COP30 SCORECARD:
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AGAINST THE AFRICAN AGENDA



POWER SHIFT AFRICA

1. Executive Summary

This scorecard provides a high-level assessment of COP30 outcomes against African priorities as articulated in the **policy brief** by Power Shift Africa (PSA). The brief aimed to support African negotiators, policymakers, and civil society in advancing a coherent and justice-centred strategy for COP30. The scorecard identifies key wins, gaps, and outstanding issues across critical negotiating tracks, including climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, just transition, and trade measures. It also suggests possible pathways to advance the wins from the COP decisions and bridge gaps through subsequent processes.



The outcomes reflect a COP marked by unprecedented geopolitical challenges, including an absent United States and a fragmented European Union. Nonetheless, significant progress was achieved in several areas, particularly the decision to establish a global Just Transition Mechanism, establishment of a two-year work programme on climate finance, adoption of 59 indicators to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation targets and establishment of a two-year policy alignment process to operationalize them. However, COP30 also resulted in weak outcomes related to the tripling of adaptation finance and the full operationalisation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

2. Political Context

The geopolitics and major power dynamics leading to COP30 were characterised by significant disruption. The United States was absent from official proceedings, with only former negotiators aligned with Democrats engaging informally in the corridors, emphasising the recognition of subnational players actively advancing climate action regardless of the national government's climate policy positions.

The European Union appeared fragmented, with Italy, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands increasingly sympathetic to the current US administration, thereby undermining the EU's traditional climate leadership role. According to the NDC Synthesis report released on October 28, 2025, only 64 countries submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) ahead of COP, despite the February 2025 deadline called for in the Paris Agreement adoption decision.[1] Although an update to the NDC Synthesis report on November 10 indicated a new total of 86 NDCs from 113 governments,[2] the late submissions reflected broader challenges in their preparation and political commitment.

Multilateral trust and fairness remained fragile, with numerous unilateral measures from the Global North shaping the landscape. The shifting geopolitical landscape appeared to have weakened multilateral institutions and had an impact on the coordination and positioning of developing country blocs, such as AGN and AOSIS, across various agenda items. The US withdrawal from the G20 meeting in South Africa and the UNFCCC's struggle to transition from the negotiation to implementation phases were evident. This was characterised by an inability to distinguish between the implementation of Paris Agreement provisions, which largely involve communication and reporting on climate action, and domestic implementation, which depends heavily on the international economic architecture where the UNFCCC has no remit beyond orchestration. With budgets increasingly diverted to military expenditure in Europe and the US pulling back on financial commitments, the ability to build trust with the Global South remains severely limited.

The Presidency's approach began with the unrealistic assertion that there would be no cover decision, particularly as critical and cross-cutting issues such as the tripling of adaptation finance, addressing the ambition gaps, and further work on the $1.3 trillion roadmap were not on the negotiating table. The four proposed agenda items discussed under a series of Presidency consultations ultimately paved the way for a cover decision, with the belated NDC and Biennial Transparency Report (BTR synthesis agenda items positioned as counterweights to unilateral trade measures and Article 9.1, which developing countries had been advancing since SB62.

The Presidency's use of shuttle diplomacy with individual groups lacked transparency and nearly led to the collapse of negotiations as there was no shared understanding of how the package would evolve following skilful diplomacy during the agenda adoption. The Presidency text was unbalanced, with demands from the LMDCs undermining priorities presented by the EU-AOSIS-Latin American alliance. The African Group appeared more aligned with the LMDC position, which was somewhat natural given their shared interests. However, the African Group generally supports high ambition, which is also championed by AOSIS, albeit with differences on how and who should shoulder the burden.

Developing countries were strategic in maintaining the integrity of the Paris Agreement's legal provisions regarding how Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes are treated. However, some developed and developing country blocs, such as AOSIS and Latin American Parties, pushed for roadmaps from paragraph 28 of the GST outcome, particularly regarding fossil fuels. As a general point, an opportunity was lost in advancing the quality of finance dimensions from the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) decision, given the geopolitical context where funds are being diverted to other areas by developed countries. The insistence on addressing Article 9.1 outside the NCQG context led to a sub-optimal outcome of a two-year work programme. This is despite some Parties having proposed roadmaps for provided or mobilised finance, and flows in the context of the NCQG, which would have yielded a better outcome as Article 9.1 would have been addressed in a more focused manner. The EU appeared to follow a strategy of trading off the tripling of adaptation finance against the fossil fuel phase-out roadmap, pitting Africa against several developing countries considering the continent's prioritisation of tripling adaptation finance.

1 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/2025-ndc-synthesis-report

2 Ibid.

3. African Priorities for COP30

Africa's commitment to ambitious climate action is beyond question, given the continent's disproportionate vulnerability to climate impacts despite its minimal contribution to global emissions. Following the outcome of COP29, the Subsidiary Bodies meetings in Bonn, and in the lead-up to COP30, a top priority for the continent across all agenda items centred on developed countries delivering on their commitments in a manner consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and obligations under the Paris Agreement. With COP30 representing a critical juncture for global climate action and multilateralism, a Power Shift Africa **policy brief** identified several key African priorities heading into Belém.[3]

Adaptation and Loss and Damage: The adoption of Global Goal on Adaptation indicators was a primary concern, with Africa advocating for a robust set of indicators to assess global progress; ensure that progress is tied to predictable, high-quality finance; and secure parity with mitigation in line with Paris Agreement obligations, CBDR-RC, and equity. On loss and damage, African nations sought to operationalise the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage with adequate, accessible resources, ensuring that vulnerable communities receive direct support without burdensome conditionalities, while at the same time advancing discussions on the Santiago Network to provide technical assistance where most needed.

