturing of high-quality finished goods required for decarbonized economies and renewable energy systems.	» The UN Panel on Critical Minerals acknowledged in its report under Principal 5 that: "Development must be fostered through benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification". Actionable Recommendation 1 also states the goal to "accelerate greater benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification." The acknowledgement is a step in the right direction; however, the principles and recommendations are voluntary. There is a need to move them into official UNFCCC negotiation tracks to make them binding.	🟡
Advocate for planet-people focused industrial policies linked to the Just Transition Work Programme » that promote green industrialization in developing countries.	» No text came out of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) » Wide divergence between the expectations of global north and global south Countries	🔴
Include the provisioning of financing for Africa's green industrialization » from the global adaptation and mitigation plans through COP29's New Collective Quantified Goals (NCQG).	» The lack of quality finance supported with sourcing of the finance from public finance through the NCQG process has led to low expectations that Africa and the Global south will receive adequate financing for green industrialization	🔴

🔴 Least aligned 🟡 Moderately aligned 🟢 Most aligned

Promote people-centred participation and ownership in critical minerals production by » advocating and supporting local legislation and policy that mandates economic partnership and reconciliation with local communities and trade unions.	» The UN Panel on Critical Minerals acknowledged in its report under Principal 5 that: "Development must be fostered through benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification". Actionable Recommendation 1 also states the goal to "accelerate greater benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification." The acknowledgement is a step in the right direction; however, the principles and recommendations are voluntary. There is a need to move them into official UNFCCC negotiation tracks to make them binding.	
Enhance transparency and accountability in mining through international co-operation » by harmonizing and promoting of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics and sustainability programs led by the UN Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the EITI Standards.	» The UN Panel on Critical Minerals acknowledged in its report under Actionable Recommendation 2 the need for traceability for accountability and to launch a multi-stakeholder expert process to develop a global traceability, transparency and accountability framework along the entire mineral value chain – from mining to recycling. The acknowledgement is a step in the right direction, but the principles and recommendations are voluntary. There is a need to move them into official UNFCCC negotiation tracks to make them binding.	
Prioritize, support, and recognize the centrality of Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners (ASM) » in the mining sector by providing protection and reasonable pathways towards legalization and formalization of employment and labour protections.	» The UN Panel on Critical Minerals acknowledged in its report under Actionable recommendation 4 the need to "empower artisanal and small-scale miners towards responsibility." This will be done by convening an initiative that empowers artisanal and small-scale miners to become agents of transformation to foster development, environmental stewardship and human rights. The acknowledgement is a step in the right direction, but the principles and recommendations are voluntary. There is a need to move them into official UNFCCC negotiation tracks to make them binding. Moreover, clarity on how this process will work with already existing global initiatives such as the Delve Exchange is needed.	
Empower local communities: » Prioritizing community-centred renewable energy systems is essential for fostering energy sovereignty, creating decent jobs, and ensuring equitable distribution of energy benefits, ultimately aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.	» While COP29 emphasized the importance of scaling up renewable energy, specific commitments to community-centred renewable energy systems were not prominently featured. The focus was more on large-scale renewable projects and financing mechanisms.	



Innovate financing solutions: » Access to fairer financing mechanisms, such as grants and community-led investments, is crucial for overcoming barriers to renewable energy deployment. Ending public subsidies for fossil fuels, establishing robust fossil fuel finance exclusion policies investments, and redirecting funding towards sustainable solutions that uplift local communities is critical.	» Delegates agreed to provide climate financing annually, with an overall target to reach at least USD1.3 trillion by 2035. However, the financing mechanisms primarily focused on large-scale projects, and there was no explicit mention of ending fossil fuel subsidies or redirecting funds towards community-led renewable energy initiatives.	
Reject false solutions: » It is imperative to oppose harmful practices like geo-engineering, carbon markets and offsets, and large-scale green hydrogen projects that turn local renewables and freshwater supplies into exportable commodities without addressing providing energy access. Instead, African civil society advocate for energy solutions that promote sustainability, uphold community rights, and minimize environmental impact.	» The conference did not explicitly address the rejection of geo-engineering or large-scale green hydrogen projects. Discussions on carbon markets and offsets were deferred to future sessions, indicating a lack of immediate commitment to rejecting these practices.	
Strengthen renewable energy policy frameworks: » Developing comprehensive policy frameworks and regulatory reforms is vital for creating a supportive environment for renewable energy development. Aligning national strategies with continental initiatives will facilitate a unified and effective approach to achieving Africa's energy transition.	» While there was a general acknowledgment of the need for supportive policy frameworks, COP29 did not produce specific resolutions or commitments to strengthen renewable energy policies or align them with continental initiatives.	



