Unanswered questions as Kenya moves to build nuclear power plant 

Kenya’s President William Ruto stated in September this year that the nuclear power plant his government wants to build in Siaya County would generate between 2,000 and 5,000MW of electricity. This means it will produce between 25 and 125 tonnes of High-Level Nuclear Waste (HLW) per year, depending on the eventual power output. This HLW, made up of spent nuclear fuel rods, needs to be stored carefully because it is extremely dangerous. In fact, HLW accounts for 95% of all radioactivity in waste produced by nuclear power stations and contains radioactive elements that remain lethal to life for anything from 300 years (cesium-137, strontium-90) to hundreds of thousands of years (plutonium-239).
A nuclear power plant. STOCK

In July last year, Kenya’s Nuclear Power and Energy Agency (NuPEA) Chief Executive Officer, Justus Wabuyabo, assured Kenyans that they had nothing to worry about because Kenya will use ‘current technology’ to store its HLW. In October, visiting representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Kenya was ‘committed’ to the safe management of its HLW. On the face of it, this all appears encouraging, but nothing could be further from the truth. 

Firstly, let’s deal with Wabuyabo’s assertions. The ‘current technology’ he is referring to is to place spent fuel rods into on-site cooling pools for about 10 years before moving them into on-site dry storage casks. The fact that this option is ‘current technology’, rather than being reassuring is, in fact, a damning testimony to the global nuclear industry’s failure to provide any safe form of long term HLW storage. 

For 80 years the global nuclear industry has been promising an effective means by which to safely manage and store HLW. It once touted reprocessing, but this is not a realistic option as it is spectacularly expensive, and even after reprocessing has occurred, quantities of HLW remain which still need to be safely stored for many thousands of years. This explains why the Union of Concerned Scientists concludes that reprocessing is ‘dangerous, dirty, and expensive’. By way of example, Japan has been trying to build a reprocessing plant for HLW since 1993. Originally planned to open in 1997, its official opening has been delayed a staggering 28 times, and it is now at least five times over budget. 

Burying HLW underground in deep geological repositories is another touted option. This is currently being attempted at Onkalo in Finland at the enormous expense of upwards of $5 billion, while the United States wasted $15 billion on its now abandoned HLW waste site at Yucca Mountain. Even if it gets buried at places like Onkalo, nobody can possibly know if it will remain safe for hundreds of thousands of years, or what the real long term financial and environmental costs will be. 

It is because these options have failed or are entirely unproven, that ‘current technology’ dictates that HLW must be kept on-site. This explains why the licensing period for dry casks has increased from 20 to 40 to 60 years, and now, according to Wabuyabo, to 100 years.  

Wabuyabo also stated that after 100 years of storage on-site, HLW would be sent overseas to the nuclear vendor that is contracted to build the nuclear power station, implying that it would therefore no-longer be Kenya’s responsibility. However, only one nuclear vendor, Rosatom, currently accepts and reprocesses HLW in this way, meaning that if this is the proposed HLW option for Kenya, then it will be forced to choose Rosatom to build the proposed nuclear power station. This has potentially very serious implications for contract pricing (what Kenyan’s will ultimately pay for their electricity), as it sets up Rosatom as the only potential bidder. 

Now we turn to the recent IAEA visit to Kenya. While the IAEA acknowledged Kenya’s commitment to the safe management of HLW, the reality is that the IAEA cannot say more because Kenya does not have a policy on HLW. All that exists is a draft ‘National Policy and Strategy for Radioactive Waste Management’ from 10 years ago. This serious limitation is why the IAEA reported that Kenya must ‘finalize the national policies for nuclear energy, fuel cycle and radioactive waste management’.  

Secondly, and equally worryingly, the IAEA mission found that the nuclear safety regulator in Kenya was not independent from government. Kenya’s 2022 Nuclear Regulatory Act establishes the Kenya Nuclear Regulatory Authority (KNRA), but the executive arm of government controls its entire Board, appointing all its members, including from the Ministry of Energy which is tasked with both promoting and regulating nuclear power, and providing all its funds. In addition, any regulations coming from KNRA are subject to executive approval. 

These concerns raise several important questions. How will the KNRA ensure that HLW stored on-site remains safe? Will Kenya be forced into a contract with Rosatom? Where will the billions of dollars come from for the long-term storage of HLW if Rosatom is not the chosen bidder? How will Kenya ensure that future generations will not be burdened by unsafe nuclear waste? How can the building of a nuclear power station start in 2027 when there is no HLW management policy in place? And how can the KNRA be trusted to work in the interests of Kenyans when it is not granted the independence? 

Neil Overy is a Consulting Researcher at Power Shift Africa

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