Just Transition and Mitigation. On the Just Transition Work Programme, the continent sought to shift from dialogue to delivery through the Belém Action Mechanism and Just Transition Technical Assistance Network, ensuring that global transitions are just, respond to development needs and challenges, are job-creating, and fully financed, with the scope covering mitigation, adaptation, and finance, and primarily focusing on inter-state equity. Related to mitigation ambition, Africa emphasised the need for developed countries to lead with enhanced NDCs, reflecting their historical responsibility and capacity, while ensuring that developing countries' mitigation efforts are supported by adequate finance and technology transfer. The Technology Implementation Programme represented a strategic priority, with Africa seeking to advance it as a tool to remove structural barriers, ease intellectual property constraints, and position Africa as a technology producer and innovator through regional hubs and South-South cooperation, building on declarations from two successive African Climate Summits which positioned Africa as a solutions provider.

Climate Finance: The operationalisation of Article 9.1 emerged as a critical priority, with African nations demanding that it be treated as a binding obligation for developed countries. This position addressed the limitations of the NCQG decision in Baku, which covered finance flows of $1.3 trillion and mobilised finance of $300 billion but fell short of clarity on finance "**provided**", which is central to the legal obligations of developed countries. The COP Presidency report on the Roadmap to 1.3T and the recommendations contained therein, particularly in respect of pathways and the quality of finance aspects of the Baku NCQG outcome, could provide potential entry points for operationalising Article 9.1.

Trade and Unilateral Measures: African negotiators sought to reaffirm Article 3.5 of the Convention and challenge unilateral climate-related trade measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products (EUDR), and the Inflation Reduction Act, which undermine Africa's development and trade competitiveness.

Recognition of Africa's Special Needs: Recognition of Africa's special needs and circumstances remained a persistent demand, with the continent seeking formal political recognition under the COP/CMA to ensure that Africa's vulnerabilities and support needs are addressed coherently across all agenda items. This is particularly significant given that the Convention is explicit on Africa's special circumstances, for example, in the Green Climate Fund governing instrument, but this recognition is absent in Paris Agreement modalities.

COP30 Presidency Action Agenda: African nations approached engagement with the COP30 Presidency's Action Agenda constructively but critically, demanding transparency on the Baku–Belém Finance Roadmap, advocating for the Tropical Forest Forever Facility to be reshaped into a rights-based, multilateral mechanism under COP oversight, promoting Africa's industrialisation and fair-trade agenda in the Integrated Forum on Trade and Climate, and ensuring that the NDC synthesis report reflects Africa's differentiated circumstances.

3 See: https://www.powershiftafrica.org/publications/african-priorities-for-cop30-policy-brief

4. Assessment of COP30 Negotiated outcomes

4.1 Climate Finance

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
Inclusion of Agenda Item and work programme on operationalisation of Article 9.1 of Paris Agreement. This is crucial, especially for post-NCQG outcomes, to reaffirm the legal and foundational obligation of developed countries to provide public and grant-based public finance to developing countries, particularly for adaptation and loss and damage needs in line with the principles of CBDR-RC and equity.	Establishment of a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 in the context of the entire Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The work programme is under the CMA appointed by the COP30 Presidency.	
Follow up on accountability and transparency on NCQG implementation, including a demand for a dedicated space for countries to deliberate on development of a concrete annual delivery plan and to clarify on all the qualitative elements to secure the implementation of the NCQG decision.	The Mutirão decision emphasised the urgent need to remain on a pathway towards the goal of mobilising at least $300 billion for developing countries per year by 2035 for climate action, with developed countries taking the lead; and it reaffirmed and called for enhanced efforts to at least triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism from the 2022 level by 2030. The decision further provided for a high-level ministerial roundtable to reflect on the implementation of the NCQG on climate finance, including on the quantitative and qualitative elements related to the provision of finance. The outcome also called for continued efforts on international financial architecture reform, and noted the need to rapidly reduce existing constraints, challenges, systemic inequities and barriers in relation to access to climate finance.	
Scaling quality and accessible adaptation finance, and for COP30 to commit to establishing a new post-2025 adaptation finance pledge that triples the doubling pact from 2025 levels by 2030; in the context of a needs-based regime; and is strongly anchored on public finance provision within the existing frameworks of NCQG and the Baku to Belém US$1.3 trillion.	The COP reaffirmed the doubling by 2025, called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of NCQG, including paragraph 16, and urged developed countries to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries.	
On matters related to the Adaptation Fund, fast-track the conclusion of negotiations on matters related to all transition arrangements, including trustee, governance arrangements and the 5th review of the fund, in readiness for the Fund to also serve the Paris Agreement once monetisation of the first share of proceeds under Article 6.4 is triggered.	On the replenishment of the Adaptation Fund, developed countries were called to fast-track its capitalisation and replenishment through multi-year contributions towards achieving the goal of tripling their annual outflows from 2022 levels by 2030. The transition matters were not concluded and were differed to SBs next year.	