4. Challenges

The official opening of the COP was slowed by a long agenda battle over proposals for the inclusion of some items from various negotiating blocks. The African group called on COP29 to officiate a recurrent agenda and launch work on the recognition of the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement, in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the COPs. This was unsuccessful as the item faced resistance from both developed and some developing country negotiating groups during consultations under the Presidency.

The following are some of the key challenges that undermined the full achievements of Africa's Agenda for COP29:

Lack of Substantial Commitment on Ambition and Means of Implementation

COP29 faced significant challenges when it came to addressing the critical elements of financing and ambition needed to meet Africa's climate goals. On the UAE Dialogue on the implementation of GST outcomes, Parties had divergent views on the finance to support the implementation of the outcomes. African countries, supported by other developing nations, argued that the dialogue was meant to provide clarity on financing for GST implementation. However, some Parties opposed the inclusion of finance in the discussions. As a result, the discussion on this was deferred to 2025. This delay in achieving a consensus could impact Africa's ability to secure the necessary financial support for energy transitions and just transition programs, delaying crucial interventions in the energy sector.

The lack of ambition to provide means of implementation was reflected in the NAPs negotiations. The slow progress on NAPs review is largely attributed to divisions on the responsibility for financing their formulation and implementation in vulnerable developing countries. Moving to the SB62 and COP30, it is critical for African countries and the rest of developing countries to hammer the importance of provision of finance to implement NAPs, in accordance with the obligations under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement.

Trade Measures and carbon Border Adjustments

Another challenge was the inclusion of unilateral trade measures, such as the EU carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), which were proposed by BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). While these measures could have broader implications for global climate policy, they were seen by some as undermining the global commitment to cooperative action and development agenda, especially for developing countries like those in Africa. The uncertainty surrounding these trade measures added complexity to the climate agenda and potentially distracted from the core issues Africa needed to address, such as energy access, just transition, and financial mechanisms for sustainable energy development.

Carbon Border Adjustment mechanisms and other unilateral measures, proposed by countries mainly in the global north with the stated purpose of curbing carbon leakage, have detrimental impacts on the protection of low carbon development trajectories. Notably, these adjustment measures impose a blanket restriction on products within their scope, impacting the trade potentials of African countries. These measures also work on the assumption that all countries have similar climate obligations as opposed to the differentiated obligation envisaged in the climate regime. The measures end up shifting climate obligation onto others by expecting other countries to take climate action at the level of the imposing country. While addressing carbon leakage is essential, it should only be an issue for countries with comparable commitments and addressed with the multilateral process. African countries have rightly expressed their support for the Chinese proposal on behalf of BASIC to set an agenda item on this matter at COP29. With current international cooperation challenges at the WTO, there is a need to keep pushing for a space to discuss these measures at the UNFCCC as the measures are climate motivated.

Inadequate Addressing of Africa's Energy Access Needs

The prevailing approach towards energy transition assumes existing less desirable energy mixes and does not consider a significant portion of the population that has no access to energy systems. Energy transition should address access issues in countries that have a cleaner energy mix but have challenges related to, for instance, infrastructure investment. Despite the emphasis on renewable energy and emissions reductions, COP29 did not adequately address the fundamental energy access challenges faced by African countries. Many African nations still struggle to provide reliable and affordable energy to their populations. The lack of concrete actions to bridge this energy access gap and support countries in achieving energy security was a missed opportunity, especially given the African continent's abundant renewable energy resources.

Limited Progress on Just Transition Pathways

For African countries, the Just Transitions Work Programme is seen as an agenda item that advances the consideration of different pathways to achieving Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The discussion on its scope of what is included in these negotiations, beyond the question of the workforce impacted by the transition to broader questions related to sequencing and financing of whole economy transitions towards low carbon development pathways, are at the core of the future of the climate regime.