The framing of the decision broadens the scope to general climate finance discussions in the context of the whole of Article 9, instead of specifically operationalising Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. This could, however, be interpreted as meaning that Article 9.1 remains the primary mandate of the work programme, with the broader reference serving as a potential avenue for advancing a needs-based consideration of finance under the Paris Agreement. However, the decision includes a footnote stating that the work programme does not prejudge the process on the implementation of the NCQG (decision 1/CMA.6, paragraph 54). Disconnecting the work programme deliberations from informing the NCQG implementation process is not only a big contrast to the initial intention of 9.1 agenda to correct NCQG failures, but also demonstrates bad faith from the developed countries' preference to use processes to obscure and delay meaningful outcomes.

From a process perspective, the lack of detailed modalities raises potential difficulties. Being a two-year work programme on climate finance coordinated by the Presidency, how and when will the modalities be adopted? Will there be space at SB64 to reach agreement on them? What will be the nature of expected outcomes and how will those be carried forward? If not, will the work programme still conclude at COP32? Despite these concerns, the decision represents a significant step for developing countries, presenting a potential space to continue advocating for grant-based public finance and non-debt-creating instruments, particularly for adaptation and loss and damage in the delivery of the NCQG.

The decision to convene a High-Level Ministerial Roundtable on the implementation of the NCQG (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 52) is positive, providing an avenue for understanding not only the pathways to mobilised finance and finance flows but also the quality and accessibility of finance under the NCQG, including grant-based public finance for adaptation and loss and damage. This could complement the work programme deliberations for a more comprehensive output on climate finance. However, this appears to be a one-off session with no clarity on frequency, expected outputs, or how it will feed into other climate finance workstreams. The decision therefore provides a basis for accountability but is weak on transparency, where the latter would address issues of accounting and definitions.

In calling for the reform of the international financial architecture (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 44), the outcome provides the right political signal on the urgent need to remove barriers, address disenablers to climate financing, and unlock public and concessional resources at the scale required to meet Africa's climate and developmental needs. This is crucial to ensure delivery of high-quality, accessible, and non-debt-inducing climate finance within the NCQG and its upscaling to $1.3 trillion annually by 2035. However, this call should have been strengthened by making it more concrete and ensuring a meaningful process that delivers tangible results within and outside the UNFCCC system, as there is no clear process at this stage. These aspects can still be addressed within the scope of the High-Level Ministerial on implementation of the NCQG.

On the tripling of adaptation finance from the 2025 doubling baseline by 2035 (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 53), the decision has weaker language compared to the Glasgow COP26 commitment, with language that dilutes developed countries' legal obligations under Article 9.1, omits a specific figure, and extends the deadline to 2035 instead of 2030, as called for by the African and Least Developed Countries groups. However, a literal reading of the decision starts by "recalling" decision 1/CMA.3, which could be the basis for any further interpretation, and "calls" for efforts to "at least triple adaptation finance by 2035", which would assume the modalities of the Glasgow pledge.

Yet the decision broadens the commitment to include actors such as multilateral financial institutions and the private sector. The inclusion of private finance raises concerns regarding further loans and deeper debt distress for already vulnerable and debt-ridden nations. It further includes reference to the tripling of finance outflows by 2030 from the Financial Mechanism (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 51), which would assume a tripling of 2025 outflows through the mechanism, a sound base with a good timeline. Finally, it urges developed countries to increase "provided" finance, which is consistent with Article 9.1 in paragraph 28(d) of the Global Goal on Adaptation decision.

On matters related to the Adaptation Fund, developing countries advocated for COP guidance mandating the Adaptation Fund Board to develop and conclude trustee arrangements to enable prompt monetisation of the share of proceeds under Article 6.4, voluntary contributions, including resources for adaptation under Article 6.2, and the complete transfer of remaining assets under the Clean Development Mechanism. This was blocked by developed countries, who strongly pushed for changes in terminology and composition of board membership in line with the Paris Agreement as part of the transition. These delays continue to worsen the Fund's financial health. The risks posed by developed country demands include setting a precedent where Africa has a special share, as well as the fact that some Parties might exit the Paris Agreement but not the Convention, which would still maintain developed countries' obligations to provide finance to developing countries.

At COP30, the Adaptation Fund received new pledges equivalent to $134.93 million, including multi-annual pledges from some contributors. This trend is deeply concerning as the Fund falls short of its minimum $300 million annual fundraising target for the third consecutive year. This further threatens the delivery of predictable, accessible, and long-term reliable public funding streams for concrete and scalable adaptation projects in vulnerable countries, as well as its goal of tripling outflows by 2030 in line with the NCQG. Increased multi-year contributions from

more donor countries are required to meet the increasing need and urgency of scaling up public financial resources for locally led adaptation actions.

Going forward to SB64 and beyond, on Article 9.1, Africa should constructively engage in and shape the modalities and deliberations under the work programme to ensure it focuses on the obligation of support "provided". This can be viewed as complementary to the High-Level Ministerial on the NCQG, with the latter focusing on pathways, quality of finance, and the reform agenda. The approach should therefore take the form of concentric rings, moving from flows to mobilised finance to finance provided, with "provided" at the centre. The Presidency process should translate into SB64 conclusions that clarify the modalities, which may actually require an "agenda item" or another mechanism, noting the work programme is directly under the CMA in a similar manner to the NCQG decision. The tripling of adaptation finance can be carried through under both the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) and the Belém to Addis Vision.

4.2 Adaptation

4.2.1 Global Goal on Adaptation

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
Adoption of a robust set of indicators following the technical work of the experts that resulted in a potential list of 100. The list needs to align with the guidance given by Parties, which includes adaptation relevance, a sizeable number that measure means of implementation, global applicability, and local relevance. The final list to be adopted at COP30 needs to track global adaptation actions and support.	Parties concluded the UAE-Belém WP on Indicators and adopted a set of 59 indicators for the GGA, which include MoI indicators on finance, technology and capacity building, in line with BTR MPGs under the dimension targets on implementation. However, the opaque process undermined the quality of indicators and trust in the framework, requiring considerable work to make them robust and measurable.	
Beyond the adoption of a set of robust adaptation indicators, we called for a clear process post-COP30 dedicated towards the operationalisation of the indicators and their alignment with other existing processes, including the Global Stocktake, National Adaptation Plans (NAPS), and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), including under the BAR.	The indicators differ widely in quality and contain methodological gaps. Yet paragraph 11 of the decision invites parties to begin testing the incompletely developed indicators and draw experiences that will inform the BAV. More positively, the decision provides for an alignment process in paragraphs 23 and 24 on methodologies and paragraph 12 on integration in reporting planning.	

Least aligned · Moderately aligned · Most aligned

The adopted GGA indicators, while not perfect, address key concerns of the African Group, particularly regarding adaptation relevance and the inclusion of means of implementation in their most discrete form through the Modality, Procedure and Guidelines (MPGs) under the Enhanced Transparency Framework for adaptation (decision -/CMA.7, Annex). Although problematic indicators on national budgets, national legislation, and private finance were dropped, several Parties expressed concerns in the closing plenary regarding the opaque last-minute revisions and reduction of the expert-led indicators from 100 to 59. While the adopted 59 indicators may reflect progress and a step forward, their adoption has also undermined two-years of expert work, with many indicators unclear, unmeasurable and technically flawed. For instance, under target 9(f), the indicator 8(a) on "level of population living in poverty, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable" is weakly formulated and confusing, implying the degree of poverty is linked to maladaptation. As a result, there is significant discrepancy in the quality of indicators and methodological gaps that will require considerable refinement and follow-up work to ensure they are fit for purpose and usable. The Belém-Addis Vision (BAV) is a two-year policy alignment process which has responsibility for providing guidance on operationalisation of the indicators and undertaking technical work for improving metadata and methodologies (decision -/CMA.7, paragraphs 23 and 24). Technical work on improving metadata and methodologies falls outside the Belém-Addis Vision to be considered at COP32, including through a taskforce.

The decision also ensures alignment with related processes, including communications, reporting arrangements, and the Global Stocktake (paragraphs 13–16). This coordination is carried out through a range of processes, some informed by technical papers prepared by the Secretariat and others undertaken by constituted bodies. Paragraph 16 provides the widest latitude to address all concerns of the GGA. But while alignment with the processes is important, the sequencing remains a concern, as paragraphs 11 and 12 invite Parties to begin testing the 59 indicators and integrating both the targets and indicators into their reporting and planning processes, including BTRs, national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs. In the absence of consistent indicators and agreed methodological standards, early testing and integration of methodologically uneven indicators could undermine comparability, aggregation of data, and assessment of the collective progress on adaptation to inform the global stocktake. Furthermore, the decision is mute on how countries that may attempt testing of the indicators can share actionable lessons with the UNFCCC. This is a significant gap which undermines the global relevance of testing indicators and could be at odds with the policy alignment process under the BAV-A.

On a positive note, the GGA decision also encourages further coherence to the UNFCCC adaptation architecture through the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), with modalities further elaborated in paragraphs 26 to 30. A significant step towards coherence is the mandate in paragraph 26 for streamlining various aspects, including the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP), and work beyond the negotiations. Work under the BAR will primarily focus on aligning adaptation responses to different warming increments within the temperature goal, strengthening implementation of the GGA targets, enhancing knowledge-sharing, and ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation. The first two-year phase (2026-2028) of the BAR will centre on two SB chair-led workshops per year, alongside the development of a technical paper to advance adaptive capacity, national planning, and implementation in line with national circumstances and Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement. These are opportunities for the Africa Group and civil society to engage in to inform the focus and direction of the workshops and technical paper.

Going forward to SB64 and beyond, the African Group should focus on: (i) preparing a submission related to the focus of BAR workshops and technical paper with emphasis on adaptation finance (paragraph 30); (ii) streamlining mandates of the various adaptation processes, (iii) streamlining information necessary for the GST (i.e., communications and reports), and (iv) preparation for the second Global Stocktake, where completion of the various mandates ensures timely input for a meaningful assessment, contrary to the first GST.