In addition, while under the UAE Just Transition Work Programme the need for international cooperation and support toward the transition to achieving Article 2 of the PA was introduced, there was a lack of detailed strategies or financial mechanisms to implement these plans, particularly for African countries. In addition, there are no clear provisions for workers who may be displaced in sectors like fossil fuel extraction. The absence of a clear framework or sufficient support to help these workers transition into green jobs raises concerns about the social and economic implications of a low-carbon future in Africa.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

One of the key challenges under Article 6 is ensuring that it does not undermine the phase-out of fossil fuels and the rapid deployment of renewable energy under the carbon markets and transferable international mitigation outcomes. Carbon markets present opportunities for cooperation but pose risks if not properly regulated. A significant concern is the loopholes that could allow major polluters to purchase carbon credits instead of making real emission reductions. This will not only delay the transition to clean energy but also weaken the integrity of climate action and the regime. Without strong governance, carbon markets serve corporate interests rather than climate justice, enabling wealthy nations to greenwash and continue their fossil fuel expansion rather than genuinely supporting emission reductions. However, there is an opportunity to strengthen transparency and accountability frameworks to ensure that carbon markets support the achievement of NDCs and adaptation action.



5. Africa's engagements: Opportunities and recommendations for COP30

COP30 will be held amid major geopolitical shifts across the world. The exit of the US from the Paris Agreement, significant reductions in finance commitments from countries in the global north, and pronounced geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalries in international spaces are among the many shifts that inform the Brazilian COP. There is increased resistance to climate action on the national front, mainly from nationalist politics-driven actors.

These developments are eroding the foundation of global solidarity and multilateralism that underpins the climate regime. The Brazilian presidency has the unenviable task of finding ambition from different corners of the world, leading in this moment of leadership vacuum, as well as live up to its own political commitments for delivering for the Brazilian people. COP30 is scheduled to take place in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. Already billed as an adaptation COP, this year's climate conference presents a momentous opportunity and challenge to reframethe climate talks in a way that rejuvenates more collaboration and ambition from governments following the weak outcomes in Baku.

Aligning 2025 NDCs and NAPs with GST Outcomes

COP29 outcomes on ambition and finance are crucial for shaping Africa's climate strategies to 2030. With NDCs due and NAPs encouraged for submission by 2025, though not legally mandated, African countries should integrate robust mitigation and adaptation targets as well as loss and damage measures, aligned with the GST outcome. This should also include cost estimations to facilitate the provision of finance and inform the needs assessment consideration under the UNFCCC. Strengthening and linking these targets to climate finance is essential for effective implementation. Moreover, the information on finance needs will inform the discussion under the Baku-Belem Roadmap to 1.3T, to address the existing finance gap and ensure adequate resources are mobilized to support Africa's climate action.

African countries must prioritize integrating clear, actionable adaptation measures and targets in the adaptation component of their new NDCs, in accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, and the guidance provided in decision 9/CMA that includes information on national circumstances, climate impacts, adaptation priorities, goals, and planned actions. Additionally in line with the GST outcome, African countries could provide information on adaptation efforts consisting of information on climate-induced water scarcity, ensuring climate-resilient water and sanitation services, enhancing food security through resilient agricultural production and equitable access, and minimizing climate-related health risks by strengthening climate-resilient health services.

Moreover, efforts on protecting ecosystems and biodiversity through ecosystem-based adaptation, increasing infrastructure and human settlement resilience, reducing climate-related poverty impacts through adaptive social protection, and safeguarding cultural heritage with adaptive strategies and Indigenous knowledge could be provided as adaptation efforts under NDCs to reflect GST outcomes.

Climate Finance

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3T and Advocating for Enhanced Financing Commitments

The roadmap is crucial as it represents a follow-up process to secure the implementation of the NCQG decision hence defining the climate finance landscape going forward. Most importantly, it provides constructive space for developing countries to integrate African perspectives on different forms of financing to inform the process for developing the report by the COP Presidencies and potential decision at the Belém COP. This, therefore, calls for the Presidencies to promptly provide clear information and guidelines on the vital process, scope, timelines, and modalities of engagements on the roadmap to safeguard transparency and effective engagement of all stakeholders, including Party and non-party observer organizations.

Additionally, Brazil's leadership at COP30 is promising, given its great influence on the reform of the financial architecture and governance and the task force on solidarity levies as potential innovative sources of finance. Thus, the Roadmap must consolidate and sustain momentum on scaling up qualitative finance by leveraging on the existing multilateral initiatives, including in the context of Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement set to be concluded at COP30.