4.2.2 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
In continuation of their responsibility under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, developed country parties should provide MoI to developing country parties to support the formulation and implementation of their NAPs. This support should not undermine the national priorities and leadership, and should be cognisant of and complement existing national development plans.	COP30 only "noted with concern" that developing country parties continue to face challenges in accessing finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans.	
Noting that only a few developing countries have submitted their NAPs despite the 2025 deadline, COP30 should kickstart a process to identify particular climate adaptation needs of developing country Parties and barriers that inhibit them from formulating and timely submitting their NAPs. This will provide a basis for targeted support and alignment of NAPs with national development plans and priorities. Parties should also consider adaptation as part of country-development strategies instead of being a separate process; therefore, they should encourage integration and mainstreaming of adaptation initiatives into country development planning without necessarily causing countries to account for their national budgets allocations to adaptation at the multilateral level or sacrificing the obligation that developed countries have to provide resources for climate adaptation to developing ones.	In the Mutirão decision, COP30 launched the Global Implementation Accelerator to support countries and all actors to accelerate implementation of NDCs and NAPs to keep 1.5 °C within reach. It facilitated by the COP30 and 31 Presidencies, culminating in a report and a high-level event in 2026. On integration in development planning, pronouncements were only made for LDCs and SIDS for dedicated support, where the Presidency requested the LEG in collaboration with Adaptation Committee to prepare a technical paper on how these groups of countries are integrating different adaptation approaches into their plans. It also recognised the importance of integrating adaptation action into relevant development plans and processes at the national, sub-national, local and sectoral levels, as appropriate.	
The COP should fast-track the progress of NAPs assessment as a global process in ensuring that such plans are not only developed and implemented at a scale that meets local needs but also reflect responsiveness to changing global temperatures and long-term resilience.	COP30 decided that the next assessment of progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans will take place at the 35th session of the Conference of the Parties (2030). It further affirmed in the GGA decision in paragraph 28(a) that the BAR shall consider adequate adaptation responses in light of the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.	

Least aligned Moderately aligned Most aligned

After two years of unresolved negotiations resulting in procedural conclusions, the COP30 decision on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) was successfully adopted. A key element of the decision included the NAP assessment, which recognised developing countries' progress in NAP planning and implementation, while also highlighting the MoI barriers to formulating and carrying out their national adaptation responses.

National Adaptation Plans, being central to national implementation, particularly by developing countries, also provide information that has in the past been used in assessing the needs of developing countries as well as in the GST for assessing collective progress. The COP30 decision (decision -/CP.30, paragraph 12) provided for consideration of financing the implementation of NAPs, as well as through the BAR in "ensuring" "adequate" means of implementation from developed to developing countries. Paragraph 12 called for the LEG in collaboration with AC and SCF to provide an overview of financial flows for the development and implementation of NAPS, to be included in the 2026 NAPS progress report for consideration at the SBI65. This will provide useful insights on challenges developing countries face in the process of accessing finance for implementation of NAPs.

The African Group should stress the need for developed countries to provide means of implementation (MOI) to developing countries for both the preparation and implementation of NAPs. In doing so, it should highlight paragraph 23 of the NAPs decision, which recognises NAPs as a key vehicle for achieving the GGA targets. On "preparation" and "implementation" of NAPs under the BAR, including through the technical papers under both the Belém-Addis Vision and the BAR, particularly regarding paragraph 21 of the GGA decision, the focus should be on enhancing the quality of NAPs across all developing countries in a manner that aligns with national development plans and delivers long-term resilience.

4.3 Loss and Damage

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
Developed countries must commit to not only making more new pledges but also deliver on existing ones as well as sustain the FRLD at a scale that matches the true extent of damages.	COP30 welcomed additional pledges from Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain, and the government of the Wallonia Region of Belgium, with the cumulative pledges to the FRLD reaching $817.01 million. As a step towards ensuring sustainability of the fund, COP30 welcomed the proposition of the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) to develop a long-term resource mobilisation strategy and plan.	
Arrangements for the delivery of the FRLD must provide a greater window for direct access by communities that need it. This should be designed in ways that avoid the bureaucracies and barriers common with other financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC.	COP30 welcomed the progress made by the Board of FRLD, specifically under BIM, targeting full operationalisation of the fund. Among other things, BIM provides for bottom-up, country-led and country-owned approaches to supporting and strengthening national responses to loss and damage, including decisions taken with respect to funding criteria and direct access modalities. BIM promises to enhance access to the FRLD through consideration of rapid disbursement modalities and a small grants policy.	
Parties must pursue regional spread of the Santiago Network with the aim of providing tailored technical support that matches actual damages and losses, including accounting for non-economic losses. The Network and its secretariat should also be adequately resourced with the needed funding to scale up the provision of technical assistance to developing countries.	The decision reaffirmed regional presence of the Santiago Network.	

COP30 must use the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism to align and strengthen coordination, coherence, and complementarity between the FRLD, SNLD and national mechanisms. This is critical to enhance access, outreach, and support to climate-vulnerable countries.	The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) Third review was finally adopted at COP30.	
COP30 should consider developing a roadmap for integrating loss and damage into national policies and international reporting frameworks.	At COP30 the push to recognise national and context specific vulnerabilities was a great success. Integration of Loss and Damage into national policies will be crucial to addressing loss and damage at national level. This will also increase transparency and tracking of funds channelled to different sectors to address climate economic and non-economic losses.	

Least aligned Moderately aligned Most aligned

At COP30, the operationalisation of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was witnessed. This was a significant milestone towards realising the loss and damage needs of developing countries. Despite recognition of gaps in these needs, the $250 million allocated for 2025–2026 remains insufficient and far below the global need of $450 billion annually. The momentum of fund mobilisation should continue on the road to SB64 and COP31 in 2026 to be able to support capacity-building, adaptation and resilience projects, as well as technology transfer for communities on the frontline of economic and non-economic losses and damages amidst the climate crisis across the continent.

Whilst the additional pledges are welcome, there is no mention of how much of these pledges has been delivered since the establishment of the Fund. Data from the FRLD show that only 22 of the 28 countries that pledged to the Fund by 30 June 2025 have signed contribution agreements. Moreover, only 19 have released the pledged funds in the same period. The delay in adopting the long-term fundraising and resource mobilisation strategy and plan continues to undermine this momentum. The Board of FRLD's decision to start the first replenishment process of the Fund in 2027 provides hope for its future.

On the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), despite recognition of the need to support developing countries with means of implementation for capacity-building, finance, and technology transfer, there is still no clarity on operational guidance for implementation.



4.4 Just Transition Work Programme

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Non-negotiated outcome	Ranking
Formal institutional arrangement/ mechanism to operationalise JTWP (e.g. Global JT Framework/ Belem-style mechanism).	Decision mandates the development of a Just Transition Mechanism, with SBs tasked to recommend a draft decision on its operationalisation by SB64 (June 2026). Clear political breakthrough presents first formal pathway beyond dialogues. While design deferred, the mandate itself responds directly to AGN/G77 calls for structure and coordination.	Action Agenda-Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS)- Multiple Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS) addressing just transition-related themes — including energy planning, minerals, social protection, and green skills — were launched as voluntary implementation vehicles.	
Predictable, grant-based finance and means of implementation (MoI).	Strong language on MoI, concessional finance, debt constraints and capacity gaps, but no quantified commitments or new finance window. Normative recognition achieved, but without operational finance triggers or timelines; reflects resistance from developed countries on resourcing. It is further silent on the fairness of finance aspects, particularly in respect of the international finance architecture.	Several finance skills and social protection initiatives aligned with just transition principles were announced through partnerships and coalitions. Examples are the Climate-Resilient Social Protection partnerships, Global Initiative for Jobs and Skills for the New Economy, and just transition-adjacent education and capacity-building platforms	
Clean cooking as a JT priority (without fossil gas as "transition fuel").	Clean cooking and universal energy access strongly reflected; no explicit exclusion of gas, although the text on "transition fuels" was removed in the final text. Inclusion is positive for Africa, but ambiguity around fuels leaves space for fossil lock-in narratives.	The Platform for Clean Cooking in Schools was launched. Hosted by the World Bank's Clean Cooking Fund, it aims to transform household and institutional cooking systems into clean, efficient, and gender-responsive models by focusing on data collection and analysis, carbon-credit frameworks, and integration into NDCs. It aims to enable clean cooking access for 140 million people annually by 2028.	
Inclusion of critical/transition minerals within JTWP.	Minerals referenced only indirectly via value chains, technology and industrialisation; no standalone agreement on minerals, with final text removing language that references minerals based on China's refusal of their mention.	Plan to Accelerate Minerals for the Transition and Circularity, a voluntary COP30 scheme launched to strengthen transition-mineral value chains through better data, grid expansion, circularity, skills, gender inclusion, and coordinated finance and policy reforms to support developing economies.	



Human rights, labour rights, Indigenous Peoples, informal workers.	Strong, detailed and cross-cutting language retained across operative paragraphs. One of the strongest areas of consensus, reflecting sustained pressure from AGN, LDCs, IPs, civil society and labour groups.	"New Skills Development for the Future: Empowering Women and Youth for a Just Transition - A Global Multi-Stakeholder Partnership" was launched, with a plan to accelerate skills development for women and youth, and building on programmes already underway across Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas. It seeks to scale up existing efforts such as The Green Jobs for Youth Pact, UNIDO's Global Cleantech Innovation Programme, and the Global Network of Sustainable Energy Centres.	

Least aligned Moderately aligned Most aligned

The COP30 outcome on the Just Transition Work Programme marks a qualitative shift from dialogue to institutionalisation. The decision to initiate the development of a Just Transition Mechanism represents the most significant advance since the JTWP was launched, responding to long-standing calls from the African Group, G77+China, and LDCs for a structure capable of coordinating finance, capacity-building, and technical assistance. However, the compromised nature of the outcome is evident: while the mechanism is agreed in principle, its design, governance, and resourcing are deferred to SB64, reflecting continued resistance from developed countries concerned about duplication and new obligations.

Substantively, the decision consolidates important gains for Africa, including the three pathways of Article 2 and strong recognition of energy access, clean cooking, social protection, labour rights, adaptation, and resilience as integral components of just transition pathways. At the same time, key political fault lines remain. Trade-related concerns, particularly around unilateral measures such as CBAM, were removed from the JTWP negotiations and shifted into the COP30 Mutirão decision. While this avoided deadlock in the JTWP text, it also meant that the direct relationship between trade measures and just transition outcomes was not addressed within the work programme itself.

Nonetheless, the Mutirão decision partially compensates for this gap by reaffirming that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 55), and by mandating future dialogues involving UNCTAD, the WTO, and the ITC. Taken together, the outcomes strengthen the normative foundations of a just transition but leave implementation power unevenly distributed. For Africa, the JTWP now offers an entry point to contest trade, finance, and mineral governance debates, but only if the forthcoming mechanism is shaped to operationalise equity, CBDR-RC, and development-first pathways.