Africa should continue to push for concrete financial commitments from developed countries to fund renewable energy and just transition initiatives in the region. The outcomes of COP29 underscored the need for a predictable and adequate flow of finance. African countries must advocate for the full implementation of the USD1.3 trillion roadmap to ensure that financing mechanisms centre adaptation finance and set a new quantitative target beyond the doubling goal; and prioritize energy access,

clean energy infrastructure, and just transition initiatives, particularly for vulnerable communities. African negotiators should align with multilateral climate finance institutions to push for robust financing frameworks, ensuring that they reflect Africa's priorities for equitable energy transitions.

There is an opportunity to leverage other key moments and multilateral processes to build towards a good outcome at COP30. African countries should also utilize these moments to build better coalitions that can achieve tangible outcomes at the COP. The Financing for Development summit planned for mid 2025, for example, can provide a chance to align asks and plans for how to achieve more financing for climate action and development. Furthermore, engagement through the Jubilee campaign work on debt, as well as the IMF and World Bank Spring and annual meetings could assist in creating common positions and game plans for improving financing climate action through different channels.

Adaptation

Influencing UAE-Belém Work Programme on Indicators

With the UAE-Belém work programme concluding at COP30, a key priority in 2025 must be finalizing a focused set of no more than 100 indicators to track progress toward achieving the 11 GGA targets. African and other developing countries must work to secure the gains made at COP29, particularly the inclusion of Means of Implementation (MoI) indicators, ensuring they are retained in the final list presented by experts ahead of COP30. The planned workshops and expert consultations in 2025 present a crucial opportunity to strengthen African perspectives, ensuring that the selected indicators are contextually relevant and applicable while reinforcing the necessity of linking indicators to MoI. With Brazil's COP30 presidency signalling support for adaptation, there is a strategic political opening to push for an ambitious adaptation outcome.

Baku Adaptation Roadmap

African CSOs and negotiators must actively participate in crafting the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, which provides an opportunity to maintain a dedicated adaptation agenda item within the UNFCCC. This agenda must prioritize the needs of developing countries, including ensuring adequate financing and capacity support for tracking and reporting on the final indicators agreed upon under the UAE-Belém Work Programme on Indicators.

Just Transitions Pathways

African countries have called for a Just Transition Pathways Work Programme that supports achieving Paris Agreement goals. The programme should support transitions towards low emissions and climate-resilient development in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. African countries have also emphasized that just and equitable transition encompasses different pathways and should consider the social and economic circumstances of different countries. With adaptation set to be a top focus at COP30, there is an opportunity to further operationalise the work programme by anchoring adaptation and resilience as one of the pillars of just transitions. The programme should provide guidance on enhancing adaptation and resilience to support the transition efforts of countries and identifying the resources needed.

Advancing Renewable Energy and Critical Minerals for sustainable transitions

Strengthening Regional Collaboration for Energy Projects

Africa must focus on regional energy cooperation, leveraging its abundant renewable energy resources through regional power pools, cross-border renewable energy projects, and shared infrastructure. Regional collaboration can help reduce costs and improve energy access while ensuring more equitable distribution of resources. African nations should prioritize intergovernmental agreements and regional partnerships on energy transition, particularly focusing on clean energy technologies, cross-border grids, and regional financing mechanisms that support energy access and jobs creation. In addition, Africa must intensify its efforts to ensure that a comprehensive transition plan that addresses the needs of workers in fossil fuel-dependent sectors is developed. This includes provisions for skills training, job creation in renewable energy industries, and social safety nets for affected workers.

Critical Minerals

Africa holds vast reserves of critical minerals essential for renewable technologies yet, historically, these resources have been extracted for foreign benefit with minimal local value addition. A dedicated index could establish frameworks for fair trade, resource sovereignty, and regional beneficiation, ensuring that revenues from critical minerals contribute directly to Africa's transition. By leveraging these resources strategically, Africa can secure funding mechanisms that reduce dependence on external debt and aid.

Strengthening Africa's Role in Global Climate Negotiations

COP30 presents an opportunity for Africa to continue strengthening its role in the global climate negotiations arena, particularly in shaping the rules and frameworks that govern climate finance and energy transition mechanisms. The political momentum generated by the outcomes of COP29 could be leveraged to advocate for policies that specifically address Africa's energy access and job creation needs within a low-carbon economy.

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