Going forward to SB64 and beyond, the African Group should: (i) shape the Just Transition Mechanism by co-developing clear proposals on mandate, governance, finance triggers, and linkages to existing bodies (including carrying forward UN Panel on Critical Minerals insights); (ii) elevate transition minerals by pushing for explicit recognition of critical/transition minerals as a JTWP pillar, grounded in value retention, human rights, and industrial diversification; (iii) operationalise clean cooking by securing language that prioritises renewables and excludes fossil gas lock-ins; and (iv) monitor both finance aspects and means of implementation delivery by tracking whether JTWP commitments translate into grant-based finance and debt-sensitive support for African countries, and a fairer international finance ecosystem in financing the transitions. The decision emphasised the scope as including all three Article 2 pathways but overemphasised the "national" level more than the "international" dimensions, which will require re-emphasis as it addresses the "justness" between states.

4.5 UAE Dialogue on Implementing GST Outcomes

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
African Group position emphasised that paragraph 97 is limited to finance for the implementation of the GST-1 outcomes.	The decision affirmed a broader scope covering Means of Implementation, rather than just finance, balanced with a broader reference to the implementation of GST outcomes. It further set modalities on annual dialogues during the SB session in 2026 and 2027 and provided for a high-level ministerial roundtable in 2027 at COP32, with outputs serving as inputs to the next GST.	
The African Group position focused on how the international cooperation tools and instruments consider principles of the Convention and the creation of an international cooperation framework, including under Mission 1.5.	The Annual GST Dialogue acknowledged summary reports of the 2024 and 2025 dialogues, which will terminate in June 2026, with a possibility of further undertaking the dialogue after the 2nd GST.	
The African Group sought to synchronise the IPCC cycle with the GST process, and recognition of the primacy of science.	On procedural and logistical elements of the GST process, the decision reiterated the sources of input in decision 19/CMA.1 and acknowledged the critical importance of the inputs from the IPCC.	

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COP30 had to address several divergences. The first concerned the interpretation of the scope of paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5 as to whether it covers only finance, as understood by several developing countries, including the African Group, or includes all elements, particularly paragraph 28. The second involved the legal basis of "implementing GST outcomes", noting that the provisions of the Paris Agreement on the GST outcome are limited to "enhancing action and support", which includes NDCs among others, and "enhanced international cooperation". The third concerned the alignment of timeframes of the IPCC assessment with the GST-2 cycle, where some Parties placed more emphasis on sequencing the GST processes after IPCC reports.

The decision does not resolve the issue concerning the scope of paragraph 97, although it places priority on Means of Implementation, with still a secondary consideration of the implementation of GST outcomes. This provides an avenue to discuss items such as a "fossil fuel phase-out roadmap" among others.

The language of the decision also raises questions about what "implementation" means in the UNFCCC process, as it can mean implementation of provisions of the Paris Agreement (which is only communication, reporting, and collective assessment) versus national implementation (which is nationally determined and involves other "real world" stakeholders whose remit is beyond the UNFCCC), notwithstanding the orchestration role the UNFCCC can play.

The African Group, going forward to SB64 and beyond, should decide on the political capital placed on the UAE Dialogue on implementing Global Stocktake outcomes, noting its mandate ends in 2027, even though it will serve as an input to the second Global Stocktake. No contentious issues can be identified in the decision on the dialogue referred to in paragraph 187 of decision 1/CMA.5, whereas the African Group should continue exploring options from within the UNFCCC and IPCC to ensure a GST that is informed and based on best available science.

4.6 Other Items:

- Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3 Trillion
- Unilateral Measures
- Political response to NDC
- Africa's Special Needs and Circumstances

PSA COP30 expectations	Decision outcome	Ranking
Report of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3 Trillion: Ensure the roadmap is anchored in Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, with annual disaggregated progress reports on delivery of the $1.3 trillion to ensure transparency, accountability of public finance and prevent double counting.	The Mutirão decision reaffirmed the call on all actors to enable scaling of finance to $1.3 trillion per year by 2035, took notes of the report on B2B Roadmap, and decided to urgently advance actions to enable the scaling up of financing for developing country Parties for climate action from all public and private sources to at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2035.	
Unilateral Trade Measures: Reaffirm Article 3.5 of the Convention and challenge unilateral climate-related trade measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Regulation on Deforestation-free Products (EUDR), which undermine Africa's development and trade competitiveness.	Trade measures were removed from the JTWP and addressed instead under the Mutirão decision, which reaffirmed that unilateral climate measures must not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised trade restrictions, and mandated future dialogues with UNCTAD, WTO and ITC on trade barriers and cooperation.	
NDC and BTR synthesis response: Ensure that the NDC synthesis report accurately reflects the differentiated circumstances of Africa.	The outcome of this topic was the launch of the Global Implementation Accelerator under the Mutirão decision.	
Africa's Special Needs and Circumstances: Seek formal COP/CMA recognition to ensure Africa's vulnerabilities and support needs are addressed consistently across agenda items.	The outcome of the COP on the call for an agenda item on Africa's special needs and circumstances will be contained in the COP Report. In substance, the understanding reached was for a special event to be held by the COP Presidency on the subject in 2026 and 2027.	

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Report of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3 Trillion: The report, although identifying relevant actors and including some useful action points, lacks specificity and concrete action plans to scale up qualitative public finance at the scale required by developing countries. It also fails to provide an operational and credible way forward with accountability and clear direction for the short-term and longer-term steps it proposes. Being a non-negotiated outcome, the report raises clear tensions over scope, ownership, and alignment with the climate frameworks. As such, there is generally lack of political appetite to move forward with the implementation of the report and its recommendations within and beyond UNFCCC.

Unilateral Trade Measures: The removal of trade measures from the Just Transition Work Programme and their inclusion in the Mutirão decision represents a strategic compromise that provides important normative protection through reaffirmation that climate measures should not constitute arbitrary discrimination or disguised trade restrictions (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 55), while establishing three-year dialogues with the WTO, UNCTAD, and ITC (paragraph 56). However, significant limitations remain: the dialogues are confined to subsidiary body level rather than being elevated to COP/CMA political discussions and create no binding obligations or review mechanisms. Also, their removal from the JTWP means that explicit linkages between trade barriers and just transitions, particularly Africa's ability to develop green industries, add value to critical minerals, and participate in clean technology supply chains are not formally recognised. Going forward, the African Group should utilise these dialogues strategically to build a robust evidence base on how CBAM, EUDR, and technology transfer barriers impede Africa's climate action and development, push for substantive outputs beyond purely consultative exchanges, and explore formal linkages to the Just Transition Mechanism to ensure trade barriers are explicitly recognised as impediments to equitable transitions for mitigation and adaptation.

Response to NDC and BTR synthesis reports: The launch of the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) under the Mutirão decision (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 41) and the Belem Mission to 1.5 C (paragraph 42) represent attempts to address the ambition and implementation gaps revealed by the GST1 SYR and 2025 synthesis reports, which showed current NDCs would reduce emissions to only 12% below 2019 levels by 2035, far short of the 43% reduction needed by 2030 for a 1.5 degrees C pathway. However, the GIA's voluntary nature, lack of clear institutional anchoring, overlapping mandate with the Mission 1.5, and absence of concrete deliverables or commitments to means of implementation raise serious questions about effectiveness. Going forward to SB64 and beyond, Africa should (i) advocate Mission 1.5 that leverages the orchestration role of the UNFCCC with the 'real world' and for the GIA to establish clear criteria for accessing implementation support, (ii) create explicit linkages to the Article 9.1 work programme and High-Level Ministerial on NCQG implementation, (iii) develop transparent monitoring of developed country provision of means of implementation (not just developing country implementation efforts), and (iv) ensure the 2026 report to CMA8 includes specific recommendations on addressing the widening implementation gap for developing countries due to insufficient support.

Africa's Special Needs and Circumstances: The outcome represents a significant disappointment, with the decision not to establish a formal agenda item but instead settle for ad hoc Presidency-organised events in 2026 and 2027 and a summit in Africa in 2027 falling far short of the African Group's expectations for institutional recognition within the UNFCCC process. The relegation to the COP report rather than a formal decision means no operational mandate, no clear follow-up mechanism, and no obligation for future COPs to continue addressing this issue, reflecting the persistent challenge Africa faces in securing the political recognition that exists in the Convention. The lack of formal COP/CMA recognition means Africa's special circumstances will not be systematically integrated into decision-making processes, guidance to financial mechanisms, or operationalisation of Paris Agreement provisions. Going forward, the African Group should strategically utilise the 2026-2027 events to build an evidence-based case documenting concrete instances where absence of formal recognition has led to inadequate support, develop specific proposals for how Africa's special circumstances should be operationalised across all workstreams (adaptation, mitigation, finance, technology, capacity-building, transparency), build coalitions to revive the push for a formal agenda item at COP31 or COP32, and ensure all African interventions across UNFCCC agenda items consistently reference the need for this recognition, creating continuous political pressure as the second Global Stocktake approaches.

5. Brief Overview of Key COP30 Action Agenda Items

Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF):

The launch of the TFFF at COP30 in Belem signals important political momentum. Securing $6.7 billion with ambitions toward $125 billion, committing to exclude coal-, oil- and gas-linked investments are all positive signals. However, structural concerns prevent a stronger rating. Its leveraged finance architecture, sovereign bond layering and donor-influenced governance raise serious questions about additionality, transparency and sovereignty. The fact that it operates outside the formal financial mechanism of the UNFCCC also risks fragmentation of multilateral finance structures.

In short, while directionally supportive of forest protection and indigenous peoples and local communities, the TFFF requires governance reform to ensure it is additional, rights-based and accountable under multilateral oversight. Finally, the scope of TFFF remains focused on tropical forests, which neglects and undermines support for boreal, temperate, subtropical and mangrove forests across the world, particularly in climate vulnerable regions like Africa.

Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT):

The IFCCT outcomes reflect meaningful but incomplete alignment with Africa's strategic position on trade–climate governance. The forum's attention to unilateral measures such as carbon border levies directly responds to concerns about climate-related trade instruments functioning as de facto protectionism. By acknowledging developing country asymmetries in capacity, competitiveness and historical responsibility, it opens space for more balanced dialogue.

That said, concerns remain, given the outcomes do not clearly embed foundational UNFCCC principles, particularly CBDR-RC, nor explicitly ringfence the forum from shaping norms outside formal negotiations. As a voluntary Presidency-led platform, the IFCCT could evolve into a soft-standard setting arena on "green trade" without binding equity safeguards. For Africa, this creates both opportunity and vulnerability: it can be used to articulate a collective position on green industrialisation and fair market access, but without coordination it risks reinforcing Northern-defined decarbonisation standards that constrain domestic value addition and policy space.

Overall, both the TFFF and IFCCT initiatives signal momentum and engagement with structural climate issues, forests and trade that are central to Africa's future. However, in both cases, governance, equity safeguards and multilateral accountability remain insufficiently secured.



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